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This thesis aims to rework Foucault’s care of the self so that it can be understood as a 
political activity that opens the possibility for a new type of subjectivity. I develop and 
exemplify this claim through an analysis of the digital. Firstly, I focus on Foucault’s ethical 
work, which I articulate and defend by reading the care of the self through the notions of 
body, critique and limits, thus envisioning a political activity from which a new subjectivity 
can emerge. Ultimately, I understand the care of the self to be an embodied critical practice 
that aims at transgressing the limits of imposed truths and forms of life. The exercise of the 
care of the self, thus, permits for a conversion of power, which signifies the passing from a 
moment of subjection to one of subjectivation. Secondly, I employ such arguments in a more 
practical manner and analyse the digital and the subjection process it enacts. I argue that the 
digital, which I take as the exacerbated use of the internet through gadgets, is a complex tool-
like space characterized by quantification, seclusion and symbiosis, and that such notions 
arise as a result of the mechanisms that uphold the digital: discipline, mediation of discourse 
and biopower. However, my interest here is not in these characteristics and mechanisms per 
se but about the subject they create. I claim that the digital serves to exemplify the making of 
the useful and docile bodies of the twenty-first century: depoliticized in their utility and 
docility insofar as they are made to take for granted the imposition of a contingent truth. 
Thirdly, I then explore how my political reading of the care of the self serves to ‘fight’ the 
depoliticized digital subject, where I claim that our attention should be directed towards the 
mundane, the everyday, and the regaining of it through thought exercises, which allow for the 
subject to rethink that which was once taken for granted and regarded as incontestable. In 
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“My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly 
the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do.” 
(Foucault, 1997b) 
 
The interest in political theory follows, I think, primordially from a desire for an 
understanding that may lead to change. Those of us who call ourselves theorists in one way 
or another want to offer some sort of comprehension that leads to the opening of possibilities. 
And, for most of us, this yearning to do so will have come from the heavy influence of 
another theorist who came before us, and whose work we most likely stumbled upon and 
hooked us. Who we crossed paths with will, undoubtedly, have important consequences in 
the shaping of our research. A French author once wrote that names carry weight, 
expectations and assumptions. He posed that names of authors become key words in a way; 
we hear them and immediately pose ourselves in a certain world, a particular understanding. 
Authors are names loaded with meaning. In my case, coincidently, the theorist that gripped 
me happens to be the same as whose ideas I just expressed: Michel Foucault.  
To mention the name Foucault is to call upon notions such as: power, discipline, 
madness, subject, knowledge, truth, biopower, governmentality, and ethics. And, it also 
means to invite a certain degree of frustration. Foucault is not the name usually turned to 
when wanting to find possibility and change. Rather, such a name is read to call upon an all-
encompassing notion of power that (supposedly) leaves no room for resistance. This thesis, 
through an analysis of his ethical work, will work against such pessimism. I take Foucault’s 
invitation to understand his work as a toolbox, from which I will make use of certain notions 
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that I will contend offer possibility through the understanding of what we are and, in doing 
so, permit the grappling of the unoccupied space of what we could be. I will argue that 
Foucault’s ethical study of the subject through Greek and Roman ancient thought poses 
important implications for political possibility through the coming about of new 
subjectivities.  
I will further develop and flesh out such claims by offering an analysis of the digital, a 
tool-like space from which a particular subject emerges. My bringing of the digital into the 
conversation intends to offer a more practical and tangible reading of my theoretical 
reworking of Foucault’s care of the self. Moreover, I take and defend the digital to serve as 
an exemplary case of the subject today, one that results from the emphasizing of particular 
characteristics and the Foucauldian power mechanisms at play in this tool-like space. In 
doing so, I also aim to show the productive conversation that arises from bringing together 
the strands of Foucault studies and digital media literature.  
Scope of the Thesis  
Allow me to set the stage for the thesis to follow. I aim here at offering a succinct description 
of the work so as to better ground and underscore my contributions. Within Foucault’s ethical 
work, I am particularly interested in the idea of the care of the self, offered in the third 
volume of The History of Sexuality: The Care of the Self. In this text we find a historical 
tracing of such a notion, from Antiquity until early Christianity, arguing that this was an 
activity to be understood as a technique by which the subject could fashion itself. Contrary to 
critics that read it mainly as an individualistic account of the subject, I take the Foucauldian 
care of the self as inherently political. I contend that the turn to the subject of ancient thought 
is the result of his genealogical take on power, not as a renunciation, but rather, as the 
theorization of resistance. I read in the care of the self the way in which to begin 
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understanding how to ‘fight’ against power by posing the idea of the subject at the centre, one 
which has the capacity to self-transform and bring about a new type of subjectivity.  
 I offer such reworking of the care of the self by bringing to the fore the concepts of 
body, critique and limits. Ultimately, I argue that the care of the self can be read as the bodily 
critique of limits, a critical embodied exercise which aims at transgressing the limits of an 
imposed truth.  The ‘practicality’ of such activity will be evidenced by a discussion of 
thought exercises which allow for the possibility of thinking, as rethinkable, what was 
previously understood as incontestable, thus, permitting the self’s own truth over an imposed 
one. This statement, begs the question: which is the imposed truth am I trying to contest? And 
so, I take a step back from Foucault’s care of the self and into his genealogical analysis of 
power, which I showcase through the notion of the digital. In doing so I offer a reading of the 
digital that underscores its complexities, contending that from them a particular type of 
subject emerges, a depoliticized one.    
When attempting to bring together both my interests—a political reading of the care 
of the self, and making a case for the depoliticized digital subject— I require making use of 
notions and theorization outside of Foucault, such as micropolitics, politics of becoming and 
thought exercises. I do not shy away from the limitations of Foucault’s thought, but rather 
rework them through the summation of voices which complement the objective being sought. 
Ultimately, this dissertation aims to offer a reworking of Foucault’s thought into instances of 
possibility. I will argue that rethinking Foucault’s ideas on the care of the self offers a 
possibility for a new subjectivity, exemplified through an analysis of the digital.  
Current debates and Contribution  
Foucault’s thought, as mentioned, is not one to be thought as pertinent in seeking change. 
Rather, his ideas on power are deemed as totalizing, making any hope for resistance or 
9 
 
change fruitless. This reading is particularly heightened when discussing his ideas on the self: 
the Foucauldian subject is taken to hold no space from the power mechanisms that made it, 
making it futile in any attempt of contestation or transformation (Nealon, 2008; Castro, 2012; 
Allen, 2013; Castro-Gomez, 2015). Even more drastic of a reading, are those that take it that 
not only the self in Foucault cannot contest that which made it, it is not even able to actualize 
such interest (Žižek, 2002; Myers, 2013). This body of work will be addressed and discussed 
in depth in Chapter Two as one that wrongly takes Foucault’s notion of power to be lacking 
in freedom, and thus, in the possibility to resist. Due to this, they contend that a subject 
constructed in such a scenario would be one with no capacity to differentiate itself from the 
power mechanisms that made it. This is not my reading of Foucault.  
My reading of Foucault finds resonance with those that, without negating the 
problematics and limitations in his thought, do read in his work the possibility of finding 
freedom, resistance and change. Particularly, I find my thesis to be engaging with those that 
take Foucault’s work on Greek and Roman ancient thought of vital importance to emphasise 
possibility within his theorization or power (Lloyd, 1997a; Butler, 2001; Luxon, 2008; Kelly, 
2013b; Laidlaw, 2014; Sauquillo, 2017; Lemke, 2019). My thesis is housed within a reading 
of Foucauldian thought that underscores the valuable role that ethics, embedded in both 
power and freedom, had in the delineation of the subject. This is an understanding that sees 
Foucault’s work on ethics as the pertinent response towards his notion of power: from an idea 
of power that reaches even life itself, where else could resistance be understood if not from 
that same life? Moreover, I take that this body of work is one that, like me, first and foremost 
takes Foucault’s invitation to not take any truth for granted, to always question those aspects 
which seem the most objective: madness, the prison, sexuality. It is here where I find my 
thesis to contribute in a threefold way.  Firstly, contributing into furthering a positive reading 
of Foucault, I offer a novel argument into reworking the care of the self. My first contribution 
10 
 
is, then, not only defending that the subject in Foucault holds a potential for possibility, but 
that such a defence is constructed by the notions of body, critique and limits. I set apart my 
reading of the care of the self as I argue that, in order to understand it as an inherently 
political activity, we must read it as an embodied critical exercise of the transgressing of 
limits.  
My second contribution stems from my discussion of the digital and the subjection 
process it signifies. The digital I define through the exacerbated use of the internet and 
gadgets. I characterize it as a tool-like space, referencing everyday examples like sleeping 
with our phones next to us, the restless need of having the newest model of smartwatch, the 
normalized use of apps to track our steps, the blurred line between home and workspace as 
we carry with us our work commitments everywhere we go. What interests me in this part of 
my argument is offering a reading of the digital that underscores its complexities and 
ambivalences, and the theoretical possibilities that emerge as a result (Bucher, 2019). Such 
complexity is one that I emphasise through the voices of  the pioneering analysis of the 
digital (Turkle, 1984; Poster, 1990); through the relation between the digital and democracy 
(Dahlgren, 2007; Hands, 2007; Dahlberg, 2011; Tufekci, 2014b); and through the more 
radical and sceptical views with regards to the possibilities that may come from the digital 
(Gane and Beer, 2008; Harcourt, 2015; Moore and Robinson, 2016; Han, 2017; Dean, 2019). 
Each and every one of these readings of the digital offer important and valuable arguments of 
what the digital is and what it has to offer: quantification, symbiosis, seclusion, and 
empowerment. My interest, however, is not so much these characterisations per se, but rather 
what allows them to come about in the first place and what they mean for the subjection 
process.  
And so, I make use of Foucault’s genealogical thought to flesh out three key 
mechanisms of the digital. Firstly, I underscore the role of discipline and normalization 
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through the digital, evidenced by the constant surveillance that the virtual world signifies. 
Secondly, I argue for the mediation of discourse, not simply as censorship but as in the 
making and regulating of meaning. Consequently, and lastly, I take the digital as mimicking 
biopower, through the minute control of populations. Succinctly put, I argue that from the 
digital, the useful and docile bodies of the twenty-first century come about. And such utility 
and docility is characterised by its depoliticized being. The digital works to bring about a 
particular type of subject, one that sees the digital’s imposed truth as normal, objective, 
incontestable. Such is my second contribution: in the complex and ambivalent tool-like space 
that is the digital, a particular type of subject emerges, a depoliticized digital subject.  
As I bring together the two previous arguments—my reworking of the care of the self 
as the bodily critique of limits and the depoliticized digital subject—my third contribution 
comes to the fore. To bridge both arguments, I recognize a limitation in Foucault’s work 
when it comes to offering a practical take on the care of the self and, thus, I turn to the work 
of Merleau-Ponty, read through Marina Garces, and William Connolly. By such additions I 
am able to then offer a more tangible comprehension of the bodily critique of limits, 
actualized through thought exercises that centre the body in the practice of critiquing limits. I 
work from the idea of ‘the politics of becoming’ in underscoring the value of thought 
exercises (Connolly, 1999) that allow for the questioning and contestation of what was 
previously taken for granted. This idea, while fleshed out through the authors I introduce to 
‘solve’ Foucault’s limitations, is one which still finds resonance and place in Foucauldian 
ethics. The care of the self is an activity that theoretically culminated through the idea of 
askēsis, an activity framed by the exercises of meditation and training, aspects which allowed 
for the subject to come into its own truth or, in other words, to contest the imposed truth. In 
this way, my third contribution becomes a furthering of Foucault’s work on ethics through 
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the fleshing out of the possibility that thought exercises allow in the contesting of imposed 
truths and the bringing about of new subjectivities.   
From the contributions just outlined, I would like to further offer an important 
implication. From my political reading of the care of the self, understood through the bodily 
critique of limits, the idea of conversion of power will emerge. I will contend that, given the 
great importance that critique plays in a political care of the self, such an activity, much like 
critique, signifies a conversion of power. Critique in Foucault is an exercise of questioning 
that which governs us and such questioning carries within it a refusal. Critique is not only an 
enquiry into that which made us but, rather, the phrasing of the intrigue is already stating a 
dismissal: “how not to be governed like that?” (Foucault, 2007b); in other words, “how not to 
be subjected like that?, how not to be made like?, how not to be limited like that?”. So, as I 
defend the care of the self to be inherently political, I propose the idea of conversion of power 
insofar as it poses a question which, in its very phrasing, refuses subjection. Conversion of 
power exemplified from the passing of the subject that was made to one that made itself; the 
passing from a subjection to a subjectivation process. However, the conclusion that can stem 
from such conversion, and the one I offer, I will state since now, is not one of certainty in 
answers. The struggle to pass from subjection to subjectivation is not one to be clear and 
delineated, but it is one that rather explores how, through the underscoring of critique, we can 
advance possibility and new subjectivities.  
I take my work to be speaking, ultimately, to post-structuralist theory in conjunction 
with Foucault studies literature and digital media literature. Post-structuralism, broadly 
understood, continues to grow and further enhance its theoretical possibilities, and within it 
the work of Foucault persists to be current and important. My thesis helps further this 
conversation as I offer a reworking of one of his vital ideas, the care of the self, and defend it 
to signify the possibility of a new subjectivity. Also, my thesis helps to emphasize and grow 
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digital media literature in the awareness that such is an aspect of our lives that has changed 
forever, and I make a case for better understanding it through an analysis of the subjection 
process it entails, and in this way offering a way to reimagine the subject from within.  
Constructing the Object of Study  
I would like to use the remainder of this introduction to address the way that this dissertation 
came about through the approaches that informed it. The reader might have already noticed 
that the project to be advanced in the following chapters are aspects to be constructed; none 
of the notions that I have presented up until now have been traced as already existing ‘out 
there’. And, indeed, the following chapters will take time to offer accounts of 
problematizations, instances of constructing the object of research, of bringing to the fore the 
possibility of offering being to be necessarily thought – what does this mean?  
Foucault would shy away from any sort of categorization or label. He refused to 
answer if he considered himself a philosopher, a theorist, a historian, or something else. And 
he would also show hesitation in classifying his thought within a particular school of thought. 
Foucault’s thought was always oriented towards one main objective: understanding the 
present, being able to offer an ontology of that which we are today (Foucault, 2007b). The 
way in which this objective is sought will change throughout his work1 but ultimately it is 
always there.   
Often deemed as a structuralist, given his emphasis on discourse, his work is actually 
more fitting in the post-structuralist school; he was not so much interested in the existence of 
the structure but how such a structure was made. As Paul Rabinow explains, while Foucault 
indeed was “caught up in some of the structuralist vocabulary of the moment, he never 
intended to isolate discourse from the social practices that surrounded it” (Rabinow, 1984, p. 
 
1 A comprehensive review of Foucault’s thought will be offered in the beginning of the first chapter.  
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10). Rather his enquiry was always focussed on a core question: how does discourse 
function? - and in the posing of this question he intended to isolate techniques of power in the 
places where such analysis is rarely done (Rabinow, 1984, p. 10). When, however, we try to 
offer a definition of what Foucault meant by discourse we run into a problem, for such a 
notion is left frustratingly unclear by Foucault, mutating in between his stages of thought 
(Howarth, 2000, p. 48). It is in his last stage of thought, the one that occupies the interest of 
this thesis, where, while he maintains a “commitment to a non-reductionist conception of 
discourse, he links it to non-discursive practices and political strategies surrounding 
sexuality” (Howarth, 2000, p. 78). In the introductory volume to The History of Sexuality, he 
says:  
Indeed, it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together. […]. We must 
make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both 
an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point 
of resistance, and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and 
produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile 
and makes it possible to thwart it. (Foucault, 1978, pp. 100–101)  
Indeed, this is not a precise definition, but is one that serves the purpose of this dissertation. 
What I want to underscore here is how this definition of discourse is one that brings to the 
fore power and knowledge and how these concepts result in the coming about of regimes of 
truth and the position that the subject will have within this matrix (Howarth, 2000, p. 79). Not 
only that, but it also helps to bring into conversation the drive that Foucault had in his 
research and work as one which does not accept any external position of certainty; there are 
no universals in Foucault’s work, there is historicity and there is context. To put it in other 
terms, our world, Foucault would agree, is contingent; there is no possibility of full fixation, 
even of the subject. One of Foucault’s infamous phrases “the death of man” (Foucault, 1989) 
speaks to this. Not wanting to argue that man itself had ceased to exist, he rather argued that a 
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particular type of subject had died, made by the particular context and historicity of its time, 
which in themselves worked through contingent power mechanisms. 
What does it mean for the doing of research to have such a world view? Foucault 
went through different approaches and methodologies (which I will present in the next 
chapter), but it is by his later work that he was able to pose and verbalize more clearly his 
guiding principle in doing research. Not that it should be seen as a correction from the 
previous nor as an improvement, but as often happens when doing research, it becomes easier 
to bring something to the fore after many attempts. Ultimately, Foucault reaches a point 
where it is not only the world that he understands as not having certainty, but also the object 
of research itself. In other words, to theorize and speak of a world with no universal grounds 
upon which to stand, this has to mean that the object of study is, also, uncertain, contextual, 
constructed. 
The way, or name, by which Foucault will refer to this aspect of his research is 
problematization, where the researcher finds themself constructing the object of study. The 
object of study in this view is not pre-existent, but as Glynos and Howarth explain, it is being 
constituted through the unearthing of the discursive and non-discursive practices that bring 
the former into play as a problem. It “is the constitution of a problem (explanandum) which 
invariably results in the transformations of perceptions and understandings” (Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007, p. 34).   
It is in his penultimate piece of work where he officially introduces such an idea. 
Foucault explains his ‘new’ approach to research, as one that aims to fulfil the objective of 
offering a contextualized history of experiences (here, particularly, of sexuality), and so he 
must first offer an account of who is living such experiences. In other words, he must 
construct an account of man at that moment. He posits:  
16 
 
It was a matter of analysing, not behaviours or ideas, nor societies and their 
“ideologies”, but the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, 
necessarily, thought—and the practices on the basis of which these problematizations 
are formed. (Foucault, 1985, pp. 11–12) 
Here, we must be cautious and not understand problematizations to simply “represent 
concrete (political, economic, etc.) problems; [rather] they refer to creative work defining the 
conditions under which certain possible answers may be ´constructed´ or ´created´” (Lemke, 
2019, p. 358). It is in this manner that the project for the remaining chapters of History of 
Sexuality becomes the problematization of the desiring man, or, how different moments in 
time have constructed and understood various ways to approach a subject that experiences 
sexuality (also contextual and historical).  
In the last interview before his death, Foucault talked about his research approach, not 
as one that claimed to be methodical with the purpose of rejecting all but one answer,  but 
rather, more of an approach of, precisely, problematization or “the development of a domain 
of acts, practices, and thoughts that seem to me to pose problems for politics” (Foucault, 
1997c, p. 114). Throughout his work this is palpable; he analysed madness, delinquency, 
sexuality, all examples of problems for politics, all of them dependent on understanding 
political structures in certain ways, but at the same time, it cannot be assumed that politics 
will solve them. Foucault goes on to say:  
In madness, delinquency, and sexuality, I emphasized a particular aspect each time: 
the establishment of a certain objectivity, the development of a politics and a 
government of the self, and the elaboration of an ethics and a practice in regard to 
oneself. (Foucault, 1997c, pp. 116–117) 
The establishment of a certain objectivity, or being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought, are 
I think the key aspects in understanding the use, or role, of problematization in Foucault. The 
possibility of being the actual ‘being’ establishing itself as a supposed objectivity where 
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contingency becomes secluded and hidden, being then presenting itself as natural, given, 
taken for granted. For this seclusion, or depoliticization, to happen three aspects intertwine: 
games of truth, relations of power, and forms of relation to oneself and to others (Foucault, 
1997c, p. 117), three aspects which, as we will see as this thesis advances, are precisely the 
pillars of Foucault’s work. 
Moreover, and what is vitally important in Foucault’s thought, is that if 
problematization allows for the underscoring of how a possibility became thought as a given, 
it must also then offer the conditions for different responses to be offered. In other words, if 
by problematizing we underscore and aim to show that a given is not so, by doing so and 
drawing out the mechanisms, circumstances and contexts which led to the establishment of a 
certain objectivity, we are also then implying the possibility to be thought differently: 
[Problematization] develops the conditions in which possible responses can be given; 
it defines the elements that will constitute what the different solutions attempt to 
respond to. This development of a given into a question, this transformation of a 
group of obstacles and difficulties into problems to which the diverse solutions will 
attempt to produce a response, this is what constitutes the point of problematization 
and the specific work of thought. (Foucault, 1997c, p. 118)  
A given into a question. In other words, transforming the given of seeing supposed objective 
fields of knowledge, like madness, delinquency, sexuality into questions of how each of these 
fields of experience shape the subject. The world, as the object of research, is not “out there” 
ready to be seized.  Rather, for Foucault and Foucauldians alike, it is to be constructed. 
Understanding the world and research in such a way, opened Foucault to many criticisms. 
Maybe the most common in this regard was the supposed relativism upon which his work 
supposedly falls, relativism in the understanding and relativism in the steps to follow. As we 
will see in the coming chapters, this alleged relativism meets another popular critique which 
Foucault faces, namely, the supposed totalizing effect of his analysis of power. A supposed 
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conclusion that, power being everywhere, leaves no room for resistance, theorized upon a 
relativistic ground. What can come from such a scenario his critics ask? My aim in this 
dissertation is to show that, not without its problematic aspects, the ground of the uncertain is 
an extremely productive site for the envisaging of theoretical research and resistance.   
So, this thesis offers a problem driven approach, in which I will construct the object 
of study, not claiming to have found it “out there”, but bringing it into being through the 
uncertain and contingent. I place myself upon this understanding of doing research for it is 
here that I find where possibility can arise. By problematizing the subject, the care of the self 
and the digital in such a way, I signal to the always open space that calls us to always have 
something to do. Foucault said, following the epigraph that opens this Introduction, that his 
supposed pessimism is not to conclude that nothing can be done, but rather, on the contrary, 
as knowing that there is always something to be done, inviting us to seize that space.  
Structure of the Thesis 
This dissertation aims at just that through three main contributions. First, it provides a 
political reading of the care of the self through the bodily critique of limits which makes way 
for a new type of subjectivity. Then, a critique of the current subject will follow, by arguing 
for an analysis of the digital as a toollike space that serves a particular subjection process in 
upholding the hegemonic discourse. Lastly, I will bring the previous two contributions into a 
third argument of how to imagine the new subjectivity in more practical and tangible terms 
through the digital, by bringing to the fore a defence for thought exercises. The thesis 
develops as follows.  
Chapter One starts by offering an overview of Foucault’s thought in order to position 
the reader in relation to the texts, and to offer the appropriate context. After doing so, I 
concentrate on giving a full rounded account of the care of the self. I do so, firstly, by 
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presenting and fleshing out in a chronological manner the ideas that would construct this part 
of Foucault’s work. I offer a comprehensive account of the project titled The History of 
Sexuality. What we take from this first chapter is that Foucault read the care of the self 
through three distinct historical periods, one of which, referred to as the golden age, would be 
the one where Foucault would concentrate on building his understanding of the care of the 
self.   
Chapter Two begins by offering a defence of Foucault’s work on the subject and 
Greek and Roman Ancient thought. I open the chapter by discussing the main critiques that 
have been made towards the care of the self, which I will spend the totality of that chapter 
arguing against. I then move onto a discussion of the political in Foucault, given that if I am 
to offer a political reading as part of his work, I must situate what is meant by ‘political’ and 
how this fits into my aim for the chapter. The rest of the chapter argues for the underscoring 
of three main aspects: the body, critique, and limits, as the concepts that when brought to the 
fore allow for the care of the self to be understood politically, thus opening up the possibility 
of a new subjectivity. The chapter concludes by accepting that this part of Foucault’s thought 
is not finished, and that a clear and practical understanding of the care of the self is still to be 
fleshed out, but there is a particular concept (askēsis) to which I will return to salvage my 
argument from the limitations faced here.  
Chapter Three aims at fleshing out the exemplary case that I will make use of to 
characterize our subjection process today. And so, the chapter dives into constructing an 
understanding of the digital as a tool-like space, which serves as a paradigmatic case of the 
discourse which today governs us. I make use of current digital media literature to underscore 
the various concerning aspects that the digital holds and, to add to such existing literature, I 
emphasize that the worrying aspects of the digital arise primarily because they signify a 
particular type of subject, a depoliticized one. 
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Chapter Four builds on the previous chapter to draw out the mechanisms which 
enable and make the depoliticized subject. While chapter three offers an argument for 
understanding the digital in its complexity and ambivalence, the fourth brings to the fore the 
particular mechanisms found at play in the subjection process. Here, as I delineated before, I 
make use of Foucauldian ideas, which will further strengthen the argument for the need of 
care of the self. Firstly, I draw out the aspect of panoptic discipline, the constant surveillance 
we know we face within the digital. I follow this by contending that the digital holds a 
mediation of discourse, understood as in a mediation of meaning: the digital regulates 
meaning, ours included. Lastly, and as a consequence of the previous two points, I argue for 
the aspect of biopower, as the digital comes to control entire populations through the creation 
of useful and docile bodies.  
Chapter Five brings together both sides of the argument, as once again I foreground the 
pillars that allowed me to make the political reading of the care of the self – the body, critique 
and limits – signalling how these concepts should be understood in a more practical manner. I 
argue for the body to be seen as the site of resistance, where critique is understood as the 
exercise of resistance, while the limits (or transgressing of them) constitute the objective of 
resistance. Here, I emphasize that Foucault’s thought shows limitations, and so from his 
reading of askēsis - that which lives in between the poles of meditation and training - I invite 
the reader to imagine the productive possibility of mundane thought exercises, and the way 
we can regain the everyday through them. I signal to the potential that rests upon making 
questionable that which is thought as certain or, in other words, to bring about a new 
subjectivity through the living of our own truth instead of the imposed one.   
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I. Chapter One: Foucault’s Care of the Self  
To hear the name Michel Foucault will immediately ignite certain ideas: “the death of man”, 
“power is everywhere”, “where there is power, there is resistance”, and adjectives like 
relativism, totalizing, and despair are probable to also be triggered by said French name. 
These ideas and adjectives, while representing wrong understandings of his work, do in fact 
signal to the pillars in Foucault’s texts: the subject, power-resistance and how to better 
understand the relation between them. Even if he is thought primarily as a theorist of power, 
the reality is that his work was always focused on the subject and its interplay with power 
(Foucault, 1982); whether it is through an analysis of scientific knowledge, or through 
disciplinary power mechanisms, or through the subject itself and its possibility to self-
transform.  
Like any thinker, Foucault’s thought is not without limitations and criticisms, 
however as I will argue in the next chapter, I take most of these criticisms as not grounded 
upon a fair or right reading of that which they intend to critique. For example, there is a 
common line of critique2 which argues for a supposed lack of continuity in Foucault’s work 
when, rather, the objective was to simply offer different angles and new perspectives. Those 
that critique Foucault, never offering actual solutions, seem to ignore the fact that he himself 
never intended to offer solutions.  He was vocal about this point, never aiming to offer steps 
or recipe like solutions to his theorizations, he never wanted to conclude a “this is what we 
now do” thread in his analysis. Rather, Foucault himself classified his work always as a 
“toolbox” (Foucault cited in O’Farrell, 2005, p. 50) for those interested to grab as they need 
in the moment they need it. Foucault envisioned for his analyses, his problematizations, his 
genealogies, his thought, to ignite thought, raise critique, and formulate questions oriented 
 
2 A reading and discussion of Foucault’s critics will be fleshed out in the following chapter.  
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towards the underscoring of contingency understood as the impossibility of full fixation. 
Plainly put, if anything, I take Foucault as wanting to ignite the simple but powerful 
realization that the mechanisms that make us into subjects are never objective, never given or 
“natural”, but rather they are always contextual, they could have always been different and, 
thus, the possibility to resist and reimagine them is always present.  
At the core of this dissertation is a rethinking of Foucault’s care of the self into a 
political reading that ignites a new type of subjectivity. I will offer what critiques this part of 
his work faced, and argue against them. However, before being able to achieve both of those 
objectives, which will be the subject of Chapter Two, I must first offer the necessary 
contextual information and background into Foucault’s last stage of thought, which is 
precisely what this chapter will do. Firstly, I will present a brief overview of the entirety of 
Foucault’s thought so as to better situate my particular interest. Secondly, I will go into depth 
in Foucault’s interest in ethics, offering an account of the core texts of this moment, and how 
he moved from a focus of understanding sexuality as a contextualized lived experience to an 
interest in antiquity’s activity for self-transformation.  
Foucault’s Thought, An Overview  
Foucault’s thought can be divided into three stages: archaeology, genealogy and 
governmentality or ethics. This is not a demarcation that he himself made, but in retrospect is 
how most people read Foucault. His archaeological work was one in which his main concern 
was the analysis of subjection through the so-called objective sciences or, in other words, the 
relation between subject and knowledge. The way in which this part of his thought has been 
understood, and hence it being named as archaeology, is through the signalling of historical 
breaks in the ways in which subject and knowledge are related. At this point he did not care 
to give reasons as to why such breaks and shifts happened, that would come in the next stage. 
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His second stage, genealogy, perhaps the most famous, is where we find his focus and the 
analysis of the relation between subject and power. It is through his genealogical analysis of 
power that he goes deeper into the previously superficially signalled breaks, and this interest 
goes beyond merely signalling such breaks but, rather, seeks to explain them. Lastly, he turns 
to ethics, also known as his governmentality stage, where he situates the subject and the 
relation to itself as the centre of study. I read this last part of Foucault’s work as that where he 
wanted to understand how the subject can enact the possibility of self-transformation as 
resistance.  
Archaeology  
The first stage of thought in Foucault’s work was the most ‘superficial’ in the sense that what 
he had as an objective was to ‘simply’ point towards historical breaks or shifts. To point 
towards historical breaks in archaeology meant to study the underneath of knowledge, or, in 
other words, “the conditions upon which different discursive formations arise”  (Sauquillo, 
2001, p. 21). Simply put, there was a desire to understand the underneath of knowledge as a 
means to signal the ways in which different historical times drew the dividing lines between 
truth and falsehood. It is in this way that Foucault sets out to be a non-transcendental thinker; 
there will be for him no one discourse, no one truth, no one rationality. For Foucault, each 
historical time will have its own regime of truth and in this initial stage of his thought, he 
traces three particular ones. By the name of  epistemes he will be referring to “the condition 
of possibility of knowledge from a certain époque” (Sauquillo, 2001).   
Episteme is that which sets about the possibility of discursive formation: that which 
demarcates what can—and cannot—be thought. By setting about these possibilities, 
epistemes ultimately dictate the relation between man and knowledge. The three analysed by 
Foucault are:  Renaissance (XVI century), Classic (XVII century) and Modern (XVIII 
century) (Sauquillo, 2001, pp. 72–73). During the Renaissance, the construction of 
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knowledge is understood through an order of likeness, where the world is comprehended 
through symbols and signs, including man himself. The Classic episteme replaces the simple 
likeness with representation: signs are now seen as deceiving, and we cannot ever truly know 
the world but rather only its representation. Lastly, in modernity, if all is a representation, 
there must be someone in charge of such representations, and so man takes the role of the 
representing subject.   
The tracing of these three epistemes underscore how the role that knowledge has is to 
not only make us understand reality in different ways, but actually constructs reality in 
different ways. In other words, it is an analysis of the role played by what we know as 
scientific knowledge in the subjection process. It is not so much about who the renaissance, 
classical or modern man is but what made the renaissance, classical and modern man possible 
in the first place. And so, this is precisely to what Foucault was referring when he uttered the 
phrase “man is dead”, not a negation of the subject, but rather, the underscoring of the idea 
that contingency and historicity construct not only what surrounds man, but also man himself.  
There is, for Foucault, no essentiality in the subject. Rather, subjects are always a contingent 
social and historical construction. This is better exemplified in his idea of subject positions 
within a discourse, meaning the “places of enunciation that subjects can occupy in speaking, 
acting and thinking” (Howarth, 2018, p. 384). Having brought to the fore the falsehood of 
thinking of truth and rationality as one cohesive block, it remained to study and analyse the 
how and why of such contingency. This is not to mean that by analysing the how and why 
would then allow for the control and manoeuvring of contingency, but for the understanding 





During his second stage of thought, Foucault would offer what remains to this day one of the 
most intriguing and controversial analyses of power. Having set out the breaks in between 
discursive formations, it remained to offer the mechanisms of such breaks, genealogy would 
have to go deeper than archaeology. It is no longer about only signalling to different regimes 
of truth, but more so towards what explains the changes between them through an analysis of 
the relation between praxis and knowledge, and power in between:   
Genealogy means to develop an analysis that focuses on and distinguishes power and 
different territories in which specific knowledges and powers that make up capitalist 
societies arise. A genealogy of power, then, looks into the history of the conditions that 
allowed the formation and development of both knowledge and power mechanisms; it 
is a discrete look towards the truth that permitted the establishment of the complex 
relations between the social world and its representations. (Varela and Alvarez Uria, 
1999, p. 360, my translation) 
Genealogy, then, can be said to be the method of analysis that first and foremost, 
teaches to not take anything for granted. Genealogy is that which invites us to question why 
our society is set up in a certain manner, which is never accidental. Genealogy highlights that 
it is precisely one of power’s most powerful mechanisms to make us believe in the supposed 
accidental or natural character of each society’s regime of truth and the practices that stem 
from there. The key piece of work that Foucault produces in this period was his analysis of 
the penitentiary system in Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1995). In this text Foucault offers 
a genealogical account of the passing from a sovereign type of power to a disciplinary one, an 
explanation that stems from the posing of the question: prisons, why do we take them to be 
the natural and only form of punishment (Foucault, 1995)? And so, in a meticulous manner, it 
is shown how the prison responded to particular needs, to the specific needs of a political 
economy in a given context. It is not that the prison is a given that has always been. It is in 
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this manner that Foucault culminates his ideas on power, as one that goes beyond any 
juridical or State conceptualization, beyond the idea of commodity and one that negates 
power as solely repressive.  
This stage of thought began with his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, later 
published under the title The Discourse on Language (Foucault, 1971c), where he traced the 
production and coercion of discourse and truth in our society. As he analyses the coercion of 
discourse, we can begin to see the first hints towards an idea of power that is not found in the 
State or juridical figures, as it was typically thought. In this speech which marked the start of 
his genealogical stage, he would also offer a glimpse into an understanding of power that 
ultimately negated a uniquely repressive facet. So, from discourse as the starting point, 
through the prison, there is in this moment three takeaways from Foucault’s notion on power. 
Firstly, he will take the notion of power from the almost exclusive juridical and state 
conceptualization in which it had been placed. Power is more than the State. Secondly, power 
is not a commodity; it is not something that can be passed in between individuals in a zero-
sum game. And last, but certainly not least, power is not only repressive, as typically thought. 
If power were only repressive, Foucault posed, who would obey it? Power has a productive 
quality; power creates, makes and allows (Brown, 2008).  
Ultimately what emerges from this genealogical stage is the triad: knowledge-power-
truth, three terms so closely tied together in Foucault’s thought that one must be cautious of 
not confusing them for synonyms. Power as a strategic relation of forces, as that which can 
embrace everything. Truth as product of discursive formations that possess their own political 
economy (Sauquillo, 2017, p. 153), which means it cannot be verified, demonstrated or 
recuperated (Chignola, 2018, p. 21); truth is never without nor outside power. And 
knowledge as that which stems from the interplays of power and truth. The conclusion of 
Foucault’s genealogical stage is the creation of useful and docile bodies through the power-
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truth-knowledge triad. And so, from the conclusion of a subjected body stems the interest of 
how that body could also be possibility. The matter of how subjects are governed and govern 
themselves through the production of truth becomes vital (Chignola, 2018, p. 21). And thus, 
enter Foucault’s governmentality stage.  
Ethics 
This last stage is one that receives the most criticism in Foucault’s work. Not even the name 
of the stage has a consensus: governmentality, ethical stage, biopower, biopolitics. This last 
stage is read as being disconnected from the previous ones, given the ‘abrupt’ turn to Greek 
thought and the heavy focus on ethics, a notion which Foucault took to understand as the 
ability that the self had to fashion itself. As we will see shortly, readings of Antiquity, from 
the Greek through the Hellenistic-Stoic period to Christianity, will be core components of his 
thought at this time. Through the juxtaposition of such historical stages, he will offer the idea 
of an ethical subject not as one that is free of restraints to do as it may in its constitution, but 
as one which depends deeply on the ideas of epimeleia heautou (care of the self) and gnōthi 
seauton (to know oneself), ideas which will be developed in the remainder of the chapter.  
In my reading of Foucault, the exploration of an ethical subject in his last stage of 
thought is one that is done so not in negation of his previous stages but, rather, to accentuate 
them. In a way we can see in Foucault’s work on The History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1978, 
1985, 1986) the synthetization of archaeology and genealogy into problematization. We have 
seen from the introduction that Foucault’s research was problem driven, where the object of 
study was not seen as already existing, but rather as one to be constructed. This becomes 
extremely clear in this last stage of work, and such clarity is not through a dismissal of 
previous stages but, rather by the bringing of them together and closer. In reading the 
volumes of The History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1978, 1985, 1986) one can see the 
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archaeological signalling to the breaks in our understanding of sexuality, a genealogical 
account of the power mechanisms that upheld the breaks and, finally, the making of these 
instances into a problematization of the contextualization of subjection through sexual 
experience.   
The emphasis in this chapter—and in this dissertation—given to Foucault’s ethics, 
should not be understood as a negation of his previous work. On the contrary, the emphasis 
on the ethical subject is done so precisely because of the ideas and analyses that preceded it. 
One cannot understand The History of Sexuality without signalling to the breaks in the sex 
narrative—archaeological work—nor without trying to understand those breaks through the 
underscoring of the micro workings of power in such narrative—genealogical analysis. 
Foucault’s governmentality is thus deeply dependent on its previous stages.3  
This has been an admittedly brief introduction to Foucault’s thought, but I trust it has 
been enough to situate the reader for the analysis that will now follow. Thus, it is important 
for the reader to know that Foucault’s thought has three stages which build up on one 
another, and that more than power what was truly the interest of these stages was subjection; 
how the subject was created and made into a certain way by different mechanisms. It is in the 
last stage where it seems as if the subject carries more of an importance because, this time, 
the analysis is not so much on how it is subjected but, rather, on subjectivation: on how the 
subject can create and transform itself. Let us now fully flesh this out.  
Sexuality as Experience, and the Self that Experiences It  
It is said that Foucault began to write the introductory volume to The History of Sexuality on 
the same day that he finished writing Discipline and Punish. This volume, titled The Will to 
 
3 A more in-depth account of both the criticisms and defence that Foucault’s governmentality stage 
receive will be outlined in the 98next chapter.  
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Knowledge and published in 1976, is seen to mark the move from genealogy to his study of 
governmentality. The premise of the book is simple: we have come to believe a false premise, 
we have mistakenly come to understand sexuality as something which is repressed in modern 
society but, signals Foucault, the reality is that we are constantly talking about sex, even to 
the extent that we are actually being forced to confess our sexuality without realizing it. This 
constant talk of our sexual lives is not to conclude that we are living our sexuality freely and 
openly but, rather, that sexual discourse is constructed in a way which allows for the 
thorough control and monitoring of one of the fundamental human activities. It is in this text, 
then, where Foucault can clearly formulate what he has been concerned with all along: the 
relation between regimes of truth and the subject, a relation analysed through power. 
As he brings to the fore how an uncontested notion of a repressed sexuality is actually 
actively working to make a certain type of subject, Foucault here is then bringing to the fore 
precisely how the role of truth is not innocent, but very much a mechanism of subjection. The 
idea of sexuality here serves a purpose and it is not to be understood that the idea of sexuality 
in itself interests Foucault. The idea of sexuality here is to be seen as a dispositif serving two 
aspects, says Miguel Morey:  
[…] one has to do with the relationship between subject and truth; the other concerns 
the nexus that is established between sex and knowledge—and, behind them both, we 
find, a same figure in exercise: power. (Morey, 2014, p. 391) 
 
Foucault himself states that the objective of the project, at this point at least,4 was to analyse a 
“certain form of knowledge regarding sex, not in terms of repression or law, but in terms of 
power” (Foucault, 1978, p. 92). And it is in this way, that we find the culmination of 
 
4 The objective of the project changes drastically in between the first and second volume of HS and I 
will outline this shortly.  
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Foucault’s work on power, for it is through the dispositif of sexuality that an idea of power as 
omnipresent and productive strategic forces is taken a step further, into biopower. 
Foucault offers a schematization of power as follows: one, it is not something to be 
acquired; two, it is exercised from innumerable points; three, the relations that power creates 
are immanent and have a directly productive role; four, power comes from below; five, power 
relations are both intentional and non-subjective—this does not mean that it results from the 
choice or decision of an individual subject; and, lastly, where there is power, there is 
resistance (Foucault, 1978, pp. 94–95). Ultimately these characteristics will nourish an idea 
of power that is everywhere, which is “not to mean that it comes from everywhere, but that it 
embraces everything” (Foucault, 1978, p. 93). This conceptualization of power, as one that 
can embrace everything, that starts to signal it as the infinite control of populations, shows us 
that the project at hand is not so much about sexuality and its legal regulations and its 
repression, but more so we are facing a story about the hows and whys regarding our 
discourse on sexuality and underscoring the fact that we have taken them for granted.  
This analysis of power through sexuality is one that mimics in many ways the analysis 
offered in Discipline and Punish. In the key text of his genealogical stage, Foucault offers an 
analysis of different models of power exemplified by illustrations of how cities would act 
towards cases of different diseases, whether it be leprosy or pests (Foucault, 1995, pp. 195–
228). In this way Foucault starts to build a notion of power which goes beyond the juridical 
structure and brings together corporal control through inclusion and exclusion mechanisms. 
In The Will to Knowledge, sexuality will take this analysis even further, insofar that in this 
scenario we are presented with a power that works in the minute management of populations, 
even through our biological needs and composition. This is the key aspect that Foucault 
wished to make: it is not that sexuality is repressed, but that this discourse of repression 
serves as a cover for how deeply controlled this aspect of our lives actually is.  
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As we move into the nineteenth century the ‘new’ forms of sexuality that arise further 
prove this control. Homosexuality, the child’s sexuality and non-monogamous relations, 
mimic again the argument made of how different penal economies would disguise themselves 
as more humane, but, in reality, the analysis offered by Foucault is to not think of these new 
frontiers of sexuality as to signify a better sense of freedom because they simply are further 
forms of control by bringing about the discourse of perversion (Foucault, 1978, pp. 36–49). 
This analysis corresponds to that found in Discipline and Punish, where we see the sovereign 
power mutate from corporal to disciplinary punishment, a move that should not be taken to 
signify a humanization from power precisely because the change in punishment responds to 
the ‘need’ for effectiveness from the penal economy of the time. The parallels to the analysis 
of sexuality are then in understanding that the coming about of different terrains of sexuality, 
far from signifying the exercise of choice and freedom, are constructed in a way which serves 
the ultimate control of the population through sexuality. And so, the objective of this 
introductory volume comes to life. The objective of analysing regimes of truth and the 
subject through the underscoring of power, by the use of sexuality as a dispostif, comes to 
show that sexuality far from being repressed is more thoroughly controlled, meaning that the 
subject is then made and adjusted in its specificity. The consequences and implications of this 
argument, however, are not discussed in this introductory volume. And then an eight-year 
silence followed.  
 It wouldn’t be until 1984 when the continuation to the introductory volume to The 
History of Sexuality would be published and, in fact, this year saw the publication of not only 
volume two but also volume three: The Use of Pleasure (Foucault, 1985) and The Care of the 
Self (Foucault, 1986), respectively. However, these publications would cause quite a bit of 
confusion, which Foucault anticipated and addressed. The objective of the project set out in 
the first volume seems to have changed in the second and a gap is found between them. And 
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so, Foucault offers a clarification in order to introduce the second volume. The idea for the 
project, we are told, was for it to be a questioning of sexuality understood as an ahistorical 
constant (Foucault, 1985, p. 4), which meant to offer “a history of the experience of sexuality, 
where experience is understood as the correlation between fields of knowledge, types of 
normativity and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture” (Foucault, 1985, p. 4). However, 
after the ending of the introduction he deems that there is a key aspect missing from any 
theorization that would allow him to construct such a history, the form of subjectivity, what 
Foucault would reference as a theorization of the desiring man, a theorization of man as an 
object of itself. And so, the perceived change in between volumes happens due to the need for 
a re-focusing of attention and to: 
[…] analyse the practices by which individuals were led to focus their attention on 
themselves, to decipher, recognize, and acknowledge themselves as a subjects of desire, 
bringing into play between themselves and themselves a certain relationship that allows 
them to discover, in desire, the truth of their being, be it natural or fallen. In short, with 
this genealogy the idea was to investigate how individuals were led to practice, on 
themselves and on others, a hermeneutics of desire, a hermeneutics of which their 
sexual behaviour was doubtless the occasion, but certainly not the exclusive domain. 
(Foucault, 1985, p. 5)  
In other words, there is a realization that if a history of the experience of sexuality is to 
be accounted for this can only be achieved by also offering an account of the subject that 
lives such experience, and that not only lives it but is made through it. In order to do so, 
Foucault will go back in between the fifth and third century and analyse the experience of 
sexuality and the desiring man through four axes: “the relation to one’s body, the relation to 
one’s wife, the relation to boys, and the relation to truth” (Foucault, 1985, p. 32).  The 
analysis of these four instances will be done by bringing to the fore the interplay of 
aphrodisia and chrēsis: pleasure and use. The experience of the aphrodisiac comes about by 
the linking of acts, pleasures and desires in a dynamic relationship (Foucault, 1985, p. 43), 
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and when understood alongside the aspect of use, we reach chrēsis aphrodisiōn which has a 
threefold strategy: need, time and status. (Foucault, 1985, p. 54). This analysis serves the 
ultimate purpose of underscoring a concept that will become of the utmost importance for 
Foucault: the techniques of the self, one which we will be returning to throughout the fleshing 
out of the thesis.  
Ultimately, what underlies the analysis of this second volume of The History of 
Sexuality is an understanding of how the techniques by which man focuses attention on 
itself—dietetics, economics, and erotics—are intertwined with the role of truth. What is 
brought to the fore is how the conjunction of these techniques posed a regime of truth in the 
making of a subject, one which will underscore the role of austerity5 in and through the 
sexual act. Dietetics signals to the technique of the right time, where the body become the 
concern of austerity. Economics understands austerity through the moderation of the privilege 
that man has over his wife. And, lastly, austerity in relation to erotics meant the renunciation 
of all physical relation with boys (Foucault, 1985, pp. 251–252). In other words, these three 
techniques demarcate the three axes previously stated: the relation to one’s body, to one’s 
wife and towards boys; three axes tied by a fourth, their relation to the axis of truth. The role 
of truth is that which allows for the idea of mastery, or self-mastery, to come about: dietetics 
as the mastery of oneself; economics as mastery of the idea of authority in relation to the 
conjugal relation, and mastery towards the more carnal desires towards boys (Foucault, 1985, 
p. 212).6 
 
5 An aspect which will be of great importance in the care of the self. 
6 This last aspect is interesting, as it is the technique which allows for the idea of mastery to be not just 
important to the desiring subject, but also in the boy’s point of view. The idea of austerity was also to 
be performed by the boy in not yielding to others and achieving self-mastery (Foucault 1985, 212).  
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It is in such a way that Foucault concluded that the analysis of sexual behaviour in 
Greek thought throughout the 5th and 3rd centuries BC is one that first and foremost 
underscored the idea of self-mastery: 
We have seen how sexual behaviour was constituted, in Greek thought, as a domain of 
ethical practice in the form of aphrodisia, of pleasurable acts situated in an agonistic 
field of forces difficult to control. In order to take the form of a conduct that was 
rationally and morally admissible, these acts required a strategy of moderation and 
timing, of quantity and opportunity; and this strategy aimed at an exact self-mastery—
as its culmination and consummation—whereby the subject would be “stronger than 
himself” even in the power that exercised over others. (Foucault, 1985, p. 250) 
What is of particular interest for Foucault here is how the aspect of desire is theorized, 
understood and enacted in this historical period. The conflict that desire produces is not to be 
shied away from; rather it is placed at the centre of the subject’s lifeworld so as to produce a 
truth-power juxtaposition that would inform the subject’s path to self-mastery. How this self-
mastery actually came about, or how the subject enacted a relation to itself that allowed for 
this possible austerity, becomes the next theoretical undertaking.   
The Hermeneutics of the Subject, or How the Subject Makes Itself  
Having rerouted the project of The History of Sexuality into a problematization of the desiring 
subject juxtaposed to truth, the task then becomes the understanding of how the self came 
about. Foucault’s work and research interest in a particular moment were always made 
evident by his seminars at the Collѐge de France, and his interest in the care of the self is no 
exception. It is in the seminar The Hermeneutics of the Subject where one can read and 
appreciate all the research, reading and thinking that went into the third volume of The 
History of Sexuality, The Care of Self.  
Foucault will frame his analysis of the self to self-relation through two concepts:  
epimeleia heautou and gnōthi seauton, Greek terms that translate respectively into care of the 
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self, and know yourself. The research of bringing to the fore how the desiring subject could 
create itself will be characterized by the role played between care and knowledge. In fact, 
Foucault claims to undertake such objective means to try to uncover the idea of epimeleia 
heautou from gnōthi seauton. Foucault argues that Western thought managed to seclude the 
care of the self by rather emphasizing the role of knowing oneself and, while he does not 
want to deny the importance of knowledge in the self to self-relation, he wants to uncover the 
reasons and mechanisms which allowed for Western thought to dismiss the idea of care.  
The researching of the care of the self, and the attempt to uncover it from the need to 
know oneself, will ultimately be signalling to the relation between truth and subject, or, 
between the juxtaposition between philosophy and spirituality; notions which Foucault takes 
to mean the already demarcated limits to access truth and the self-transformation needed to 
undergo access to truth, respectively. Ultimately, then, the Foucauldian journey into the 
analysis of the care of the self is one of tracing subjectivities being made through regimes of 
truth. The care of the self will look different depending on the historical moment, Foucault 
will underscore three times: Socratic-Platonic, Hellenistic-Roman and Christianity. Through 
each of these stages Foucault will try to underscore the relation between care and knowledge, 
and how such a relation uncovers a particular process of subjection or subjectivation through 
regimes of truth. In the different historical moments, epimeleia heautou will mutate and 
change. It will be seen as an attitude towards the self, others and the world; as attention and 
looking; and as actions exercised on the self by the self  (Foucault, 2005, pp. 10–11). Even 
within these mutations, however, Foucault finds that there is a constant at the core of the idea 
to care for oneself, and that is, from Socrates to Stoicism and even into Christianity, it was 
understood as a principle of moral rationality (Foucault, 2005, p. 9), which for Foucault begs 
the question: how, then, did such a pivotal notion in the history of thought come to be 
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neglected by Western thought and philosophy, and absorbed by the idea of knowing oneself 
(Foucault, 2005, pp. 12–13)? Enter the Cartesian moment.  
The Cartesian moment is the moment in which to know oneself was centred over the 
idea of care; it is the moment in which we find a “philosophically requalified gnōthi seauton 
and a discredited epimeleia heautou” (Foucault, 2005, p. 14).  Ultimately, this was a moment 
in which the understanding of the access to truth drastically changed. Prior to the Cartesian 
moment, when care of the self was the priority, the practicing of such activity is that which 
allowed the access to truth; such activity enabled the subject to practice the self to self-
relation in order to access truth. But, as the Cartesian moment happens, the self to self-
relation ceases to matter and thus the access to truth becomes dependent on the accesses 
already demarcated; there is no need for care or transformation. In other words, the Cartesian 
moment is that moment in which the possibility of truth is explained and allowed by the mere 
existence of the subjection process (Foucault, 2005, p. 15).  
The displaced importance in the need of self care for accessing truth signifies that 
there was a shift in the relation between spirituality and philosophy. Philosophy, let us 
remember, as that which “determines that there is and can be truth and falsehood, and 
whether or not we can separate the true and the false” (Foucault, 2005, p. 15), and spirituality 
as the “search, practice and experience through which the subject carries out the necessary 
transformations on himself in order to access the truth” (Foucault, 2005, p. 15). In this notion 
of spirituality, naturally there can be no truth, nor access to it, without the transformation of 
the subject (Foucault, 2005, p. 15). This is why the Cartesian moment is so concerning for 
Foucault, for it was the moment when Western thought secluded the self to self-relation, and 
came to understand the mere existence of knowledge as an access to truth, disregarding the 
tradition of a history of thought that understood the transformation of the subject, i.e., the 
practice of spirituality, as vital for the access to truth. Spirituality becomes relegated behind 
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philosophy, and so gnōthi seauton is brought to the fore over epimeleia heautou. It is the aim 
of Foucault to analyse this covering and undo it, and highlight the possibility that rests within 
the practice of the care of the self. Ultimately, he will reach a moment of argument where he 
will signal to a particular historical moment, the second stage, referenced as the “golden age” 
of the care of the self as the preferred moment for his analytical purposes. This will be 
justified through an argument of it being a moment of the care of the self where the activity 
was better framed within the possibility of allowing the coming about of new subjectivities.  
The first stage of the care of the self is introduced through the reading of key ideas 
from Socrates’ Apology, in this way, offering a first glimpse of such a first stage and its 
relation to gnōthi seauton. The reading of the Apology shows that, at this moment, to know 
oneself was a consequence of caring for oneself (Foucault, 2005, p. 5). In other words, it was 
epimeleia heautou that which gave reason to gnōthi seauton. This “prioritization” of care is 
exemplified by how Socrates encouraged others to take care of themselves, an aspect which 
has four important implications according to Foucault: (1) to encourage others to take care of 
themselves is something which is entrusted to him by the gods, (2) in this encouragement 
Socrates has neglected himself, he has not cared for himself, (3) Socrates sees his role as the 
one to awaken the citizens, and (4) to care for oneself is a principle of restlessness and 
movement (Foucault, 2005, pp. 7–8). By signalling to these four aspects, Foucault is 
underscoring the starting point of encountering the care of the self as an activity that is 
encouraged by a figure that has not himself cared for himself and, furthermore, is actually 
just a messenger of such encouragement, and it has the very specific objective of awaking 
citizens.7 Simply put, Foucault is encountering a first moment of the care of the self as an 
activity that is subjected to divinity’s encouragement and to fulfil a specific role for a specific 
 
7 The wording citizens here matters and is not arbitrary insofar as in this first historical stage to be 
studied, it will become clear that to care for oneself was reserved for a very limited part of the 
population, that of rulers to be.  
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number of people, and in which it was to care for oneself that justified knowing oneself. 
Notice the importance of care over knowledge—the latter being justified by the former.  
The call from divinity into the practicing of the care of the self brings to the fore the 
soul as the objective of the care (Foucault, 2005, p. 53), such that was what spirituality 
intended to look out for. Here Foucault finds that the idea of khrēsthai is particularly 
necessary to understand the role of the soul, as a verb which translates to “I use, I utilize” 
(Foucault, 2005, p. 56) but it is not any type of use, rather it is a use that happens through the 
subject itself and in such a manner that the meaning of being a subject becomes: “the subject 
of instrumental action, the relationships with other people, of behaviours and attitudes in 
general, and the subject also of relationships to oneself” (Foucault, 2005, p. 57). In other 
words, the soul being linked to the activity of caring for oneself through this particular 
envisioning of use is highlighting the not yet secluded role of spirituality.  
Ultimately, Foucault will argue that at this historical moment, the care of the self, 
understood as the caring of the soul, has four important characteristics: firstly, it is linked to 
the exercise of power, which signals the emergence of a care that is between privilege and 
political action (Foucault, 2005, p. 36); secondly, there is a pedagogical lack, argues 
Foucault, in Athenian education which then makes the care of the self follow a pedagogical 
model which will mould the idea of care in a particular way (Foucault, 2005, p. 37); thirdly, 
this idea of care was exclusively for young people within their relationship to a master, or a 
lover (Foucault, 2005, p. 37); and, lastly this is a care with no urgency, in Foucault’s reading  
of Alcibiades, the care is only brought to the fore in the realization of being ill-prepared to 
tackle an objective (Foucault, 2016, p. 38). Ultimately, what we learn through these four 
characteristics is that at this moment, the care of the self is saved for a particular age group in 
order to alleviate a lack in education. Also, there is no rush in this care; rather it is only until 
the lack is exemplified when the year to care for the soul begins. To care for the soul, then 
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meant a particular purpose, a particular objective, and that was the becoming of a better ruler, 
the better knowing of the city-state (Foucault, 2005, p. 38).  
Within the specificity of this understanding of the care of the self, Foucault ultimately 
takes his reading of Alcibiades to signal that to care for oneself consists, precisely, in 
knowing oneself (Foucault, 2005, p. 67), as was advanced by Socrates insofar as to care was 
exposed as that which gives reason to knowledge. Contrary to what would later characterize 
Western thought, in Alcibiades we find a relation between care and knowledge in which it is 
knowledge which is at the service, so to speak, of the self; knowledge finds its place through 
the subject that cares for itself, not before. This allows us to make better sense of the 
introduction of the idea of khrēsthai, as we find the subject itself to use and utilize itself by 
being subject to action and to others. It is in this manner that the exercise of knowing oneself, 
in the Socratic-Platonic stage, must be understood, for in order to know oneself there must be 
a withdrawal into the self (Foucault, 2005, p. 68); the self becomes the subject of itself in 
order to know. This does not happen in isolation but, rather, the role of the master will be 
particularly important, and a figure that will constantly appear in the care of the self, but 
whose particular actions will mutate. For this particular stage of epimeleia heautou, the 
master-disciple relation is understood as the one who cares about the subject’s care of itself                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
and loves the disciple - it is very much a guiding figure (Foucault, 2005).  
Three changing aspects start to open the transition towards the Hellenistic-Roman 
stage. Firstly, the idea of care begins to be a more generalized activity (Foucault, 2005, pp. 
74–75)8 and not exclusively for rulers to be. Secondly, we have seen that the care responded 
to a lack in Athenian education, but with the passing of time and the generalization just 
 
8 We must be cautious of the idea of generalization, Foucault is careful to point out. There are two 
crucial constraints to this generalization: (1) to take care of oneself is an activity that requires time, and 
thus is only available for those with the capability of free time, i.e., the elite; (2) those who are capable 
to care for themselves will become separate from the rest.  
40 
 
signalled to, the care began to be seen as indispensable in all life stages, particularly so during 
old age, and not just serving to rectify a pedagogical gap (Foucault, 2005, pp. 75–76). And, 
lastly, the erotic of boys, this link to the erotic, present in Plato, starts to disappear and move 
to the background—a change that will specifically be evidenced in the master-disciple 
relation (Foucault, 2005, p. 76). So, here we are seeing changes in the relation that the care of 
the self holds with politics, pedagogy and the erotic (Foucault, 2005, p. 76).  
We move now to the 1st and 2nd Centuries AD, also known as the prime of Roman 
Stoicism, from Musonius Rufus until Marcus Aurelius, which Foucault calls the renaissance 
of the classical culture of Hellenism (Foucault, 2005, p. 82). The changes towards politics, 
pedagogy and the erotic, will be the three aspects used in Foucault’s analysis to demarcate the 
reading of the care during the Hellenistic-Roman moment. The transforming and changing of 
said aspects during this second historical moment will bring to the fore the comprehending of 
the care of the self through the ideas of notion, practice and institutions (Foucault, 2005, p. 
82): a notion that has become generalized as a principle which sees oneself as the end instead 
of the city-state institution, and is practiced through an aspect of self-finalization and not 
solely through the aspect of self-knowledge.  
The spreading of this activity through more life epochs than just young age and life 
activities does not happen seamlessly, a tension is brought to the fore, as this activity is 
opened to any facet of one’s life, then a question is raised regarding how this activity could 
be coextensive with individual life and, more importantly, must it be so? (Foucault, 2005, p. 
86). I take this question to mean the interrogation of what was an activity that seemed only to 
matter for politics, as it now finds itself crossing into other spheres. The generalization across 
all of a lifetime is explained by Epictetus (Foucault, 2005, p. 90) and his defence of the care 
of the self as to be purposeful for life moments, which is not to mean that to care for oneself 
will be the same in all stages of life. So, ultimately, what we are seeing here is a decentring 
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and re-centring of the care, insofar as it is decentred from the exclusivity of young age and 
political training, and recentred in all stages of life and as a more critical activity towards 
oneself. Foucault will understand and further flesh out this decentring and recentring through 
three interrelated aspects: (1) a critical activity with regard to oneself, (2) self and medicine, 
and (3) old age (Foucault, 2005, pp. 94–100, 107–108). We thus, start to see the care of the 
self in the 1st and 2nd Centuries as an activity that more and more intertwines itself with life in 
general, with the art of living, and does so, not as pedagogical training as it was previously 
understood, but more so as a critical activity, involving more of a sense of correcting than 
that of teaching (Foucault, 2005, p. 125).  
How does this new understanding, which aims to correct rather than teach, affect the 
role of the master, one which we have seen in the Socratic-Platonic age functioned on the 
basis of the ignorance of the disciple and underscored the role of the erotic (Foucault, 2005, 
p. 128) in order to better the political telos of the time? As we move to the next stage of the 
care, we find, with Seneca, that the role of the master remains, but its importance is not due to 
ignorance, which is not to say that ignorance is not there, but the master’s role is more about 
correcting the subject in order to find its status as a subject: “[…] the subject should not strive 
for knowledge to replace his ignorance. The individual should strive for a status as subject 
that he has never known at any moment of his life” (Foucault, 2005, p. 129). It is not that the 
master teaches the disciple for a specific activity, like rulers-to-be, but rather it is a matter of 
correcting past teachings so as to become a subject in itself. The master here, then, is the 
mediator in the individual’s relationship to his constitution as subject, the master is effective 
agency (Foucault, 2005, pp. 129–130).  
Such constitution as a subject will happen through three main domains: dietetics, 
economy and erotics, or: the body; the family circle and the household; and love (Foucault, 
2005, p. 161) which, we have seen already, are the guiding pillars in the understanding of 
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pleasure in the second volume of The History of Sexuality. These three domains 
characterizing care in this stage show that the role of others has a different purpose than in 
the previous stage. For Alcibiades the others referred to those that were to be governed, one 
had to be better for them, but they had no active role in such a process. In this Hellenistic-
Roman stage, the displacement of ruler training, does not displace the need for others in the 
care, but gives them another meaning. It is through the relation with the other that the care of 
the self acquires meaning in this second stage. The aspect of salvation is particularly 
important to better understand this.  
The idea of salvation in Stoicism is not one seen as being saved from (a negative 
understanding) but being saved by (a positive reading). For example, says Foucault, let us 
think of how a city is saved by its building defences, signalling then a positive reading of 
salvation (Foucault, 2005, p. 183). But what does this positive salvation signify for the care 
of the self in this particular moment?  
The person saved is the person in a state of alert, in a state of resistance and of mastery 
and sovereignty over the self, enabling him to repel every attack and assault. Similarly 
“saving yourself” means escaping domination or enslavement; escaping a constraint 
that threatens you and being restored to your rights, finding freedom and independence 
again. (Foucault, 2005, p. 184)   
The subject is then saved by and not from, saved by the caring for itself in its relations to 
others, and in doing so the role of master and disciple blurs, the self becomes its own master, 
the self becomes the agent of salvation. This begins to push us towards the idea of resistance 
in stoic salvation, to be understood as that in which the self becomes its master, it escapes 
domination. Ultimately, what we are seeing here is a care of the self in which the self turns 
more towards itself, an idea which opens way for a discussion on conversion (Foucault, 2005, 
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p. 207), a paramount concept in Foucault’s notion of  critique.9 This notion of conversion is 
not exclusive to the golden age of the care of the self, but, needless to say, that during this 
period it has a significance which Foucault deems worthy of highlighting and contrasting 
against the other understandings of this notion.  
For the Socratic-Platonic moment, conversion meant the turning away from 
appearances, acknowledging one’s own ignorance and a reversion to the self (Foucault, 2005, 
p. 209). In Christianity conversion is taken to be a sudden change, a transition from one type 
of being to another, a renunciation of the self (Foucault, 2005, p. 211). And in between, 
during the Hellenistic-Roman period, the idea of conversion signifies a reversion in the 
immanence of the world, liberation from what we cannot control, in the adequacy of the self 
to self and where, as we have seen before, knowledge is not so important (Foucault, 2005, p. 
213). This idea of conversion signifies a turning of the gaze from others onto the self, a 
“movement” which is closely related to truth. Signalling to this reminds us that it is precisely 
the relation between subject and truth that sets about the framing of the interest in the care of 
the self. So, where does this fit into this analysis of conversion and turning of the gaze?  
Conversion in Hellenistic-Roman time signified a shift—a movement of the subject 
with regards to himself, the subject must advance towards something that is himself, it 
returns to itself (Foucault, 2005, p. 248). Foucault contends that this movement has been 
interpreted by Western thought as the negation of possibility for an ethics of the self 
(Foucault, 2005, p. 252) when, rather, it should be understood and worked as the possibility 
for a creation of an ethos. Stoic morality helps to illustrate this as it discloses that you can 
only arrive at yourself after having passed the great cycle of the world, that there is no 
negation of the world or an enclosed individualism as Western thought would like to argue. 
 
9 The concept of critique will be explored in the next chapter and will represent one of the pillars for 
making my argument for a political reading of the care of the self.  
44 
 
The turning of the gaze is only achievable through the relations to others as much as the 
relation to the self, something that a deeper look into Seneca’s spiritualization of knowledge 
makes clearer (Foucault, 2005, p. 289). 
Seneca’s spiritualization of knowledge makes clear the idea of the turning of the gaze 
by bringing to the fore the following characteristics: (1) the subject changes its position, (2) 
the change allows for the grasping of reality and value of things, (3) the subject sees himself 
and grasps himself and, (4) in this, the subject finds freedom and a mode of being in its 
freedom. All these four aspects compose the idea of spiritual knowledge for Seneca 
(Foucault, 2005, p. 308). This theorization of the spiritualization of knowledge to explain the 
turning of the gaze, does not answer the question of how is it that the subject changes its 
position. How does the subject enact the first “step” of the spiritualization? The answer to this 
question is askēsis, a concept which in Greek Hellenistic-Roman signifies the practice of the 
self by the self, but rather it is a way of binding the subject to truth, it is the practice of truth 
(Foucault, 2005, p. 317). We have returned, once again, to the posing of the relation between 
subject and truth: “the ‘spirituality of knowledge (savoir)’, and there was ‘practice and 
exercise of the truth’. This is how, I think, the question of askēsis should be approached […]” 
(Foucault, 2005, p. 319). 
Within the Christian world the aspect of askēsis  transforms greatly, signifying the 
progressive renunciation that leads to the ultimate renunciation of the self (Foucault, 2005, p. 
319). For Antiquity it was rather more about the constitution of the self to ultimately arrive 
towards a self-sufficient relationship with oneself (Foucault, 2005, p. 320) which happened 
and was dependant on paraskeuē, an “open and oriented preparation for the individual for the 
events of life” (Foucault, 2005, p. 320). For Greeks and Romans, the function of askēsis had, 
then, as a final objective the constitution of a full and independent relationship of the self to 
itself through paraskeuē, i.e., the passing from the logos to the ethos. It is askēsis that enables 
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truth telling to be constituted as the subject’s way of being (Foucault, 2005, p. 327).    So, 
askēsis in the Hellenistic Roman understanding, succinctly put, is that which enables the 
acquisition of true discourses and the possibility of becoming a subject of these discourses; in 
other words, making truth your own (Foucault, 2005, pp. 332–3). Opposed to this, is the 
overall idea of Christian askēsis, which ultimately is built on the aspect of self-renunciation 
reached by the role of confession, which is when the subject objectifies himself in a discourse 
of truth (Foucault, 2005, p. 333).  
How is this binding of truth practically achieved? Foucault points towards listening, 
reading and writing, and speech, activities which find themselves tied through the idea of 
parrhēsia, which roughly translates to the idea of frank speech, and activity which brings 
again to the fore the role of the master, for it is a speech in a dialogue. The idea behind the 
purpose of the master’s speech10 is for it to allow the disciple to: 
Form an autonomous, independent, full and satisfying relationship to himself […]. The 
objective of parrhēsia is to act so that at any given moment the person to whom one is 
speaking finds himself in a situation in which he no longer needs the other’s discourse. 
(Foucault, 2005, p. 379) 
In other words, parrhēsia has the objective of achieving this self sufficiency which the 
seminar has been hinting at. Up until now, Foucault says, we have encountered the first stage 
of askēsis, the listening and reception of a true discourse, but there is another stage, that of 
the exercise of putting these discourses to work in the subject’s activity. In other words, it is 
the phase how to truly become the active subject of a true discourse, how to transform truth 
into ethos. Enter the role of exercises, through the understanding of ascetics:  
Ascetics, that is to say the more or less coordinated set of exercises that are available, 
recommended, and even obligatory, and anyway utilizable by individuals in a moral, 
 




philosophical, and religious system in order to achieve a definite spiritual objective. 
(Foucault, 2005, pp. 416–417)  
The system of askesis-exercises which Foucault identifies from ancient thought, are 
ones which very much mimic the idea of technique, or specifically the idea of techniques of 
the self which are paramount for the possibility of the self creating itself: abstinence, 
meditation on death, meditation on future evils and the examination of conscience (Foucault, 
2005, p. 417), activities which ultimately will be encompassed in two pillars: meditation and 
training, which open up possibilities for a transformation of the subject into one of action and 
true-knowledge (Foucault, 2005, p. 417). In other words, meditation and training encompass 
the activities which allow for the self to make itself as the object of tekhnē. Within the two 
pillars there are some further key ideas. Training is one, which is lived by the idea of 
abstinence and tests, and meditation is understood as an exercise of thought on thought itself. 
Abstinence, we have seen since the beginning, feeds into the idea of self-mastery, while the 
aspect of tests calls, precisely, to see life itself as a constant test. With regards to meditation, 
what interests Foucault is how it allows for care and knowledge to meet and the testing of the 
truth of representations, and to see if we will be able to act according to them. These pillars 
call for the self to answer, through frank speech, the question: am I really the ethical subject 
of the truth I know (Foucault, 2005, p. 463)? 
What comes out of this lecture is a tracing of the care of the self that is unfinished, 
understandably so given that this was a first approach to this matter through a seminar format. 
However, I think that what does remain clear is that the analysis of the care of the self offered 
is one done first and foremost through the interplay and relation between the aspect of 
spirituality and philosophy, or between the idea of truth itself and the access to truth. In this 
manner Foucault tries to convey, I think, that indeed his interest has been permanently not 
only the relation between subject and regimes of truth, but how the access to truth, or the 
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possibility to do so, may signify either subjection or a subjectivation process. And this, 
Foucault tries to frame by underscoring other elements of his historical reading of Antiquity: 
the analysis of the passing from epimeleia heautou as a secluded activity to a more 
generalized practice, the role of the master and salvation, the idea of conversion, 
spiritualization of knowledge, askēsis, and tekhnē.  
The Foucauldian Care of the Self 
How then do we read Foucault’s care of the self? The bulk of this chapter until now has been 
about how he read Greek and Roman ancient thought to inform himself. Now we turn to 
understand how he made such readings his own and offered his own comprehension of said 
concept, which he tackles in the third and last volume11 of The History of Sexuality: The Care 
of the Self (Foucault, 1986). This volume follows the second volume in the sense that it offers 
and analysis through the use of the same three pillars of thought: the body, the wife and boys. 
Now, here I think it is important to underline, and it will become even clearer in the next 
chapter, that it is not so much about the pillars per se, but what they meant in the constructing 
the idea of the care of the self. In other words, it is not so much about fidelity in a marriage, 
but about what that aspect of sexuality meant in the coming about of a certain subjectivity. 
In this text we are presented with an idea of epimeleia heautou understood as an 
activity that signifies the cultivation of the self (Foucault, 1986, p. 43). This, of course, 
follows from the ideas discussed in the seminar where, even through its mutations, the care of 
the self was presented to us within an ethical framework, one to be read as a framework in 
 
11 It was not intended to be the last, but as already mentioned The History of Sexuality was unfinished 
given Foucault’s death. 2018 saw the publication of a fourth volume, Confessions of the Flesh, a work 
that gathers the research, notes and writings that Foucault was compiling for this text at the time of his 
death. The publication of this text was controversial given that Foucault was very clear in neither 
wanting nor giving permission for any publications after his death.   
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which the self relates to itself and in doing so fashions itself. The care of the self is concluded 
to be an attitude, a mode of behaviour which ultimately:     
[…] came to constitute a social practice, giving rise to relationships between 
individuals, to exchanges and communications, and at times even to institutions. And it 
gave rise, finally, to a certain mode of knowledge and to the elaboration of a science. 
(Foucault, 1986, p. 45)  
Again, here in this definition, all the analysis and reading of the care of the self through 
Antiquity is evident. By posing this as his ultimate definition, Foucault is encapsulating an 
activity he read through history as that activity that passed from a narrowed down part of the 
population towards a more generalized practice, which ultimately we understood as allowing 
for a knowledge of the self through the guidance of a master, one that had the purpose of 
leading the path from a self being a non-subject to becoming a subject, the stoic turning of the 
gaze. Foucault is also emphatic and clear when offering his “finalized” understanding of the 
care of the self not as an individual activity but as a social practice (Foucault, 1986, p. 51). 
And how could it not be, if the pillars that brought it into being, were all of them speaking to 
social relations? Here Foucault will also stress the aspect of labour, to take care of oneself 
implies labour, it implies taking time from one’s day in order to pursue such practice 
(Foucault, 1986, p. 50). What is the characterization of this labour? It is a labour of thought, a 
task that goes beyond tests of measures or assessment of fault, and rather serves the screening 
of representations as a constant attitude (Foucault, 1986, p. 63). This is a point which will 
become particularly important in the following chapter. Enough to note for now how such a 
characterization is one which draws on an understanding of the care as an activity to be 
carried throughout life, not instilled in the specificity of becoming a ruler to be or in the guilt 
of Christianity.  
Ultimately, what we find here is Foucault paying further attention to the aspects of the 
Hellenistic-Roman care of the self that he read as alluring during his seminar. The golden age 
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for Foucault meant the turning of the gaze, a turning of the self onto itself. This turn, or the 
recentring of the self, was to be seen as a notion of conversion, as that which implies a shift 
in one’s attention and allows one to ultimately re-join oneself, an aspect which Foucault will 
equate with an idea of the ethics of control (Foucault, 1986, p. 65), or as he later also 
expressed it as a sovereignty over oneself (Foucault, 1986, p. 85). Ethics of control and 
sovereignty over oneself have at the core, as the terms evidently imply, the aspect of 
austerity, which was something Foucault underscored through his reading of Stoicism. He 
poses that austerity is to be met or achieved through the askēsis, an activity which achieves 
meaning through the ideas of meditation and training (aspects which will be furthered 
developed in the chapters to come).  
The concluding thoughts offered by Foucault on the care of the self are around the 
strengthening of austerity themes, where physicians would worry about the effects of the 
sexual practice. Any sexual practice outside the bond of marriage was condemned and the 
love for boys was disqualified (Foucault, 1986, p. 235). What I find useful here, is not so 
much how austerity was evidenced in these three pillars but how those pillars allowed for the 
coming about of a subject. I do want to underscore the pillar of the body. The body, we have 
seen, becomes all the more significant when we see the passing from a pedagogical to a 
medical model of the care as we move from the Socratic-Platonic to the Hellenistic-Roman 
period. Here, in the third volume, we come to see the body clearly as the vessel to be cared 
for, which he took to be a warning in Antiquity from the dangers of illness deriving from 
sexual practices (Foucault, 1986, p. 238). Again, here I am not so much interested in the role 
played by the risk of illness per se and how that set about the bodily lived experienced 
through the body. Rather, what I find is the continuity that the underscoring of the body in 
The History of Sexuality signifies with the work in Discipline and Punish.  
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As said in the brief overview opening this chapter, the genealogy of the passing from 
a sovereign to a disciplinary form of power is one that concludes in an analysis of the control 
and manufacturing of the subject through power mechanisms. Now, in the care of the self we 
find Foucault informing his thought through a reading of the body in Greek and Roman 
Ancient thought which required for the self to create itself through bodily austerity, ideas 
which I will fully develop in the next chapter.  
Historical Moments of the Care of the Self  
The tracing of the care of the self shows that Foucault’s turn to antiquity follows a concern 
with better understanding the subject and its relation to ethics or, in other words, an interest in 
better theorizing how it is that subjects are able to fashion themselves. This curiosity unravels 
juxtaposed to the analysis that wants to better understand a concept of the care of the self 
which is not secluded by the idea of knowing oneself; and so the account develops in wanting 
to understand how, in Antiquity, the care of the self became an event in thought (Foucault, 
2005, p. 9). There was particular attention paid towards the interplay of the idea of 
philosophy and spirituality. In other words, epimeleia heatou is found in between that which 
determines that there is and can be truth and falsehood—philosophy—(Foucault, 2005, p. 15) 
and the search and practice through which the subject transforms itself in order to have access 
to truth—spirituality—(Foucault, 2005, p. 15). The need for transformation that spirituality 
highlights to access truth, will have particular importance for Foucault:  
It [spirituality] postulates that for the subject to have right of access to the truth he must 
be changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a certain point, 
other than himself. […] It follows that from this point of view there can be no truth 
without a conversion or a transformation of the subject. (Foucault, 2005, p. 15) 
Both in Greek and Roman thought spirituality was found to hold an important role; the 
subject needs to undergo a self-transformation to be able to relate to truth. This changed in 
Christianity where the relation between subject and truth becomes permeated by the Cartesian 
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moment: the period after which, in the modern age, what gave access to truth was knowledge 
(connaissance) in itself, with no need for the subject to have transformed. In other words, the 
modern age sets up a form of subjectivity without spirituality (Sauquillo, 2017, p. 418), 
which comes to mean an idea of subjectivity that comes about through subjection and not 
subjectivation. It is a subject that is constructed and not one that has constructed itself.  
There are three stages: the Socratic-Platonic, followed by the Hellenistic and Roman 
period—known as the golden age—and, lastly, the Christian asceticism stage. During that of 
the Socratic-Platonic moment we can see a care of the self that is linked to knowledge insofar 
it serves the governing of others, thus, it was an activity with pedagogical ends and 
exclusively for a certain part of society. During the golden age, the care of the self became 
more of a cultural aspect, leaving behind its exclusive pedagogical ends for future rulers to 
be. Finally, during Christianity, the relation of truth and the self was majorly transformed by 
the role of confession.  
Socratic-Platonic Stage  
The first stage of the care of the self is very much characterized by its pedagogical purposes, 
as well as the importance of the master-student relation, aspects exemplified by the four main 
characteristics which Foucault draws out: it’s link to the exercise of power, pedagogical lack, 
the centricity of young people (and their relationship with their master), and its lack of 
urgency (Foucault, 2005, p. 36). The care of the self had a very specific target in mind at this 
moment: those who would become rulers so as to assure they would become better at their 
future responsibility. The care of the self, thus, allowed for the rising of a proper political 
subject, which was needed insofar that such subjects had to govern others (Raffnsøe, 
Sørensen Thaning and Gudmand-Høyer, 2016, p. 382). There was an important pedagogical 
aspect that the care of the self needed to fulfil in this moment, not only in the ‘becoming 
better’ of rulers but also that, argued Foucault, in comparison to Spartan and oriental wisdom, 
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Athenian education was found lacking in academic and amorous purposes (Foucault, 2005, p. 
44) which made all the more important the matter of taking care of oneself.  
This pedagogical lack signifies for the care of the self in this historical moment to be 
understood as not only having a purpose in the need to govern others but also in the manner 
of being governed, says Foucault: “taking care of oneself in order to be able to govern, and 
taking care of oneself inasmuch one has not been governed sufficiently and properly” 
(Foucault, 2005, p. 45). There was then a sense of utility in this moment of the care of the 
self, which is why the verb khrēsthai was introduced, understood as a use that happens 
through the subject, pertinent to the understanding that it was the soul that needed to be cared 
for. As the care of the self here serves to better prepare rulers to govern others and 
themselves, to care for the self represents at this moment an instrumental action in the 
connecting of others and with oneself through the link of the soul (Foucault, 2005, p. 57).  
Foucault’s reading of this first stage of the care of the self, leaves us with an activity 
that had evident links to the practice of politics. The care of the self served, first and 
foremost, to the better governing of the city. While indeed a pedagogical lack also signalled 
that the activity was to serve the subject itself, ultimately, the goal was the city state. The care 
of the self, as an activity for the subject, was merged with the care of the self as an activity 
for the ruler to be. Foucault becomes critical of this, as he finds that such an emphasis on the 
pedagogical model denies the care of the self of a sense of autonomy. The self cares for itself 
to comply with an objective outside of it.  
The Golden Age  
It will be in the middle stage of the care of the self where Foucault will draw out the most for 
the purposes of an analysis of subjectivation. From Hellenistic-Roman thought, heavily 
drawing from Stoicism, Foucault will try to separate this stage from both the Platonic-
Socratic and the Christian moments (Foucault, 2005, p. 254). There are similarities between 
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the first and second stage insofar as they both share a pedagogical aspect. But, contrary to the 
first stage, for the golden age the pedagogical purpose takes the form of a “general and 
unconditional principle” rather than it being about “corrections” (Foucault, 2005, p. 247), 
which means that it is no longer bound exclusively to a certain status in society, i.e. becoming 
a ruler (Foucault, 2005, p. 247). To care for oneself becomes a part of life, independently of 
the profession practiced. This generalized care is a much more critically loaded activity, for 
though the aspect of knowledge and training is still present, we have seen that this time it is 
much more about the critical conversion of unlearning and questioning previous education.  
From Seneca we will learn to speak of the care of the self as the idea of bettering 
oneself, in the sense that the self must achieve an authority over himself that nothing limits or 
threatens in order to achieve the ultimate purpose of control accompanied by an enjoyment 
that has escaped desire (Raffnsøe, Sørensen Thaning and Gudmand-Høyer, 2016, p. 391). 
This is the idea of sovereignty and mastery over the self through austerity. What we see in 
Foucault’s interpretation of Seneca is, thus, that the care of the self has a purpose residing in 
the self itself. The care of the self was no longer exclusively for bettering future politicians; it 
became something for ‘everyone’, in which the ultimate goal resided in the self itself. The 
purpose of the care of the self, thus, becomes the bettering of the self for the self itself, not for 
its subordinates. This intensification of the self-self relation follows an understanding of the 
care of the self as a relation where the subject is first and foremost a field of possibility. What 
I take makes the golden age ‘golden’ for Foucault is, precisely, that Hellenistic-Roman 
thought viewed the subject, through the care of the self, as capable of conversion, critique and 
possibility. This entails that the subject was viewed as an object of knowledge and field of 
action (Raffnsøe, Sørensen Thaning and Gudmand-Høyer, 2016, p. 392). Such a possible 
object of knowledge and field of action opens the way for the political stemming out of the 
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self itself, and such a relation is formed by what becomes the key part of this new era of the 
care of the self, that of questioning what has been previously learned.  
Christianity  
The third, and last, moment of the care of the self that Foucault analyses is that of 
Christianity where the idea of confession gains particular importance. For Foucault the 
golden age of the care of the self is obscured by the stages that precede and follow it, for both 
of these moments practice the care of the self with a lack of autonomy. As was mentioned, in 
the Platonic-Socratic stage, the purpose of the care of the self did not fall on the self itself. In 
Christianity, we once again face a lack of autonomy insofar as the main aspect of the care of 
the self becomes the renunciation of the self. For Foucault the Christian interpretation of the 
care of the self carried within it not the richness of the golden age, but the problematic 
aspects of the Socratic-Platonic moment, hence why he concentrated so much in uncovering 
the mid historic moment (Foucault, 2005, p. 254).   
During this Christian interpretation Foucault finds circularity between self-
knowledge, knowledge of the truth and care of the self (Foucault, 2005, p. 255). To be saved, 
you must accept the truth of the revelation, but this is only attainable if you have purified 
yourself through knowledge through the care of the self, but this purification is only possible 
if you have previously accepted the truth (Foucault, 2005, p. 255). In other words, what 
Foucault is seeing here is the Cartesian moment where the subject’s attainment of truth does 
not require a transformation of the subject, but that each subject is enabled for knowledge in 
itself, the role of spirituality is displaced (Sauquillo, 2017, p. 419). What this ultimately 
means for Foucault is that the Christian care of the self is characterized by the renunciation of 
the self (Foucault, 2005, p. 256).   
Moreover, this displacement of spirituality becomes all the more worrying as it is 
done at the same time that the aspect of confession comes into play as a particularly 
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important role, an action that would open the way for the matter of humiliation (Sauquillo, 
2017, p. 416). This importance of truth telling and purification through confession comes 
about from the influence of the idea of askēsis, present in Socratic philosophy and Stoicism, 
but radically reinterpreted in Christianity to signify the renunciation of the world and the self, 
and, thus, leaving the self bound to the search for truth and submission to God (Raffnsøe, 
Sørensen Thaning and Gudmand-Høyer, 2016, p. 413); a truth that was not found through the 
transformation of the self, but through the exercise of confession fed by humiliation and guilt. 
The search for truth and submission to God only demerits what was supposed to be an 
activity of the self for the self (Foucault, 2005, p. 256); furthermore, a renunciation that only 
highlighted an idea of subjectivity that only understood itself in the service of those that 
governed, a confessor that renders its body as a confessor and will only seek truth insofar it is 
demanded of him by another (Raffnsøe, Sørensen Thaning and Gudmand-Høyer, 2016, p. 
419).  
The Care of the Self, a Conclusion  
A first moment in which the role of education foregrounded through pedagogical lack plays 
the centre role. A final moment in which the role of truth is used to subjugate the mind and 
body through confession. And, in between, a moment which is characterized by the art of 
knowing oneself, through both learning and unlearning. Foucault set out to study these three 
different stages with the purpose of analysing the relation between truth and subject, for he 
would try to separate the golden age from the rest. 
What is it, then, that Foucault takes from his analysis? Given the three stages, the 
critiques and worries found in each, Foucault comes to understand the care of the self as a 
“cultivation of the self” (Foucault, 1986, p. 43) both “personal and social, where self-
knowledge occupies a considerable place” (Foucault, 1986, p. 45). As personal as it was, 
Foucault was insistent in signalling the activity’s social aspect which would give rise to 
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relationships between individuals, even institutions, and ultimately, a mode of knowledge 
(Foucault, 1986, p. 45). So, even as the influence of the golden age, particular that of Seneca, 
is patent in Foucault’s care of the self seen as converting the self to the self (Foucault, 1986, 
p. 65),  this underscoring of the self is not one enclosed in itself, but rather, it is the starting 
point to an interest in the political and its conditions of possibility:  
It [the care of the self] is much more concerned to define the principle of relation to self 
that will make it possible to set the forms and conditions in which political action, 
participation in the offices of power, the exercise of a function, will be possible or not 
possible, acceptable or necessary. (Foucault, 1986, p. 86) 
The role of the self-self relation signals to the way in which Foucault understood the relation 
between the self and the political, or, even more so, as the way he wanted to construct such 
relation. It is not about the prioritization of the ethical sphere over the political, but about the 
importance of the self in both. In the activity of the self cultivating itself, fashioning itself, the 
political tension is a productive one, and the way to understand the political in this reading is 
then the politicization of perpetual tension and conflict. The care of the self leads to the type 
of subjectivity that has that tension within.  
Let us remember the importance of spirituality and philosophy drawn out by Foucault, 
as he placed the care of the self to be in between that which determines the limits of truth—
philosophy—and that which allows the subject to transform in order to have access to truth—
spirituality (Foucault, 2005, p. 15). This tension in between truth and the subjects’ access to 
it, calls upon the crisis of subjectivation of the golden age, in which the self found itself 
trying to navigate the critical exercise of unlearning the political while still inhabiting it: the 
transformation to access truth while facing truth’s limits. Foucault said that what he tried to 
offer through the analysis of the care of the self was a story of the relation between subjects 
and regimes of truth and underlying such a query is, thus, a story of the relation between 
ethics and the political. Let us now turn to this more directly in the next chapter, where I will 
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underscore the idea of the body, critique and limits, as notions which help to read the care of 






II. Chapter Two: The Bodily Critique of Limits  
 
“Greek ethics is centred in a problem of personal choice, of the aesthetics of existence” 
(Foucault, 1997b, p. 260)  
 
The previous chapter offered the reader a familiarization with Foucault’s work by manner of 
a brief overview, and a greater concentration on the last part of his thought, that of the care of 
the self. This part of his work, we have seen, is what has become known as his ethical stage, 
characterized by an analysis on ethics and governmentality. The ‘last’ Foucault, we have also 
seen, is one that cannot be understood separated from the previous one, for in the concern for 
ethics we find both the archaeological and genealogical Foucault. In a way, one could say 
that the final Foucault is the climax and summation of that which preceded it. We find in 
Foucault’s ethical stage the archaeological work through the uncovering of the changes in the 
discourse on sexuality, and we find a genealogy that underscores how the shifts in the way in 
which talk about sexuality is far from random, but rather follows a careful tracing of 
population control. These carefully manufactured discourses on sexuality find reason in an 
understanding of a rationality that works to make us into subjects.  
Just as much as Foucault’s last work cannot be understood without the previous 
stages, his last stage cannot be separated into two different accounts, as one of 
governmentality and one of ethics. Rather, they work, and must be understood, in unison. The 
work on governmentality is the climax of the analysis on power that Foucault offered in his 
genealogical stage. Parallel to this climaxing of power through a rationality that can embrace 
anything, even life itself, we find his analysis of resistance, as the antidote, in his work on 
ethics. Foucault’s last work then is both the analysis of the way things are and the resistance 
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we can pose. To a form of governmental power, it is only through ethics that we can find a 
resistance towards it. Ultimately, what we find in Foucault’s last decade of work is the climax 
point of a perpetual problematization of the idea of the subject. He himself said that it was the 
subject, and not power, that had been his interest all along. In an interview at the beginning of 
1984 when asked about his current work, Foucault replies by saying that his work remains 
with the constant concern of “trying to find out how the human subject fits into certain truth 
games whether they be scientific model, institutions or practices of control” and the 
difference is that in his last decade he sees “the games of truth not as coercive but as practice 
of formation of the subject, as an ascetic practice” (Foucault, 1997f, pp. 281–282). The 
subject has been there all along, whether in the analysis of subjection through the 
science/knowledge discourse, through power mechanisms, or through the possibility of self-
formation.  
Nonetheless, reading Foucault’s work as perpetually prioritizing the theorization of 
the subject is not easily accepted, as I have hinted at since the introduction. Rather, his ethical 
work is typically read as if he had renounced his previous analysis and was developing 
something ‘new’. This understanding follows a pessimistic reading of the Foucauldian notion 
of power. Given that, as we saw briefly in the previous chapter, the conclusion of his 
genealogic work is that of an omnipresent productive power, critics deemed that this left 
little—if not no—space for the theorization of resistance and freedom in such a framework. 
And so, these critiques have also claimed that Foucault himself realized this and, thus, 
renounced this framework and turned to ethics. Reading his turn to ethics in such a way, leads 
also to the perception that the interest of the subject is a purely ethical one, as if he realizes 
that indeed nothing politically productive can stem from his ideas on power, and thus we 
should solely concentrate on the ethical realm. I will offer a different reading of Foucault’s 
ethics, but I must first offer a more comprehensive account of said critiques.   
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Defending Foucault’s Subject 
Foucault is a controversial thinker whose work invites criticism and debate. Particularly, his 
work on the care of the self is one of the most criticized and contested. Let us remember that 
Foucault’s work is usually read through three stages, not set out by himself but rather by 
scholars and readers, and it has resulted in a double edge sword. On the one hand it serves as 
an initial pedagogical guidance, but it is also at fault for the most common misunderstandings 
which lead to incorrect analyses of Foucault. The analysis by stages allows conclusions of 
disconnection and incoherency. Moreover, this assumed disconnection is taken to mean that 
by jumping from one stage to the next Foucault ‘gives up’ on each stage and starts a clean 
slate every time; this is a particularly common comment regarding the end of his genealogical 
stage. By setting a notion of power through an analysis that commenced by looking into 
speech and “its order”, culminating in the deep gaze into the whys and hows of the 
penitentiary system, Foucault is able to construct an idea of power that does not come from 
everywhere but can embrace everything—an idea which is wrongly simplified into thinking 
that what Foucault was arguing for was power being everywhere in a totalizing manner.  
This very simplistic phrasing of Foucault’s genealogy of power is one that seems to 
leave no room for change or transformation: if power can embrace everything then where can 
resistance stem from? Critics of this idea of power take that even Foucault realized how 
problematic this notion was and, thus, renounced it and turned to ethics (Castro, 2012; Allen, 
2013; Myers, 2013; Castro-Gomez, 2015; Lemke, 2019). And, I must admit, in a way these 
critiques are right. Foucault is not one to give clear answers into what to do, or even if there 
is anything to do. There is no recipe book when it comes to Foucault’s theory; there is no 
clear path of what to do once we understand power as a strategic relation of forces that can 
embrace everything. And, surely, this lack of instruction makes many that read Foucault 
dubious of how useful his ideas actually are. 
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However, I will argue that this scepticism about Foucault’s utility feeds on the 
misunderstanding of coherence throughout the stages of his thought. In other words, critics 
deemed that Foucault himself realized the frustration that his analysis on power produced 
and, thus, started anew by studying the subject and antiquity once he realized how 
unproductive his ideas of power were. Thus, this change of focus has been understood to be 
inspired not only as wanting to have a clean slate from the analysis on power, but, from the 
topic of the political in general, given that Foucault’s development of an account of 
subjectivity is read to be purely ethical. Having realized that his genealogical work offered no 
possibility of transformation, he himself—supposedly—abandons the project on power—and 
political possibility—to turn solely to an ethical venture through an analysis of the subject. 
The turn to the subject is then seen as a result of Foucault’s anesthetizing effect of his thought 
(Castro-Gomez, 2015, p. 18), and thus he renounces his previous work (Lemke, 2019) given 
that the idea of anaesthetic is not understood here as the alleviation of the pain, but as the 
impossibility of movement and reaction. And so, the last part of his thought, deemed as 
purely ethical, where the subjectivity envisioned is one which is closed off to the political 
reigned by a power that offers no grounds for change. In other words, Foucault’s interest in 
the subject is seen as following an aspect of privatism, abandoning the political, and is about 
the subject in its seclusion to itself (Lemke, 2019, pp. 239, 308). 
So, as gripping and inciting as Foucault’s revolutionary analysis on power was, when 
paired with subjectivity and resistance, it seemed, for certain critics at least, to offer no 
political possibility. If we have a power that is omnipresent, where do we find the space of 
resistance? Moreover, how can it be convincingly argued that the subject that comes from 
such power mechanisms will be capable to critique, fight and resist the very mechanisms that 
make it? In other words, if power can embrace everything, what differentiates it from 
domination, and how then can we envision a subject that is not dominated? These are the 
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critical questions that Foucault’s work on power pose and which divide scholars into either 
answering them in a positive or a negative way. From this idea of power, that supposedly 
holds no difference with domination, any idea of subjectivity seems fruitless for political 
transformation—the negative reading. From an idea of power that cannot be understood 
without the role of freedom, the idea of subjectivity is the vital component for political 
transformation—the positive reading.  
To further develop the negative reading, we must flesh out another component of 
Foucault’s notion of power which has up until now only been hinted at: its productive quality. 
Foucault’s genealogical stage stems from the dismantling of traditional models of power 
which understood it solely to inhabit the state apparatus as a repressive commodity (Brown, 
2008). To view power as solely tied to the state is a too reductive quality which leaves 
unattended all the other ways in which power affect us which are not juridical or state figures; 
“we must cut off the head of the king in political theory” (Foucault, 2001, p. 122) Foucault 
famously said. Cutting of the head of the king means to also let go of seeing power as a 
commodity: power is not something that can be transferred between individuals, as the 
passing of the crown amongst Kings makes us falsely believe. And, of course, power is not 
only repression, if it were only so, who would obey it? Power is enticing, seductive. By 
tackling these three models of power (juridical, commodity and repressive), Foucault sets the 
grounds for the way that he will invite us to think about power as it passes through the subject 
by tying itself closely to knowledge and truth—this is how power can embrace everything. 
Both knowledge and the subject are vital conducting vessels of power. As we understand 
power to be something that extends far beyond the state, we start to see it as a force which 
passes through the subject and in doing so constitutes it. Power, then, produces discourse as 
much as it controls it. Power creates.  
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However, power’s productive quality only seems to add more complications into the 
matter. If it is power that enacts a subjugation process from which a particular type of 
subjectivity emerges, then how can we consider such subjectivity to have any sort of 
possibility to ‘break free’? Any subjectivity constructed within this framework is one created 
by that same power it is trying to fight, so even if such a subject is able to articulate the desire 
to embark on such a fight, it cannot. There is no authenticity in a supposed fight against the 
mechanisms that subjugated it insofar such as the subject is always-already interpellated in 
the social norms it wishes to attack (Nealon, 2008, p. 102). If we take it that, indeed, power 
mechanisms are those that create subjects, resistance to those mechanisms is nonsensical. 
This is the underlying argument that feeds the negative reading of Foucault’s History of 
Sexuality, where his analysis of antiquity does not offer a convincing possibility for the 
subject to rearticulate itself given the power mechanisms in which it is found (Žižek, 2002). 
Žižek argues that Foucault’s very idea of biopower, presented precisely in the first volume of 
History of Sexuality, captures the idea of how power constitutes individuals directly, so how 
then can we expect for the subject to all of a sudden fight that which makes it? (Žižek, 2002, 
p. 253). In other words, the subject that resists is actually playing under the same rules it is 
trying to fight; it is a product of the disciplinary norms and biopolitical technologies that nest 
capitalism (Vighi and Heiko, 2007; Castro-Gomez, 2015). It seems illogical, then, to expect a 
subject to put up a fight since that which made it would not equip it with the necessary 
antagonism to do so (Castro-Gomez, 2015). This critique can even be taken a step further. 
A subject which is always already interpellated in the forces which make it, poses a 
problem in terms of being able to fight such forces, but even more so begs the question if 
such a subject would even care about fighting them in the first place. It is not only that the 
Foucauldian subject could not fight off that which made it, but that it is not deemed to have 
the concern to try to fight in the first place. Why would we expect a subject built by totalizing 
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forces to have the ability to want to critique? Such a subject, rather, is one that, in its 
construction, is one which by its very defining qualities closed off to the world (Myers, 
2013). We have discussed the problematic that the conceptual framework between power and 
domination present, and it is in this critique in which it becomes all the more amplified: if we 
cannot differentiate between power and domination, then the subject made from power is a 
dominated one, why then would it even care to fight such domination? (Myers, 2013, pp. 36–
37). 
To take that power and domination are synonyms in Foucault’s work is an implication 
resulting from reading a supposed lack of theorization of freedom in his work. Even if we 
were to try and look into his analysis of the ‘politics of ourselves’ as a moment in which he 
seems to offer us political possibility, the lack of the role of freedom makes this analysis 
unconvincing. In such a discussion, Foucault first suggests that the self is not a given entity 
which rests between political struggle of forces of domination and, second, he acknowledges 
the possibility of self-transformation through the techniques of the self (Allen, 2013, pp. 1–
2). So, we have, on the one hand, a self that conceives itself within the workings of power 
and, on the other, one that conceives itself within the possibility of transformation (Allen, 
2013, p. 2). By posing the subject in between these two pillars, Foucault would seem to 
propose that individuals are both able to take up a critical perspective on technologies of 
domination and on them being able to transform such technologies (Allen, 2013, p. 46). 
Allen, for example, reads these two accounts as the two sides of Foucault’s autonomy, but as 
a whole still finds such a notion embedded and rooted in power, which leads to the question 
of how this account of autonomy is truly enacted in subjects (Allen, 2013). So, while bringing 
to the fore the idea of freedom and how it plays in the politics of ourselves does seem to hint 
at being able to envision a subject that would be ignited by critical thought, we still find 
ourselves where we started: being bound by a power that seems to offer no room for change. 
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Even if we want to be charitable, say his critics, and assume that there are hints to a 
transformation, Foucault still “leaves unanswered the question of what it is that enables us to 
take up relations of subjection in a transformative way” (Allen, 2013, p. 68).  
The negative way to read Foucault, then, we can conclude to be that of not finding 
reason to believe that subjectivity represents any political transformation in his thought given 
that subjectivity is made up by the power to be fought. The subject in Foucault is so 
embedded in power that there seems to be no way in which it could (or even want to) resist. 
Being from the beginning fully defined by the power mechanisms which inhabit it, the best-
case scenario would be for this subject to express some desire for transformation (without 
knowing how to go about it), or it would not even reach that point since it would have no 
capacity to even care for a transformation in the first place. In this reading there is no space to 
be found between the subject and the mechanisms that make it, no space to allow for 
freedom. In other words, the subject is ‘controlled’ by that which has made it and runs 
through it, hence, it will never be able to break free from it. The anaesthetic effect of 
Foucault, can also be read as a totalizing one (Castro, 2012): in the face of a power that 
leaves no room for resistance, what can a subject formulated from this notion offer regarding 
critique and political transformation? 
The positive way to read Foucault will be the topic of this chapter in its entirety, but I 
will start now to point towards some important aspects which will help serve the argument. 
First of all, and I by no means think this is a sufficient defence, but it seems that the negative 
reading of Foucault overlooks the fact that his work was left unfinished due to his death. 
There are in Foucault, albeit underdeveloped, instances that call for the construction of a type 
of subjectivity that rejects an imposed individuality (Chignola, 2018, p. 102). These hints are 
precisely found in the attention placed in the reading of antiquity, and through it, the study of 
the subjection process through juridical and disciplinary modernity of the state, but also 
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through an autonomous constitution of Greek and Roman ancient thought, where there is a 
creative work by the subject on the subject (Chignola, 2018, p. 123). Bringing these aspects 
to the fore, means to highlight the role of critique and its aesthetic components in Foucault’s 
thought, which the negative reading seems to overlook and, hence, miss the possible reading 
of the Foucauldian subject as one that can be read to have a desire and a capacity for self-
transformation (Butler, 2001). This is something, for example, which feminist theory, taking 
from Butler’s reading of Foucault, has advanced (Lloyd, 1997a). If we are to find—which I 
will argue we will—the possibility for resistance through the subject it is to be found in his 
reading of antiquity, for it is there that the technologies of the self, and how their role then 
allows us to see the subject as constituted by methods of work by the subject itself, come to 
the fore (Sauquillo, 2017, p. 416).  
However, in order to be able to reach the political potential that the reading of 
antiquity has, it must be done by underscoring the role of freedom and truth in Foucault’s 
thought. Power and freedom are two concepts that cannot be separated in Foucault’s work, 
something to which James Laidlaw attests to in his reading of freedom as being indispensable 
in the understanding of how subjects come about (Laidlaw, 2014). Having power and 
freedom so closely interconnected is not something to shy away from but rather, something to 
bring to the fore and utilise in the monitoring of power mechanisms, always framed by a 
discussion of what we are and what we might become (Magill in Lloyd and Thacker, 1997, p. 
7). The way in which Foucault studies subjectivity is always with regards to the role of truth. 
This is important to take into account as we read into Foucault’s work on antiquity, in which 
he would insist on how the role of truth in Greek thought claimed the invigoration of the 
subject, contrary to Christianity where truth would play a condemning role (Sauquillo, 2017, 
p. 431). Understanding the role of truth is vital in order to differentiate in Foucault subjection 
from subjectivation or, in other words, the role of truth as key in the making of a radical 
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subject that is not merely imitating the norm. By taking into account the role of truth, and its 
coming to being through freedom, we can escape the negative reading that deems the 
Foucauldian subject as one that has no space between that which made it and that which it 
can resist. And this, I read to be precisely his last stage of thought.  
  Another way in which we can appreciate Foucault’s attentiveness to truth in antiquity 
is by the role of parrhēsia, frank speech, which when practiced by the subject results in a 
subject able to “undertake the hard work of judgement aided by guides not yet supplanted by 
rules” (Luxon, 2008, p. 388). In this way we can begin to appreciate that the role of truth will 
be key in uncovering the space that at first sight might seem non-existent, but by bringing the 
idea of frankness to the front we can then begin to appreciate that the subject can differentiate 
itself from the rules imposed and can exercise judgement. In this way we can begin to see that 
there might be in Foucault the possibility of a subject that is self-creating, though not without 
constraints (Kelly, 2013a, p. 517).  
One last aspect to remark on before diving into a fully fleshed out defence of Foucault’s 
subject is the matter of supposed incoherency. Foucault regarded his work as a ‘toolbox’, he 
was explicit about never having the intention of offering a cohesive theory, and I think that 
those that engage with his thought must at least acknowledge this characterization. He never 
intended for his work on power to produce a recipe-like solution (Lemke, 2019, p. 382). 
Foucault was clear and vocal about this:  
At this point I think we need to bring into the discussion the problem of the function of 
the intellectual. It is absolutely true that when I write a book I refuse to take a prophetic 
stance, that is, the one of saying to people: here is what you must do— and also: this is 
good and this is not. I say to them: roughly speaking, it seems to me that things have 
gone this way; but I describe those things in such a way that the possible paths of attack 
are delineated. Yet even with this approach I do not force or compel anyone to attack. 
(Foucault, 1996, p. 262)  
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Not only then does he state that he has no ‘recipe’, but even given the toolbox of his collected 
thoughts, Foucault never envisioned the possibility of “eliminating” power (Foucault, 1982, 
p. 793). This speaks, though partially, to the critique towards Foucault’s notion of power. It is 
not only mistaken to conclude that there is no room for resistance in Foucault’s genealogy, 
but it is also that arriving at such a conclusion stems from an already mistaken starting point 
which assumes resistance in Foucault would be a notion free from power. Critiques that claim 
that Foucault’s genealogy of power, one that can embrace everything and which leaves no 
room for political possibility, seem to think that political transformation must be one that gets 
rid of power, as if only there would we find resistance. But there could be no such thing as a 
society without power, something which Foucault was emphatic about. And, adding to this 
the importance of freedom, we can start to see that power differs from domination insofar that 
it depends on the exercise of freedom to be. And thus, where there is power there is 
resistance.  
On the one hand then, there are critiques that deem this work as incapable of offering 
a possibility for political resistance through the idea of subjectivity because such an idea is 
seen as one that cannot be separated from the power mechanisms which made it. On the other 
hand, there is the reading of ethics as one that shows an interest in political possibility. 
However, even in this positive reading, it remains true that Foucault did not explicitly state 
how to go about it. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to offer an argument of 
Foucault’s ethics by signalling to its political potential in the coming about of a new 
subjectivity. I will try to show the political potential of his ethical work through the 
delineation of key aspects that we must look towards for the envisioning of new type of 
subjectivity. I do not intend to negate the problematics of power, resistance, truth and 
subjectivity, rather I understand the interplay of these terms to offer a new horizon of political 
praxis found within a form of subjectivity that primarily constructs itself.  
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I will attempt to show that it is not a renunciation of his previous work, nor is it an 
abandonment of the political. Rather, much like he himself said, I read Foucault´s concern on 
the subject to be deeply connected with his previous stages, as I understand it to be 
profoundly political as well. I do not see a rejection of his earlier thought, but rather in 
Foucault’s unfinished work I will argue we can read an effort toward a new type of 
subjectivity. The question, then, becomes: What does this horizon of political praxis that 
stems out of the Foucauldian subject look like? This is the question that I will try to answer 
through the fleshing out of the political instances of Foucault’s work on the care of the self, 
after which I will delineate a new subjectivity through three main ideas: critique, body and 
limits. The rest of this chapter will aim at theorizing each of these terms into the wider 
scheme of the delineation of a subject. 
The Political in Foucault  
Offering a political reading of the care of the self necessarily calls for a discussion of what, 
within Foucauldian thought, is the political. Such a term does not have a precise definition in 
Foucault’s work, so I will argue for its meaning by the bringing together of different strands 
of his work. I would like to start from an interview by the title The Ethics of the Concern of 
the Self as a Practice of Freedom where Foucault by, precisely, talking about the care of the 
self, comes to speak also about where his analysis of power finds place in his reading of 
ethics in Antiquity. He highlights the matter of freedom in Greek thought by underscoring 
that only he/she who is not a slave, not even to oneself, is free and thus, inhabits a political 
model: freedom is inherently political (Foucault, 1997f, p. 286). While this is by no means a 
definition of the political, I make reference to this discussion on freedom because it signals to 
the starting point of what the political might be for Foucault: something which is inherently 
related to freedom, and thus also holds a relation to power, since in Foucault’s thought, as we 
have seen by now, these two terms do not exist without the other.   
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To envision an idea of the political dependent on the role of power and freedom leads 
us, as does Foucault’s thought in general, to a post-foundational theoretical framework, or 
post-structuralism in other words. This particular theoretical framework understands the 
world through an analysis not only of structures, but of what makes the structure. While 
structuralism focused on analyses of the structures themselves, post-structuralism places an 
emphasis on what makes the structure. The concern about what makes the structure is 
constant, and in the analysis to achieve an understanding of what makes it there is an 
underlying conception of the world which is inherently contextual. From an analysis of the 
subjection process that the so-called scientific discourse entails, to the effects of the power 
mechanisms and to the way in which the subject itself mandates its creation as a subject, 
Foucault’s view of the world is one where nothing should be taken as a given, as natural nor 
objective. Now, this is not to mean that this way of conceptualizing the world leads us to an 
eternal relativism where anything could be, but rather it is about underscoring the 
impossibility of full fixation.  
An impossibility of full fixation points towards an idea of the political thought 
through power, antagonism, freedom, contingency (see Mouffe, 2005, p. 9; Marchart, 2007, 
p. 154), different from the term politics which is taken to be the “set of practices and 
institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence in the context of 
conflictuality provided by the political” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 9). In this way we see that politics 
talks more to the particular societal arrangement that can arise given the understanding of the 
political. An understanding of the political which is informed by notions that would seem to 
indicate its impossibility—antagonism, contingency, power—but, rather, this does not mean 
for the “the impossibility of any ground, but the impossibility of final ground” (Marchart, 
2007, p. 155). This is to say that nothing is ever fully cemented, fully closed, fully defined in 
post-foundational thought.  
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The impossibility of fixation is a never-ending concern in Foucault’s work which, I 
think, precisely points towards his ideas of the political. There is a constant signalling to 
breaks, to shifts in meaning, whether in how we understand madness, the penitentiary system, 
or sexuality, to name a few. These examples in Foucauldian thought are ones that exemplify 
antagonism, power, freedom and contingency, which allows us to start to envision the 
political in Foucault as the pointing towards that impossibility. The political is that moment 
where antagonism, power, contingency and freedom meet to set about a discourse, showing 
that nothing is ever fully closed, fully defined, fully finished. The political is the beginning 
and the opportunity of a break since it shows that discourse, meaning, could have been 
different.   
Let us take as an example the introductory volume of History of Sexuality where 
Foucault points towards how we have taken to understand our sexuality through a discourse 
on repression, but if one takes a closer look one would, first, see that it is not about repression 
and, second, it has not always been envisioned in this way. The idea of repressed sexuality 
comes about as a means of controlling a population in a particular way through the Victorian 
Age. Another example is the analysis he offers in Discipline and Punish, where he 
exemplifies how the passing from a sovereign to a disciplinary form of power has been 
wrongly understood as state power becoming more humane, and this transition implying the 
supposed disappearance of corporal punishment. The reality of such transition was not about 
being more humane, but about being more efficient: the penal economy came to realize the 
efficiency of patrolling the population over that of corporal punishment. The analysis of the 
establishment of these different discourses, that of a repressed sexuality, that of a more 
humane penitentiary system, allows us to see that such discourses are not given, not natural, 
but are built through antagonistic and contingent power relations, and show the role of 
freedom insofar that some other discourse could have been.  
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This is the political, the opening up of contestation towards the taken for granted, the 
signalling of what is as that which could have not been; it is sedimentation as much as it is 
contestation; it is rupture in its contingency, in the unoccupied moment where the possibility 
of a break lingers. I have tried to show that through Foucault’s work there is a constant 
attempt at underscoring these moments of sedimentation and breakage which, I take it, makes 
his work inherently political. The moment in which we highlight that the way we understand 
the world has been configured by contingency, antagonism, power and freedom, is a political 
moment. When we come to understand that our current penitentiary system is one that was 
built to serve higher efficiency, efficiency which in itself is antagonistic, embedded in power 
mechanism and contingent, such is a political moment.  
The importance of freedom in Foucault’s work, as I said at the beginning of this 
section, also points towards the political. Freedom is permanent in Foucault’s work insofar as 
he would insist that one cannot talk about power without talking about freedom. Where there 
is power, there is resistance, and thus freedom. Where a certain discourse and meaning has 
been sedimented, there is still freedom for such sedimentation, we have now seen, is never 
permanent, one can always transgress the limits. Now, this must not then be understood as if 
contingency and the political are synonyms. It is not that the political must equal the 
impossible fixation, but the political is the contestation done to signal that impossibility. 
There is no political without contingency, but contingency is not enough to mark something 
as political. It is a contingent moment which by the workings of power, antagonism and 
freedom, allow for the political moment to arise, displayed not as the crisis or dislocation in 
itself, but what that crisis or dislocation means for the contestation of the hegemonic 




I have tried to argue up until now how one could read the idea of the political in 
Foucault. I have contended that this idea is to be understood through a post foundationalist 
lens, where (1) it is differentiated from politics and (2) it is an idea drenched in power, 
antagonism, contingency and freedom. This results in viewing the political as that moment 
which is both sedimentation and rupture of a discourse. Simply, as Thiele argues, what 
Foucault politicizes is the will to struggle (Thiele, 1990, p. 923). I have shown how this is 
something which we can trace continuously in Foucault’s work, and his thoughts regarding 
the care of the self are no exception. Let us remember, as was delineated in the previous 
chapter, that the care of the self is framed by the aspects of philosophy and spirituality. The 
care of the self is then outlined by the relation between that which determines truth 
(philosophy) and that which allows the subject’s transformation in order to access truth 
(spirituality) (Foucault, 2005, p. 15). I think that this framing could also be reworked as 
understanding the care of the self through the relation between the ethical and the political. 
Ethics for Foucault is the ways in which the self fashions itself or, in other words, the self to 
self-transformation needed to access truth. And, the political, as I have just argued, is that 
sedimentation and rupture of a discourse, or, the setting or breaking of the limits which 
enable access to truth. The relation that these two terms will have, as they frame the care of 
the self, is not static.  
We have seen in the previous chapter how the care of the self started as an activity 
exclusive for the young rulers-to-be to better prepare them for their profession. This was 
followed by an epoch in which the care of the self was not bound by a specific age or 
profession and, rather, the activity is seen as cultivation of a new free self. Lastly, we see the 
care of the self to be one that serves to further subjugate the self through confession instead 
of freeing it. And so, we see that each historical moment has different framings as to the need 
or not of self-transformation for accessing truth, or, in other words, we see during the 
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different moments how ethics and the political produce different outcomes in their tension. In 
the analysis of these tensions, Foucault pays particular attention to the second historical 
period, the golden age, and heavily draws on it to formulate his own understanding of the 
care of the self.  
Foucault ultimately refers to the care of the self as an activity of the “cultivation of the 
self” (Foucault, 1986, p. 43), both “personal and social, where self-knowledge occupies a 
considerable place” (Foucault, 1986, p. 45). This characteristic of it being personal should not 
mean to deny it from its social aspect which would give rise to relationships between 
individuals, even institutions and, ultimately, a mode of knowledge (Foucault, 1986, p. 45). 
The underscoring of the personal, of the self, is not one that forgets the other, but rather, it is 
the starting point to a concern on the political and its conditions of possibility:  
It [the care of the self] is much more concerned to define the principle of relation to self 
that will make it possible to set the forms and conditions in which political action, 
participation in the offices of power, the exercise of a function, will be possible or not 
possible, acceptable or necessary. (Foucault, 1986, p. 86) 
The transformation of the self by the self that such cultivation allows is one that will allow 
for the delineation of the possibility of resistance given a notion on power that, at first sight 
would seem to leave no room for change or transformation. This is why, as I have stated at 
the beginning of this chapter, Foucault’s work on ethics is developed in parallel with that of 
governmentality. The care of the self, thus, ultimately highlights the transformation needed to 
access truth while facing truth’s limits. So, as Foucault said, what he tried to offer through the 
analysis of the care of the self is a story of the relation between subjects and truth regimes, 
but what rests underneath is also a story of the relation between ethics and the political. This 
transformation of the self, however, must be achieved through particular instances, which as I 
will claim and defend are: critique, body and limits.   
75 
 
It is not that Foucault ever addressed the care of the self through these three ideas, nor does 
he ever explicitly mention them as the key to achieving a new type of subjectivity. However, 
through the remainder of this chapter, I will try to show how his analysis of the care of the 
self is actually entrenched in these three aspects and how, by highlighting each of them, we 
can read a political take on the care of the self. 
Critique  
Critique is a constant notion in Foucault’s work. There are two key texts in which he 
addresses what he takes critique to be: “What is Enlightenment?”, and “What is critique?”. 
Simply put, critique for Foucault is the questioning of authority, where the word “authority” 
references that which governs us. Authority, thus, is not just the king, the state or the 
patriarchal figure within a family, but the discourse that has made each of those figures into 
authority bearing characters. This way to understand critique is one that stems from 
Foucault’s reading of the Enlightenment as a historical moment which invites a critical 
ontology of ourselves; he finds in this epoch the ever active critical attitude with and towards 
ourselves, through the finding of limits of our time and their possible liberation (Sauquillo, 
2017, p. 72).  
To find the limits of our time and its liberation can only be achieved through the 
questioning of authority, of that which makes us and sets the limits of what we are. In other 
words, a critical ontology of ourselves through the signalling of limits can only be done 
through the questioning of the subjection process which makes us. This questioning takes the 
form of asking:   
How not to be governed? How not to be governed like that, by that in the name of those 
principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, 
not like that, not for that, not by them. (Foucault, 2007a, p. 44) 
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Not to be governed like that or, in other words in my reading, how not to be subjected like 
that. How not to be made into a subject by those terms, by those characteristics. As we call 
upon not being that subject, we undertake the critical exercise of responding to the subjection 
process which rules us. This exercise is something that Foucault traces as historically 
anchored and has a voluntary dimension to it, as we cannot be forced to be critical, we cannot 
be coerced into questioning authority, rather, to critique must be seen as “voluntary 
insubordination” (Foucault, 2007a, p. 47) against the bundle of power and knowledge which 
enact the process of subjection.   
The question then becomes, why critique? What does this questioning exercise offer 
us? Such exercise of critique, as it questions authority via a voluntary insubordination, points 
towards a conversion of power (Foucault, 1997f, p. 288) as we question that which makes us, 
as we signal to those limits. This conversion of power comes insofar as it is not that to 
critique is simply to negate that which governs us, but rather it is the questioning of that 
governing, into what it makes us and into why we have come to accept it and, thus, the 
opening for the opportunity to go onto new possibilities (Foucault, 2007b, p. 115); in sum, it 
is the conversion, not elimination of power. Let us remember that in the tracing of the role of 
salvation within the Hellenistic-Roman period of the care of the self, Foucault underscores 
the idea of conversion, as that which came to signify a shift within the subject, a movement 
of the subject with regards to himself, the subject must advance towards something that is 
himself, it returns to itself (Foucault, 2005, p. 248). The idea of conversion arising from the 
exercise of critique mirrors this well. A voluntary insubordination that questions authority, 
that poses the question of how not be governed like that, subjected like that, signifies a shift 
within the subject, a return to himself as he steps away from that which has been imposed.  
This conversion, this shift, it is important to underscore, does not mean an elimination 
of power. It is important to point towards this because it gives reason to reading Foucault’s 
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work as continuous. Precisely because he has concluded a notion of power as omnipresent, as 
one that can embrace anything, Foucault’s work on a new subjectivity could not be one of 
erasing power. There could be no society without power hence why any type of idea of 
resistance in Foucauldian terms must be one that still accepts, and even embraces, power. 
Conversion of power then must mean that the shift within the subject, the refusing to be 
subjected in a particular way, must mean that power here mutates, insofar that, from an 
imposed truth, we move to the self’s own truth.  
Let us remember that Foucault, when addressing the break between the first and 
second volumes of The History of Sexuality, gives reason to this by saying that if he were 
truly to account for a history of the experience of sexuality, he had to offer a theorization of 
the desiring man, something which he realized was missing in the introduction of the project. 
And so, as he turns in the second volume to analyse the desiring man, he does so through the 
limits that desire demarcates, and how the subject is made within those limits. What is this 
desire if not the authority figure that plays into the subjection process? The analysis of the 
care of the self that follows in the third volume of The History of Sexuality questions these 
limits and this process of being made into a desiring subject. Ultimately Foucault’s take on 
the care of the self is one that calls for an understanding of desire, of questioning, and of re-
appropriation of the self through self-mastery; what is this if not a conversion of power 
through critique? The calling into question of desire and the limits it sets is a mirroring of the 
exercise of critique previously described.  
As the care of the self ceased to be for a specific function and age group, it became 
understood more to hold an important “critical function […] To “unlearn” (de-discere) is one 
of the important tasks of the culture of the self” (Foucault, 2005, p. 495). The care of the self 
sets about the possibility of questioning, of unlearning the previous teachings through the 
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cultivation of the self-self relation. Or, in other words, setting about the voluntary 
insubordination towards authority as this unlearning also has a sense of struggle:  
The practice of the self is conceived as an ongoing battle. It is not just a matter of 
training a man of courage for the future. The individual must be given the weapons and 
the courage that will enable him to fight all his life. (Foucault, 2005, p. 495) 
The care of the self, thus, much like the exercise of critique is one that cannot be forced, but 
that has to find the courage to embark on the practice that will question that which has made 
it until then. As Foucault comes to understand the care of the self primarily through the 
Hellenistic-Roman lens, as that of a cultivation, he takes this exercise to be not one that could 
or should be forced, but one that, if desired to do, would take courage to perform.  
This is also an aspect which relates to the care of the self ceasing to be an activity for 
a specific part of the population and becoming part of the everyday life in the sense that the 
idea of such activity was not then to create a pattern of behaviour, but more so to underscore 
that it was a matter of personal choice (Lloyd, 1997b, p. 79). One could not be forced to care 
for oneself, it was a matter of choice in the knowing that the embarking on such praxis would 
require courage and, as we said in the previous chapter, labour to perform. To embark on the 
task of unlearning what has been taught is a task of labour. And doing such labour will lead 
to learning anew, taking in that which can re-make us.  
As the care of the self calls for an unlearning of the previous, it calls for a questioning 
of authority, of that which has made the self. This questioning, that can be referenced as an 
unlearning, opens the possibility for a new take on truth. “[T]he object, rather, is to arm the 
subject with a truth it did not know, one that did not reside in it” (Foucault, 2005, p. 501) or, 
in other words, it allows for the showing of the spiritual dimension of the care of the self to 
come through: the transformation needed for the self to access its truth, not the truth 
previously imposed through subjection but its own truth, by the setting and questioning of 
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limits. The question then becomes what meaning this mirroring between critique and the care 
of the self takes up politically in order to offer a political reading of the care of the self. This 
mirroring between activities shows that the care of the self is, in fact, an example of 
Foucauldian critique and by being so, its practice can be seen as a conversion of power.  
As the care of the self enables a critiquing exercise that seeks to unlearn the politics of 
truth that previously ruled us, what it ultimately achieves is a conversion of power, a limiting 
or controlling of power (Foucault, 1997f, p. 288). This, of course, poses the question as to 
what is meant by this “conversion of power”. I take this conversion of power to signify the 
starting point of a subjectivation process, of the moment in which the self by questioning the 
imposed limits from authority, questions, transgresses them and thus gains its own truth. 
What is the idea of de-subjugation by a self-transformation if not the conversion of power? 
The care of the self is, thus, a conversion of power. 
If we pay particular attention to Foucault’s reading of Seneca, we can see that there is 
room for this reading of the care of the self. Seneca said that the care of the self ultimately 
allowed: “[…] to replace the non-subject with the status of subject defined by the fullness of 
the self’s relationship to the self. He has to constitute himself as subject, and this is where the 
other comes in” (Foucault, 2005, p. 129). There are two vital parts to this quote: the status of 
the subject and the place of the other. Seneca tells us that the activity of the care offers the 
replacement of the non-subject with the status of the subject or, in my reading, this is where 
the conversion of power occurs. The non-subject I take to be the subjected self, the one with 
imposed limits and politics of truth that match it. The status of the subject is, precisely, the 
self that results from the self-transformation through the subject’s own truth. The conversion 
of power is precisely that replacing of the non-subject with the status of the subject, the 
replacement of the subjected subject by the subjectivated one, that is, the replacing of the 
subject that had been made by the subject that makes itself. The self, in this sense, practices a 
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conversion of power as it critiques the authority of previous knowledge in order to unlearn it, 
and becomes a subject.  
The second vital aspect of Seneca’s thought is the underscoring of the other as the self 
constitutes itself as a subject. This shows us that the care of the self was not intended as an 
activity to enclose the self, it is an activity that while it happens in and through the self, is not 
independent of the other: “It was a generally accepted principle that one could not attend to 
oneself without the help of another” (Foucault, 2005, p. 495). This other could be understood 
as the role of the “master” which was an important figure in the care of the self, throughout 
all of its historic mutations, the role of the master is a constant. What varies is how the master 
and student form their relationship. If we remember, during the Socratic-Platonic stage, the 
master was meant to help overcome the problem of ignorance. For the stoics, however, the 
role of the master was meant to ensure that the self achieved its status as a subject and, thus, 
was viewed more as effective agency (Foucault, 2005, pp. 129–130). And so, it is not only 
about the master teaching the unlearning, but about what that unlearning does to the others. 
Ultimately this care of the self, read as an ethos was “a way of being and of behaviour. It was 
a mode of being for the subject, along with a certain way of acting, a way made visible to 
others” (Foucault, 1997f, p. 286).  
Limits  
In his reading of the Enlightenment Foucault found an ethos which called into question the 
limits of our time. As we read the care of the self as an exercise of critique calls for the 
questioning of authority or, in other words, of imposed limits. This questioning is one that 
sets about a conversion of power through the transgression of limits. As we critique that 
which subjects us, we are questioning the limits of that which makes us. And, as we convert 
power by such questioning, we are then transgressing such limits. The how not to be 
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governed like that, could also be read as how not to be limited like that. As the practice of the 
care of the self calls for the unlearning of that previously taught, it also speaks for the 
transgressing of the previously imposed limits.  
As the stoic understanding of the care of the self works towards finding the status as a 
subject, through the learning and unlearning, we can say that this can be read as the process 
of transgressing the limits which demarcated the non-subject and delineating the limits of a 
new subjectivity. Again, this is not something which Foucault directly spells out but his 
thoughts on limits allow me to make such an argument. In a text in which he analyses the 
idea of limits, he very much insists that such a notion is one that can only be developed and 
understood parallel to transgression, because what are limits if not, precisely, the 
representation of possible transgression:  
The limit and transgression depend on each other for whatever density of being they 
possess: a limit could not exist if it were absolutely uncrossable and, reciprocally, 
transgression would be pointless if it merely crossed a limit composed of illusions and 
shadows. (Foucault, 1997a, p. 34)  
If a limit could not be transgressed, endangered, it would cease to be a limit. The limit exists 
insofar as the possibility of its negation is present. This understanding of limits is something 
which finds great resonance in Foucault’s work on power, specifically the thought that where 
there is power there is resistance. If there was no possibility for resistance, then power would 
cease to exist. The limits demarcated by power must be able to be transgressed in order to 
“prove” their existence. So, as we understand the care of the self as critique, we come to see 
that such practice calls for and allows for the transgression of limits set about by 
authority/power through the conversion of power.  
The idea of transgression is one that goes hand in hand with the idea of limits in 
Foucault’s work. In fact, the notion of transgression is one which underlies Foucault’s work 
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on ethics. Taking the idea of the care of the self as both the possibility for critique and the 
coming about of the self, as I am trying to argue, is something which signals to the idea of 
transgression, “transgression of the boundaries of discursive constitution, (self)understanding, 
and disciplinary or governmental practices” (Lloyd, 1997a, p. 289). Here, as Lloyd reads 
Foucault, we are invited to see the aspect of transgression as that which, as we push the 
boundaries of the imposed, also makes way for the reinvention of the self. Ultimately, to 
underscore the role of transgression of limits is to bring to the fore the subjects binding to an 
imposed truth, one that permits for the “simultaneous individualisations and totalisation of 
modern power structures” (Lloyd, 1997a, p. 289).  
The concern of the self being bound to an imposed truth was an aspect already in the 
conversation through spirituality and philosophy. We have seen by now that these are the two 
pillars which demarcate the care of the self. Philosophy here is understood as the possibility 
of the subject having access to truth, determining the conditions and limits of said possibility 
(Foucault, 2005, p. 15). Spirituality, on the other hand, refers to the transformation that 
subjects must undergo to meet the possibility of truth. In other words, the care of the self is a 
practice which ultimately poses the relation between subject and truth, or ethics and politics 
as I am trying to argue. By bringing these pillars into the discussion, we can better see the 
role of limits since both philosophy and spirituality are understood by limits; the former being 
that which sets the limits of truth and its accessibility and the latter being that which sets 
about the transformation to access truth. Spirituality and philosophy, thus, play into the limits 
of subjection and subjectivation processes, of a subject upon an imposed politic of truth and a 
subject demarcated by its own truth.  
If a reading of the care of the self through critique takes us to understanding the 
practice as that which questions the authority—or, the limits—in order to convert power and 
find a status as subject which makes itself instead of the one that the is being made, and 
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moreover, this move is analysed in between the role of philosophy and spirituality—or, in 
between the subject and truth—then what the care of the self signifies is a transgression of the 
limits of truth. To find, then, a status as subject is to demarcate oneself by the limits of one’s 
own truth, that which is achieved through spirituality, that which was lost in the Cartesian 
moment.  
As we read the practice of the care of the self through spirituality and philosophy 
there is a particular importance placed on the role of limits. We come to see that the care of 
the self as an exercise of critique is one that seeks to transgress limits. To highlight this 
transgression matters because it is what further exemplifies the political potential of the care 
of the self. To move, to transgress, to critique the limits of a truth subjected onto the self and 
achieving a transformation into a subjectivated truth, a truth of one’s own, is a political act. 
This, however, should not be taken to mean that the transgression, the breaking of limits, 
would mean a disappearance of limits, or erasing of power. The care of the self can be 
understood as a conversion of power, which is not to imply an elimination of power. I cannot 
emphasize enough that this was something which Foucault was clear on. There is no society 
without power relations, it is nonsensical to think of such possibility, power creates social 
actors as much as it binds us. So, indeed as we understand that through the exercise of 
critique we are able to transgress the limits of an imposed truth opening up the possibility of a 
truth of our own, this is not to say that such truth is limitless, it could not be truth if it were 
so.  
The inability to erase limits is one that can be read through Foucault’s differentiation 
between liberation and freedom. When asked if we could conceive the care of the self as a 
practice of liberation, he was cautious of this characterization insofar that it could be read to 
imply that the care of the self then discloses a certain human nature that seems to have been 
concealed by repression and, thus, all that is needed is to break such repressive chains and 
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man will be reunited with himself, the one that is its true self (Foucault, 1997f, p. 282). He 
goes on to say that moments of such understanding of liberation are non-existent and can be 
exemplified by the liberation of colonized people, but this moment still needs to be 
accompanied by practices of freedom in order to, once liberated, define the admissible and 
acceptable forms of existence or political society. Practices of freedom, thus, are those that 
set about the political. 
The delineation of the political through limits is something that speaks also in the 
stoics reading of the care of the self. Let us remember that an important component of the 
care of the self in such times was the reliance on rigor, control and austerity (Sauquillo, 2017, 
p. 426). For the Hellenistic-Roman the care of the self was a practice that ultimately called 
for the self-transformation of the subject as it lived its own truth to establish its own limits. 
The care of the self understood as an exercise of practice, then, calls for an understanding of 
limits carried out by the subject itself.  
Body 
I have argued up to this point that the care of the self is a practice that can be read as an 
exercise of a critique on limits by setting about new ones. I have also defended that to flesh 
this out from the care of the self allows for a political reading of such concept. Just as critique 
poses a conversion of power, so does the care of the self, which signifies that both these 
activities were deeply intertwined in Foucault’s thought. And in that conversion of power, the 
transgressing of limits is made palpable. I have narrated this understanding through the 
central ideas of spirituality and philosophy, which ultimately point towards the relation 
between subject and truth. This takes us to the last point which I consider must be observed in 
a political understanding of the care of the self, the place the self inhabits: the body. 
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To highlight the role of the body in an activity that is first and foremost a self to self 
activity seems straightforward and, so, the question then becomes: what is the political role of 
the body in the care of the self? As Foucault analyses the passing from the first to the second 
stage of the care of the self he puts particular attention into how the care of the self loses its 
pedagogical nature in between these stages. The passing from one moment to the next is 
marked by the fact that the care of the self ceases to be a pedagogical activity for future rulers 
and, rather, becomes a generalized activity, for everyone and throughout all of their lifetime. 
In this new envisioning of the care of the self, Foucault finds three characteristics: as a 
critical activity with oneself (as we have seen), secondly, the role between the self and 
medicine and, thirdly, the matter of old age. These three aspects are made into two main 
points: the replacement of a pedagogical model with a medical one and of the care throughout 
life (Foucault, 1997e, p. 235). As the care of the self stops being an activity that serves an 
educational purpose for a specific age and profession in life, the exploring of this activity 
becomes opened to all regardless of age or status and, thus, finds a parallel with the role of 
medicine, another activity open to all regardless of age or status.  
As the care of the self becomes freed from specific characteristics, the Hellenistic-
Roman understanding of it becomes closed to activities which are also free from specifics. As 
epimeleia heautou is no longer seen as an educational purpose for rulers, the care of the self 
becomes better understood through the medical model, a type of care which is permanent 
throughout life, and so the care can be read as one becoming the doctor of oneself (Foucault, 
1997e, p. 235). There is no longer a particular achievement of becoming the best ruler but, 
rather, the care becomes a constant practice for life achievements, which the stoics and 
epicureans thought would only become evident moments prior to death and hence why old 
age is seen as completion (Foucault, 1997e, p. 235). The perpetual concern for oneself is 
what brings about Foucault’s idea on the “art of living”:  
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From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical 
consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art. […] we should not have to 
refer the creative activity of somebody to the kind of relation he has to himself, but 
should relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative activity (Foucault, 
1997b, p. 262).  
To read the care of the self politically then is not a one-time occurrence, but it is a perpetual 
activity of self making and creation; a perpetual concern not only in the immaterial (i.e., the 
soul) but also in the body, and so enters the importance of medicine. During the seminar on 
Hermeneutics of the Self Foucault points out that in the post Platonic tradition the role of 
philosophy and medicine were deeply interconnected: the philosopher was seen as the carer 
of the soul in the same sense as the doctor would care for the body (Foucault, 2005, p. 97), 
and so the care of the self ceases to only concentrate on the soul, and care also for the body 
(Foucault, 2005, p. 108). For the golden age of the care of the self, this was a practice that 
had the objective of returning the self onto itself, turning the status of the non-subject into the 
subject. Such a return to the self in the stoics and epicureans was not meant for enclosing in 
the ethical realm, but rather it was connected to the purpose of finding a status as a subject 
through the care of the self.  
The status as a subject comes about from the recentring of epimeleia heautou onto the 
self-imposed limits of a new subjectivity. It is not that the self would then be enclosed, but 
rather that in its return to itself it poses its relation to the political in its ‘own’ terms. And this 
is why the body matters in this understanding. This new idea of the subjectivity is one which 
will live in a body, ultimately it is the body that holds a place in the world. It is not enough to 
care for the soul, but we must care for the materiality which carries this soul. This is, I think, 
the ultimate idea that the care of the self from the golden age presented. What would it matter 
how cared for your soul has been if the vessel where it lives has not received the same 
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attention? And so, this idea came to be read as the possibility of becoming the doctor of 
oneself.  
To view the care of the self as an activity that could be approached through a medical 
model allows Foucault to signal the importance of the body. In the Platonic-Socratic reading, 
to care for oneself was regarded as to care for one’s soul, however as we move to the second 
historical epoch of the care we find in stoics and epicureans discussion and concern for 
understanding the body and soul as one singular unit and, thus, both the physical and the 
mental should matter when it came to care for the self. This underscoring of the body is also 
met with a particular understanding of cure, or salvation. We have seen in the previous 
chapter how the stoics understand salvation in a particular way, and this links to the idea of a 
medical model through the care of the self. The salvation for the stoics is a positive one, 
insofar as they understand salvation in a positive sense, as saved by—and not saved from.  
By caring for itself, for both soul and body, the self recentres itself, gains the status of 
a subject and, thus, saves itself. The self is saved by caring for both body and soul. Being a 
doctor of oneself leads the self to ask for the voluntary insubordination towards the limits, the 
call for courage. The body is of course a vital part of the subjectivation process through the 
care of the self. It is in and through the body where the care of the self becomes alive, where 
ethics and politics meet.  
The Bodily Critique of Limits 
No! I am not looking for an alternative; you can’t find the solution of a problem in the 
solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I 
want to do is not the history of solutions—and that is the reason why I don’t accept the 
word alternative. I would like to do the genealogy of problems, of problématiques. My 
point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly 
the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So, 
my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper-and pessimistic activism. I think that the 
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ethico-political choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the main 
danger. (Foucault, 1997b, p. 256) 
I have tried to argue up to this point that the care of the self can be read as an activity with 
political potential as it calls for a new type of subjectivity. This political possibility comes 
about by paying particular emphasis to the notions of critique, limits and body. However, 
while I have made the case as to why these three aspects allow for a political reading of the 
care of the self, I have not addressed why these three aspects are the ones to be underscored 
to achieve such a reading. Nor have I addressed how the care of the self, even if now 
understood as a political activity, looks in a practical manner. The remainder of the chapter 
will deal with these two unanswered questions.  
I have tried to stress that this political reading ultimately rests upon the tension 
between the subject and truth, the limits it imposed and the possibility to transgress them. Or, 
to put it in Foucault’s own words, it concerns the relation between spirituality and 
philosophy. This relation between spirituality and philosophy I have also defended could be 
read, as the quote at the beginning of this section suggests, as the tension between the ethical 
and the political. It is Foucault himself who begins his seminar on the Hermeneutics of the 
Subject by demarcating what will be his reading of the care of the self by the relation between 
these two notions. The importance granted to spirituality and philosophy point us, precisely, 
towards critique, limits and the body.  
If spirituality is the transformation done through the subject in order to be able to 
access truth, while philosophy is the limits that demarcate the possibility of that access, then 
ultimately these two ideas are connected by the aspects of critique, limits and the body. A 
transformation by the self through the self to access truth in Foucault’s framework is 
something only achievable through the role of critique, which would demarcate the already 
existing limits and how to transgress them by philosophy. The body comes into the picture by 
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the fact that the transformation needed to access truth must find its place in the self, in the 
body. The body is the place where resistance first comes about. It is the body where the 
tension between the ethico-political begins. This is why I have signalled to particularly these 
core ideas to construct a political reading of the care of the self. By signalling to spirituality 
and philosophy, we can rethink Foucault’s care of the self through the bodily critique of 
limits. Understanding the care of the self as an exercise of critique that aims at transgressing 
limits through the body is a reading of this activity that goes hand in hand with the idea of the 
political traced at the beginning of the chapter. To argue for the care of the self as the bodily 
critique of limits is to offer a political reading of such a notion because, much as I defined the 
political, such a reading of the care is one which signals to contingency, towards the 
possibility of the coming about of a new discourse.  
Now, it remains to discuss the more practical implication of my argument: what does 
the care of the self ‘look like’ and how does a new subjectivity come about? This is 
something which Foucault leaves unanswered. As he signals to the idea of the ethico-political 
tension, he does so through a problematization of the subject, as “the development of a 
domain of acts, practices, and thoughts that seem to me to pose problems for politics” 
(Foucault, 1997c, p. 114). And this problematization through the care is an answer to the 
problematization of power; a power that came to be understood as totalizing, as dooming, as 
bad. But, as I have argued throughout this chapter, that was not the point at all. It is not about 
understanding power as bad, but as the danger it holds. So, in part, Foucault leaves the 
question of the practicality of the care of the self unanswered, mainly because of its 
unfinished aspect, but more so because his work was oriented towards problematizing, not 
towards offering clear path solutions. The problematization of the care of the self, I have 
argued, was a way by which Foucault pretended to answer the ethico-political choice. Given 
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the danger of a power that can embrace everything, the care of the self poses a response to 
it—given it is read through the bodily critique of limits enabling a new subjectivity.  
There is, however, an idea which we encountered in the previous chapter, which will 
hold particular importance in this rethinking of the care of the self: askēsis. Foucault reads 
this notion as that which binds subject and truth, enabling truth telling to be constituted as the 
subject’s way of being (Foucault, 2005, p. 327). This idea is introduced when Foucault is 
discussing the query of what spiritual knowledge looked like for Stoicism. As we have seen, 
it is this middle stage of the care of the self that most interests Foucault, that of the 
Hellenistic-Roman epoch, which he deems the golden age, and is particularly influenced by 
Stoicism and epicurean thought. The preference for this specific historical time is due to the 
understanding of the care of the self as an activity which has an end within the subject itself. 
Stoics and epicureans underscored the role of spirituality—being one of the two pillars 
alongside philosophy—given that they would heavily weigh the role of self-transformation 
by the self turning its gaze onto itself. This change of focus of the gaze signifies the 
spiritualization of knowledge, particularly read from Seneca, as it means the changing of 
position from the subject, allowing for the grasping of reality and the value of things, making 
the subject seek the finding of freedom (Foucault, 2005, p. 308). The subject that turns its 
gaze towards its body is changing its position, grasping reality under a different 
understanding, or put differently, is transgressing the limits of the imposed and exercising 
critique as the seeking of freedom. This is the enactment of the bodily critique of limits. This 
spiritualization of knowledge, says Foucault, is seen in praxis through askēsis, through the 
binding of subject and truth.  
The association of askēsis and spiritual knowledge is particular to the golden age. 
During Christianity, for example, the idea of askēsis signified a practice with the ultimate 
objective of achieving a self-renunciation, and it found its maximum expression through the 
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act of confession (Foucault, 2005, p. 333). By understanding askēsis in this way, Christianity 
took it to be that the truth was within the subject itself, there was no need for self-
transformation to be able to access it, all that was needed was for the subject to renounce 
itself through confession. Askēsis during the golden age was vastly different. While the idea 
of binding subject to truth is very much at the core of it, this binding happened through a 
transformation that the self needed to undergo. Askēsis was the achieving of a full and 
independent relation of the self to the self by constituting truth telling as the subject’s way of 
being (Foucault, 2005, p. 327). This way of being happens as the subject achieves a sense of 
self-mastery over itself, through the practice of different techniques that make up askēsis. The 
exercising of these techniques ultimately is understood to be: “a set of practices by which one 
can acquire, assimilate, and transform truth into a permanent principle of action. […] It is a 
process of the intensification of subjectivity” (Foucault, 1997e, pp. 238–239).   
The techniques that allow for this intensification of subjectivity are encompassed 
between two poles: meletē and gymnasia. The former refers to the imagining of possible 
events to test how one would react, whereas through the latter the self places itself in a real 
situation and tests the self’s independence to the external world (Foucault, 1997e, pp. 239–
240). Or, in other words, between the idea of self-training—through abstinence and tests—
and mediation; all techniques are done by the self through the self, which makes askēsis a 
praxis in which the self makes itself as the object of tekhne, and life becomes to be 
understood as a work of art (Foucault, 2005, p. 424).   
The spectrum upon which askēsis is found, gives us the opportunity to start 
envisioning a more practical understanding of the care of the self. It is through askēsis that 
the self manages to take care and envision a new type of subjectivity. When reading the care 
of the self as the bodily critique of limits, we can envision such a possibility of a new 
subjectivity for this reading is one which underscores the political potential of said activity. 
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And within that possibility what we find at the centre is the binding of subject and truth 
which is brought about by the techniques found in between the idea of training and 
meditation. Now, here it is important to clarify something, I am not trying to argue that it 
would have been Foucault’s intention for us to practice the care of the self exactly as we can 
find evidence of it in Antiquity. Rather, I read Foucault’s analysis of the care of the self as an 
intent to see what could be learned and bring it to our day. Much like he described his own 
work, I see Foucault’s approach to this body of work as one would approach a toolbox, where 
one takes the pieces needed to solve a problem. So, I would not follow a conclusion that 
would take the analysis of the care of the self as the need to ‘copy’ what was done in the past. 
But, rather, I find the importance of the care of the self in Foucault’s thought—and, thus, in 
our critical enterprise today—in the understanding of what the care of the self meant for 
Antiquity, and the value behind such meaning.  
I have been arguing that the meaning of the care of the self in Antiquity, in the way 
that Foucault read it, can be reworked into an understanding of it bringing about a new 
subjectivity insofar as the subject finds itself bound to truth as it practices askēsis through 
different techniques. My argument of trying to bring to our day the practice of the care of the 
self is obviously not one to be understood as replicating in an exact manner such activity but, 
rather about capturing the meaning of such techniques. To care for the self today as to 
envision a new type of subjectivity means to identify for our world how the subject can bind 
itself to truth: what is the way to practice askēsis today? Bringing to the fore the exercise of 
critique which seeks to question the limits imposed through the body, to bring the care of the 
self in our present day means to bring to the fore ethico-political tension and in doing so 
choosing what is the main danger that we face. And this danger I take it to be, and will argue, 
is the living through an imposed truth and taking this for granted into what it signifies for the 
subjection process. In this way, to practice askēsis today means to find techniques which 
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allow us to awaken to this subjection process. Now, to be stating that we need to bring the 
care of the self to today is implicitly bringing to the fore another unspoken argument: a 
critique of the subject we are today. If I aim to claim that there is an imposed truth 
overshadowing the contingent subjection process, I must then address what I take this 
imposed truth to be. This is the topic of the next chapter, offering a problematization of who I 
take the self to be today, analysed through the digital media lens which I argue serves as an 




III. Chapter Three: The Digital.  
Up until this moment this thesis has been heavily oriented toward a theoretical reworking of 
Foucault’s care of the self. At the core of this dissertation we find an argument in favour of a 
political reading of Foucault’s care of the self, which depends on a bodily critique of limits so 
as to open up the possibility for a new type of subjectivity. I contended that such reworking 
has to be made through the notions of the body, critique and limits. The care of the self as it 
calls for a conversion of power is an inherently critical exercise with the questioning of limits 
as its objective, and such an exercise is one that happens through and in the body. I concluded 
the previous chapter with a theorization of what the bodily critique of limits would ‘look 
like’, an aspect which was not answered fully and was left open ended. This loose end I 
admitted, on the one hand, was partly because Foucault’s thought might be exhibiting a 
limitation in this regard, a matter to which I will return in Chapter Five. However, on the 
other hand, and more importantly, to close such an open end and better ground the argument 
for the coming about of a new subjectivity, I must now explicitly defend what has been a tacit 
argument up until now. To call for a defence for a new subjectivity implies a critique of the 
existing one. This chapter, then, turns to the fleshing out of today’s subject.  
We have seen that in his text “What is Enlightenment”, Foucault argues for a critical 
ontology of ourselves, or, the critical knowing of what we are, what has made us, what are 
the limits imposed on us? A critical ontology of ourselves then serves to answer not only that 
which we are, but also what has governed making us so. From this, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, the idea of critique emerges as the posing of the question how not to be 
governed like that, quite that much? I would like now to flesh this out further so as to better 
frame this third chapter. A critical ontology of that which we are must not exclusively flesh 
out the self, but also that which made this self. This objective is one which I think holds true 
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for the writing of critical political theory, it is not only about seeing the governed but also 
about highlighting the practices of governance:  
[T]hat is, the forms of reason and organisation through which individuals and groups 
coordinate their various activities, and the practices of freedom by which they act 
within these systems, following the rules of the game or striving to modify them. 
(Tully, 2002, p. 538) 
Critical theory, then, underscores the practices and regimes of practices which subject us but, 
also, the way in which we resist and transform them by bringing to the fore the role of 
freedom. To see critical theory in this way is to analyse such practices from two sides, from 
both the governance side—looking into language games, the web of relations of power and 
the specific forms of subjection—and the governed side—and their acting in accordance to 
the rules, or raising problems or refusing (Tully, 2002, pp. 539–540). To put it in Foucauldian 
terms, it is seeing critical political theory as the bringing about of the ethico-political tension. 
For the critical ontology of ourselves, for the critical task to be fruitful, we must not only 
pose a critique of that which governs us, but also about the subject that has resulted from such 
governing; it is not only about the underscoring of practices of governance but of how these 
can be better understood and critiqued by those governed by them.  
The need to analyse practices of governance is then the need to analyse that which 
makes us, that which subjects us, that which is commonly called the status quo, or the 
hegemonic discourse, which today receives the name of neoliberalism. Much more than an 
economic project and more so a regime of practices that govern us, neoliberalism today 
dictates the meaning of that which makes us:  
Neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse. It has pervasive 
effects on ways of thought to the point where it has become incorporated into the 
common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world. (Harvey, 
2007, p. 3) 
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However, my interest rests upon the analysis of a ‘smaller’ scope, and so, my claim here is 
that today we can take the digital as an exemplary case when it comes to neoliberalism’s 
upholding mechanisms. I will contend that an analysis of the digital today, one of 
neoliberalism’s great enforcing mechanisms, serves to offer an account of how neoliberalism 
has entered into every aspect of our lives, norming and making us into a particular type of 
subjects. My analysis of the digital will then play the part of an analysis of the practices of 
governance. And from this analysis the idea of the governed as a particular type of subject, 
which I will characterize as depoliticized, will result.  
In today’s world it is difficult to point to where the digital ends and analogue begins. 
We live in a world where the digital has become a part of our everyday. We wake up, we 
check our phones. We reach our office, we open our email inbox. We go for a run, we open 
an ‘app’ to track our distance and rhythm. We go to a restaurant and we post about it on our 
social media accounts. We publish a new piece of research and the incessant checking of how 
many ‘retweets’ we get becomes more stressful than the process of having written that piece 
in the first place. We read news that angers us and we let our twitter account know how 
maddening it is. We go to a protest, we use the trendy hashtag. This way in which we now 
understand the world has become so normalized we do not even question it. There was a time 
in which digital platforms did not exist and we could still work, socializing at restaurants was 
possible, exercising was not scrutinized by an app, and political uproar still took place. We 
fail to acknowledge that the priority that we give to the digital today was not always so. I do 
not mean to pose all of these examples in a tone of judgment; I myself fall into these customs. 
I acknowledge how pervasive and mentally damaging my participation in social media is, still 
my accounts remain active. I can recognize how invasive it is having my email linked to my 
phone completely blurring the line between work and home, but I have not dared to changed 
it. Such is the digital.  
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It would be easy enough to say that the digital world is more of a characteristic for 
younger generations, those that truly do not know a world without the digital given the fact 
that they were born already into its existence. In a way, this is true; the digital is an aspect 
which runs deeper into generations that are so accustomed to smartphones that they might 
have trouble recognizing a landline phone as something that, at its core, serves the same 
purpose of their latest iPhone. For example, Bernard Hartcourt offers an account of how 
teenagers today feel as if their existence is only validated through social media, if they don’t 
have active profile on these platform then they do not exist (Harcourt, 2015). However, I 
think that an analysis of the digital is necessary because it serves an active role in our 
subjection process regardless of being active users of the digital media. The digital, as an 
exemplary case of the hegemonic discourse, subjects users and non-users alike.  
The digital is so pervasive that it goes beyond its active users. Even for those that 
today have consciously, or not, decided not to have social media profiles, or those who do not 
do online shopping as to not reveal their shopping habits, or those who do not have a 
smartphone, even they remain within the digital because the digital is more than a defined 
space or tool in which we can actively decide to participate. The digital, as a tool-like space, 
is a mechanism needed to uphold the hegemonic discourse. To be sure, this is not to signify 
that I am trying to offer a normative argument of the digital. I am not making a case to 
understand that what results from the digital is bad nor that the digital in itself is bad or 
wrong. Rather, my aim is to signal that the way we today understand and participate in the 
digital is complex and that such complexity is deeply intertwined with a subjection process 
which poses important challenges for the creation of critical and transformative spaces 
politically speaking. Much like Gane and Beer argue in their analysis of the internet and its 
relation to individualistic aspects: it is not that the internet itself fosters individualism but, 
rather, that given its characteristics it can be made to serve individualism (Gane and Beer, 
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2008). Such is my argument for the digital: bluntly put, I do not understand the digital as 
inherently being adept for maintaining and creating a neoliberal discourse; had the digital 
come to be in another context we cannot know how it would look like, what it would have 
upheld and created. But today, as it stands, we cannot deny, or this is what I will try to argue, 
that the digital serves particular needs. However, I will also argue that the digital’s discourse 
is a contingent one, not fully fixed, and hence it can be reimagined.  
So, What is the Digital?  
It is not a mistake or accident that it has taken me quite a few pages of this chapter to finally 
define the digital. I have given myself such space because I wanted for the reader, through the 
moments I posed as examples previously, to take the liberty to form an instinct of what the 
digital may be. My definition is as follows, the digital “is the exacerbated use of the internet 
through gadgets”.12 I offer this admittedly loose definition to capture the vast array of 
scenarios which I just described. The digital phrased in this way encompasses not only the 
internet, or social media, or the blurred lines between work and home spaces but rather 
acknowledges all of these aspects. Within this broad definition, one can fit aspects of: 
algorithms, online data, social media, technologies, internet, computers, personal devices, 
applications and so on. Perhaps the most specific part of the definition is the aspect of the 
gadgets, which I will further flesh out as this chapter develops. This specificity might ignite 
some initial confusion given the fact that I started the chapter by describing the digital almost 
as inescapable, even by those that actively choose not to participate in it—however, as the 
chapter advances, I will flesh out the fact that even if the definition ‘depends’ on gadgets, a 
person’s lack of them does not exclude them from the digital’s discourse.  
 




A way to start unravelling this is by addressing if my definition of the digital refers to it 
as a space or a tool. Indeed, the digital can be used as tool for communication, for example, 
through emails or social media. This allows us to use the digital for other purposes such as: 
organization, socialization, and so on. But the digital can also be viewed as a space, as I have 
tried to describe, as all encompassing, reaching the most intimate parts of our lives. And in 
this way, it is that I envision the digital not as either tool or space but, rather, as a tool-like 
space. I use this phrasing because it is undeniable that the digital is of course a tool, but it is 
also a space when space is understood as:  
[…] an order or representation that exhibits a structural regularity between objects, and 
spatialization to refer to the logic of representing or making visible objects, which 
(partially) fixes the meaning of their essentially contingent character. Social and 
political spaces are a specific subset of space and spatialization in general. (Howarth, 
2006, p. 129)  
In other words, I refer to the digital as a space because of its constitutive character of 
contingent meaning upon which certain articulated elements offer regularity between them. 
There are, of course, social and political spaces which are “not a subset of the physical space 
but, rather, physical space is a subset of any order that yields a structural regularity between 
objects” (Howarth, 2006, p. 115). This is to signify that the meaning we grant to the physical 
space we do so because of the social space, not the other way around. As meaning is in post-
structuralist theory, social space is constructed rather than simply given to us. When 
referencing the digital as a space, then, what I mean is for it to be understood precisely as 
giving order and fixing the contingent meanings of the hegemonic discourse. This is why, 
even those that think they have been able to avoid the tool like aspect of the digital—refusing 
the use of gadgets, social media, online shopping—are still embedded in the meaning 
creating space that is the digital. And that meaning creating space, as one of the paradigmatic 
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mechanisms that upholds the neoliberal hegemonic discourse, is one that makes us into a 
particular kind of subject. 
The digital then is a tool-like space insofar as the exacerbated use of the internet though 
gadgets can be understood as a tool, but it is also, undeniably a meaning creating space. Now, 
the reader might think at this point, that it is not clear why then I seem to be posing the digital 
as different than the technologies that have preceded it; radio and television could also be 
tool-like spaces of meaning and subject creation. However, I do indeed propose that the 
digital has particularities which previous technologies did not. One aspect we can underscore 
here is the speed by which the digital spread:  
In contrast, new information technologies have spread throughout the globe with 
lighting speed in less than two decades, between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, 
displaying a logic that I propose as a characteristic of this technological revolution: the 
immediate application to its own development of technologies it generates, connecting 
the world through information technology. (Castells, 1996, p. 33) 
Castells takes that speed as a defining aspect by which to signal to the uniqueness of the 
technological revolution, and not only that but he also speaks to its impressive flexibility: 
informational technologies have the ability to mutate easily and seamlessly. Such speed and 
flexibility have allowed for such technologies to become present in every corner of our lives; 
Castells takes Nicholas Negroponte and says: “We live in a world that has become digital” 
(Castells, 1996, p. 30), ideas that are further developed in The Internet Galaxy where Castells 
argues for the internet’s openness as one of its main sources of strength (Castells, 2001, p. 
27). I welcome Castells’ ideas and take them a step further by adding the aspect of gadgets to 
my definition of the digital. While previous technological advancements could also be seen as 
meaning creating spaces, in the case of the digital I understand this to be underscored and 
heightened given that those of us that chose to use gadgets have ended up creating a 
symbiotic relation with them. This is something that started with the PC (personal computer), 
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in an analysis which Sherry Turkle pioneered (Turkle, 1984, 1997, 2011), but as of now has 
advanced through smartphones, tablets and now, even to smartwatches: we now have the 
digital stuck to our wrists. These gadgets have become primordial in the way in which we 
make use of the internet: we hold a symbiotic relationship with them, one which sustains our 
dependence on the internet. The digital, thus, is shown through the fact that we seem to no 
longer comprehend a world without the internet, we no longer question the fact that we 
‘need’ the internet, and thus need the devices that allow us to step into it, to make use of it.  
The digital is sleeping with our smartphones next to us, it being the last and first thing 
we see during the day. The digital is having our smartphones out on the table when having a 
meal or coffee with friends. The digital is our incessant need to have the latest smartphone, 
even when the one we have works perfectly. The digital is the panic we feel when we cannot 
find our phone. The digital, thus, becomes ‘palpable’ through the gadgets that connect us to 
this tool-like space, with which we have a very symbiotic relation. This symbiosis is 
something which, as mentioned was developed by Turkle and her characterization of the 
“second self” with the coming about of the PC (Turkle, 1984). More recently we find the 
term “quantified self”, referring “to the practice of gathering data about oneself on a regular 
basis and then recording and analysing the data to produce statistics and other data (such as 
images) relating to one’s bodily functions and everyday habits” (Lupton, 2013, p. 25). 
Examples of this is the current fashion of measuring one’s steps, tracking numbers of hours 
slept, counting the number of glasses of water drank, and so on—ideas which are sold to us 
by the unquestioned hegemonic discourse, and we normalized, due to a supposed health 
discourse. This term has been taken further into an analysis of the workplace by Phoebe 
Moore and Andrew Robinson (Moore and Robinson, 2015). Specifically, Moore and 
Robinson take this term into the workforce and show how this linkage of labour with the 
quantification of the self has been exploited by mass companies, making it now customary 
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for employers to keep track of every detail of the worker’s performance, enforcing on their 
employees the mechanisms that allow them to keep perfect control and surveillance over their 
performance.  
I want to claim that Moore and Robinson’s analysis of the workforce and, thus, their 
characterization of the quantified self, is something to be taken beyond the workplace. Our 
symbiotic relation with the digital has led us to live lives of quantification; it has lead us to 
become subjects who, first and foremost, count: “the digital man fingers the world, in that he 
is always counting and calculating” (Han, 2017, p. 35). We quantify our bodily functions—
how many hours of sleep, how many glasses of water have I drunk—and our social 
encounters—how many people liked the picture of my food, how many ‘friends’ do I have 
according to social media. We are not only counted extensively in our workforce, but we 
extensively count ourselves. We count our self-worth by the interactions on social media. We 
count the number of friends we have by the amount of contacts we claim to have on 
Facebook.13 We measure our productivity during the day with the number of emails we 
answered, with the number of online forms we filled out, or the number of articles 
downloaded. We measure our research’s value in the times it has been tweeted about or 
viewed, in the alternative metrics fashion, instead of real engagement and debate had with our 
ideas. However, what I wish to signal to here is not so much the quantification but its 
normalization and the implications of it. This quantification of our lives has come to adhere 
to our lives in such a subtle manner that we do not question it. It is normal to quantify 
ourselves, it is normal to count our contacts on social media, it is normal to get a rush of 
happiness if our post surpasses a certain number of likes. It is also normal for employers to 
 
13 The Millenium Cohort Study, for example, has studied the impact of social media on the everyday life 
of teenagers, concluding that 2 in 5 girls spend at least 3 hours of their day scrolling through social 
media (Campbell, 2019). Also, a few years back, it was studied how the use of internet and social media 
impacted sleep patterns, where a fifth of the teens studied claimed to wake up during the night to log 
onto social media (Udorie, 2015) 
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make use of these quantification; how else could they account for productivity? But, as I will 
argue, this norm is the mere concealment of other possibilities, and in doing so creates a 
certain type of subject.  
So, while Moore and Han offer extremely thought-provoking characterizations of our 
time as one of the quantified self, I would like to take their arguments a step further by 
signalling to the implications of being a quantified self. I have already hinted at one, the 
normalization of quantification, we understand the quantification of ourselves as a given, and 
so, to develop this more fully in the reminder of this chapter I will further underscore the 
subjection process undergone in the bringing out of this quantified self. In other words, I am 
not so much interested in the quantification per se but in what such aspect means for us being 
made into subjects. Ultimately, I will construct an argument that claims for the digital to 
signify a depoliticized subjection process—an aspect which I had already hinted at in the 
beginning of this chapter by classifying today’s subjection process as problematic for the 
opening up of political possibility.  
This characterization of ‘depoliticised’ is one that follows from my definition of the 
political in the previous chapter. Where the political I took to be the underscoring of 
contingency, the moment of rupture and possibility of sedimentation, de-politicization I take 
to be precisely the concealing of such contingency. This is a notion that seems easier to pin 
down empirically than conceptually; we can see something happening but cannot phrase 
exactly why it is (Foster, Kerr and Byrne, 2015, p. 226). Ultimately it is a term taken to be 
housed within two broad definitions: (1) depoliticization as the removal of the political 
character of decision-making, influenced by Burnham; and (2) depoliticization as closing off 
public deliberation on a number of issues, taking from Hay and Jenkins (Foster, Kerr and 
Byrne, 2015, p. 227). I find here that Roussos’ idea of de-politicization brings together both 
of the mentioned strands in a helpful manner. He poses that a process signalled as de-
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politicized does not mean it is not political but, rather, that “the significance of an issue or 
norm is systematically diminished or marginalized” (Roussos, 2019, p. 267). I find this 
definition particularly useful, because it helps to underscore the relation between the 
depoliticized and governmentality, insofar that it helps to underscore that “[…] 
depoliticization has the concurrent effect of politicising agencies and individuals in pursuit of 
normalised political goals” (Foster, Kerr and Byrne, 2015, p. 238).  
By understanding the depoliticized as the diminishing of a norm’s significance, it helps 
underscore that, at the same time, it is further strengthening the discourse that thrives by such 
marginalization. De-politicized, thus, I take to mean taking as natural, given and objective the 
discourse which is not so, and in doing so it hides the contingent possibility. Now, this might 
seem a rather stark comment to make when analysing the digital, given that many of the 
aspects that live in my encompassing definition have been argued for to open political 
possibility. Usually, the digital is taken to be a very politically enticing tool and space, and 
while I do not intend to deny this in its entirety, I do want to signal to the complexities that 
live within the digital. 
One of the ways in which the digital has been simplified is in the understanding that it 
allows for a closer relation between citizens and politicians. It has also been spoken of by the 
way it facilitates access to information and how we make use of it. It, so we are told, enables 
participation. Our government officials are just a tweet away; all we need to do to have 
certain political information is do a quick google search; a few quick clicks on social media 
and a protest is organized. Succinctly put, the digital can be understood as a tool that has been 
used to create new spaces in which political participation is facilitated. The digital can also be 
viewed as a space for the practice of politics in itself; we inhabit such space through the 
voicing of our concerns, our thoughts and angers. These aspects just now enlisted, however, 
bring about a very simplistic view of the digital.  Characterizing the digital as merely a tool 
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which we use to ‘connect’ to politics is not enough to capture its complexity, it is not enough 
to bring to the fore the ways in which inhabiting the digital changes us and makes us 
according to its particular needs. Again, I cannot emphasize this enough, I do not intend for 
my critique of such a simplistic reading to be understood as a normative argument, it is not 
that I want to argue for the digital to be ‘bad’ and that we should try to get rid of it. Rather, I 
aim for a more complex reading of the digital to be brought about. As Foucault himself said, 
it is not that everything is bad, but that it is dangerous, and this is the way in which I read the 
digital. It is not that the digital is bad, but it is dangerous as it conceals its mechanisms in the 
subjection process, showing itself as objective, natural, as a given.  
Tania Bucher has shared an interesting argument in favour of ambivalence in our 
analysis of media technologies and their role in our society today (Bucher, 2019). Bucher 
signals to the critical power of remaining ambivalent, as she states that neither a full approval 
of these technologies, nor a complete dismissal of them, help us to truly analyse them and our 
society (Bucher, 2019). Just like the phrase from Foucault that I just mentioned, Bucher 
defends this ambivalence as not an “‘anything goes’ attitude, but, rather, a stance to ‘stay 
with the trouble’ of questioning basic assumptions and be transparent about them”  (Bucher, 
2019, p. 1). This is what I hope to transmit in the remainder of this chapter: not a normative 
argument but, rather, a signalling of those aspects we are taking for granted and their 
implications for the subjects we are today.  
How we talk about the digital  
As the brief outlining of the digital offered above showed, one of the ways in which the 
digital is thought about today is by its ability to create new spaces to practice politics, which 
in turn has meant a decline in the formerly traditional ways in which politics was exercised. 
People now prefer to pose their anger through their Facebook status than through the electoral 
ballots, so to speak. Peter Dahlgren has analysed this, to which he says that the decrease in 
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traditional civic engagement is not a decline in political worries but just a reflection of the 
resurgence of political movement outside of traditional party politics due to the fact that 
internet technology facilitates participation without which much alter-globalization politics 
would simply not happen (Dahlgren, 2007, p. 55). This shows, according to Dahlgren, that it 
is not that people have abandoned political engagement, but they have simply refocused their 
attentions outside the parliamentary system, outside traditional political engagement 
institutions, so to speak (Dahlgren, 2007, p. 57). Thus, for Dahlgren,  democratic citizenship 
through the net offers a sense of empowerment, and supports innovative forms of citizen’s 
identities (Dahlgren, 2007, p. 67).  
We can take this idea of empowerment a step further. By being able to ‘follow’ our 
political leader´s account on social media we come to feel closer to them, we feel that holding 
them accountable is within closer reach. We also feel empowered by the ease with which we 
can share our political opinions through our own social media profiles, feeling as if we have a 
more prominent role in the political sphere. This empowerment goes beyond understanding 
the digital as a space and, rather, also highlights its tool characteristics. We feel empowered 
because we feel in control and in ownership of politics through the devices of the digital. We 
own the smartphone that allows us to voice our political views, we need no one´s permission 
for accessing the space into which we think we are enacting active citizenship, we give 
ourselves the permission. Sherry Turkle had already posed this idea many years ago as she 
analysed the relation between the PC and politics. She argued that the PC became so alluring 
because of the sense of mastery it gave the person, not only for the literal ownership aspect 
itself, but because the insertion of PCs into politics makes people think they have a better and 
clearer understanding of politics (Turkle, 1982), in the sense that they come to believe that 
the workings of the political is just as mechanic and ‘straightforward’ as  the way that PCs 
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work.  People come to equate the computer with politics, as owned by them and made 
understandable—for use purposes—for everyone.   
The political exercised through the digital is also all the more enticing because this 
sense of empowerment and ownership that gadgets offer is even more gripping because of the 
symbiotic relation, as already argued, we establish with such devices. We have become one 
with the machine—whether it be our smartphone, our computer, tablets or smartwatches. In 
whatever form we prefer the machine to be, our dependence on it is undeniable. The 
symbiotic characteristic of the digital’s gadgets, is something which Turkle started to develop 
through the analysis of PCs and how they started a trend of one-person-one-computer: the 
artefact became the extension of the self (Turkle, 1984). Being able to individually own one, 
and being able to carry it around, made the individual come to understand the PC as an 
extension of itself, something which has only been amplified by the technological 
advancements that have followed the PC. This idea, of course, invokes McLuhan’s work and 
his analysis between media and man in this respect and how the former is the extension of the 
latter. McLuhan offered, precisely, the argument that our beings are extended by 
technologies: “any invention or technology is an extension or self-amputation of our physical 
bodies, and such extension also demands new ratios or new equilibriums among the other 
organs and extensions of the body” (McLuhan, 1964, p. 45); where one ends and the other 
begins will have, undoubtedly, important implications which I will discuss as this chapter 
develop.   
This symbiosis, or these extensions, have become even more acute as technology has 
advanced. Think of tablets, smartphones and now even smartwatches, all of them tools 
necessary to enter the digital which we, literally, carry with us. We have become one with the 
tool that allows for the entering of the digital. We feel panic if we cannot feel our phones in 
our pockets. We sense our phones vibrating when they have not. Our phone screens are the 
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first and last thing we see in the day. If working on a computer, most likely many of us will 
still have the phone beside us—and even a tablet—as if they offered anything different than 
the computer itself. The gadgets are a part of us. And as such, what we care for is the world 
that they allow us to enter, the world that they let unfold for us. And so, we can say that 
another consequence of the digital is, precisely, the seclusion into its terrain, done in a very 
subtle way through our symbiotic dependence on the digital gadgets. This is a worrying 
aspect, “[T]he net environment needs to help connect them [them is particularly referencing 
young people] to the political world beyond the screen itself. Yet it could be the case that the 
daily habits of online life are making the connection beyond the net less likely to take place” 
(Dahlgren, 2011, p. 103). The digital has made us forget that our lives must not be restricted 
to screens, which brings us back to the symbiotic characteristic evidenced earlier in the 
chapter.  
In this sense Turkle’s research precisely deals with our relation to a type of technology 
that offers a substitution for our face-to-face connection:  
We are offered robots and a whole world of machine-mediated relationships on 
networked devices. As we instant-message, e-mail, text and Twitter, technology 
redraws the boundaries between intimacy and solitude. We talk of getting “rid” of our 
e-mails, as though these notes are so much excess baggage. Teenagers avoid making 
telephone calls, fearful that they “reveal too much.” They would rather text than talk. 
Adults, too, choose keyboards over the human voice. It is more efficient, they say. 
Things that happen in “real time” take too much time. Tethered to technology, we are 
shaken when that world “unplugged” does not signify, does not satisfy. (Turkle, 2011, 
p. 11)  
The symbiotic relation is one that highlights the fact that we have become secluded precisely 
in the digital realm. As the quote above says, the “real” world, takes too much time, too much 
hassle. And indeed, we cannot deny that that has been one of the primary characteristics of 
the digital which has made it so appealing, and which we constantly refer to: its speed. 
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Exchanging emails is faster than a phone call or face to face meeting, being informed through 
twitter or the online newspaper pages takes less time than buying the newspaper, adding a 
‘like’ to a friend’s social media page is faster than having a coffee with them. This concern is 
only made graver when accentuating that the digital today is not solely in personal computers 
but in their climax, that of smartphones and social media: a device that we can carry 
everywhere with us, supposedly as a form of communication but, in reality, we use to abstract 
ourselves from the world of relations into a world of online connectivity. What does it mean 
for us to become subjects in this scenario? Does it not result somewhat paradoxically, that we 
see the digital platform as one that makes connections easier, but our reality is becoming 
more restricted and closed within the online space? What does this mean for the supposed 
new spaces that the digital creates?  
The new spaces for the practice of politics that are created by the digital have 
signalled us towards certain complexities. Given that such spaces are intimately related to the 
tools of the digital that created them and that allow us to enter, this has an impact in the way 
we relate to them; there is a sense of empowerment. The sense of ownership and entitlement 
that we have over the digital’s gadgets can make us also feel the same for the exercise of 
politics. We come to feel empowered in this exercise given that we have tools that make our 
access to it so simple and straightforward. Our understanding of politics is very much 
influenced by the way we relate to the digital, in the sense we come to understand politics as 
if it functioned through the same mechanisms as the digital does. We naively come to think 
that political participation is as easy, straightforward and fast as posting our Facebook status 
or our tweet. And, soon, we become secluded in this particular type of space through the 
symbiosis that characterizes the digital. We come to equate the ‘real’ world with what we see 
through a screen. What then does it mean to make use of the digital for political purposes, 
when it can lead us to have a much distorted conception of politics?  
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Joss Hands offers an analysis as to how we do democracy online (Hands, 2007, p. 89), 
where his emphasis is on how to model democracy according to the internet’s characteristics. 
This leads him to argue for what he names a radical e-democracy, as he sees in radical 
democracy’s characteristics the possibility to form a productive political relation with the 
internet:  
The internet, in augmenting the balance of hegemony and autonomy, offers agonistic 
pluralism the capacity to further ‘an extension’ of the democratic revolution to a whole 
new series of social relations. As such, the internet presents the chance to expand the 
range of social movements while maximising their autonomy, and therefore it must be a 
vital component in any radical e-democracy  (Hands, 2007, p. 91).  
Hands sees that the internet has the capability of further bringing out radical democracy’s 
characteristics of critical political change. It is not only that the internet creates new spaces, 
says Hands, but that they actually signify, in his view, productive practices of agonistic 
pluralism with a given new sense of autonomy. This, of course, begs the question of how true 
this would hold depending on the type of democracy in question, something which Lincoln 
Dahlberg has tried to answer.  
Dahlberg looks into four different types of democracy: liberal-individualist, 
deliberative, counter-publics and autonomist Marxist (Dahlberg, 2011). What Dahlberg 
argues within these four positions is precisely that the way the internet is understood to serve 
democracy ranges between a tool-like space/object—i.e. the digital media is something to be 
used—and a constitutive discourse—the digital is a space which constitutes discourse and 
meaning (Dahlberg, 2011, p. 865). The first two positions have a very similar relation to the 
internet, in the sense that they both see the internet as enabling and facilitating the democratic 
exercise. Dahlberg states that the liberal-individualist takes the internet as offering easier 
access to the information that citizens need to better examine political positions  (Dahlberg, 
2011, p. 858), while deliberative democracy sees itself as having an elective affinity with the 
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internet and, thus, deems it to be enabling this democratic conception (Dahlberg, 2011, pp. 
859–860).  
The next two positions, however, have a less tool-like conception of the internet. For 
the counter-publics position, digital media is emphasized within “political group formation, 
activism and contestations” (Dahlberg, 2011, p. 860). Within the counter-publics position, 
democracy is based on two major assumptions: “(1) any social formation necessarily involves 
inclusion/exclusion relations and associated discursive contestation; and (2) that this 
antagonistic situation is the basis for the formation of vibrant ‘counter-publics’, i.e. critical 
reflexive spaces of communicative interaction  […]” (Dahlberg, 2011, p. 861). This 
understanding of democracy means that the engagement sought through digital media, 
encompasses both inclusions and exclusions; in other words, it serves both dominant and 
counter-publics. However, even as it serves both types of discourses, by helping the bringing 
out of counter-publics, the internet in this democratic position is—overall—understood to 
enable and strengthen the voice of alternative and marginalized groups (Dahlberg, 2011, p. 
862).  
The last position, that of autonomist-Marxism, sees democracy as “a self-organization 
autonomous from systems of centralized power” (Dahlberg, 2011, p. 862), and understands 
the internet to be “enabling the extension of this commons networking, particularly in terms 
of ‘dematerialized’ open source cultural production and distribution […]” (Dahlberg, 2011, p. 
862). In this sense, the internet is understood to challenge non-democratic systems through 
the possibility of alternative productive networking, rather than explicit protest movements 
(Dahlberg, 2011, p. 864). Dahlberg concludes that the closer the position to the liberal-
individualist, the more the internet is understood as something tool-like that serves the 
democratic exercise. As we draw closer to the autonomist-Marxist, however, the internet is 
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seen in a more constitutive way, bringing into existence a new democratic society (Dahlberg, 
2011, p. 865).  
However, even this last position is to be taken with caution insofar as Dahlberg notes 
that there are two mainstream understandings of democracy and internet. One of these visions 
is the one that sees the Internet “as a force for ‘radical democracy’, helping marginalized 
groups, communication spaces […] the Internet’s interactivity and reach assists politically 
diverse and geographically dispersed counter-publics […] the Internet supports online and 
offline counter-public contestation of dominant discourses […]” (Dahlberg, 2007, p. 56). In 
order to fulfil such aspirations, it is important to foster the articulation of counter-publics and 
thus opposition discourses (Dahlberg, 2007, p. 57). However, there is another reading of the 
internet and democracy, where the “Internet [is] seen as reproducing dominant discourses … 
this reproduction included powerful social interests promoting dominant meaning and 
practices, while blocking marginalized ones, through the ownership and control of the 
medium” (Dahlberg, 2007, p. 56). Whether the internet serves radical democracy or the status 
quo, has to do with the possibility of counter publics—however, this calls upon the 
questioning of how possible this actually is, since the digital is a space that primarily serves 
the neoliberal status quo. Wendy Brown speaks to this issue.  
Specifically, in her text “At the Edge”, Brown analyses the role and meaning of 
political theory and she grapples with why political theory has seemingly lost its interest in 
tackling capitalism. Some ideas she has as to give reasons for this are the fact that capitalism 
appears as unchallengeable, it is difficult to make the case for viable alternatives and, with 
time, capitalism has managed to make itself look less “odious”, capitalism has developed an 
“ethical face” (Brown, 2002, p. 362). And, it is her argument of this ‘ethical face’, which I 
want to highlight here. Brown contends that one of the ways in which such a face of 
capitalism has come about, has been through its close relation with the media: the media is a 
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sponsor of capitalism, an aspect which makes her wary of any supposed intent of critique 
coming from such a sphere. Media is one of the key aspects for capitalism thriving, thus she 
criticizes any hope of capitalist critique to rise from such space: critique of the system cannot 
rise from the mechanisms that enforce the system  (Brown, 2002, p. 563). These are ideas 
which we can bring to neoliberalism and the digital today. What is neoliberalism if not the 
culmination of a capitalist society? What is the digital if not an augmented platform for 
media? What are neoliberalism and the digital if not two concepts deeply intertwined?  
Manuel Castells speaks to this in The Rise of the Network Society: Volume 1  ̧as he 
poses that the current technological revolution:  
[…] originated and diffused, not by accident, in an historical period of the global 
restructuring of capitalism, for which it was an essential tool. Thus, the new society 
emerging from this process of change is both capitalist and information […]. 
(Castells, 1996, p. 13)  
Not only that, but Castells furthers this argument by underscoring the role played by the state 
in the advancement (or lack thereof) of technology; he contends that it is the state that is the 
leading force for technological innovation (Castells, 1996, p. 10). What critical capacity, 
towards that which fosters and sustains it, can we then expect from the digital? I have 
signalled to a supposed easier communication, but what is actually being communicated?  
The digital enhances communication, facilitates it, creates it, but may also present it in 
a very particular way, a manner which follows the needs of the hegemonic discourse, as was 
just argued for through Brown. This idea is one which builds upon McLuhan’s take on the 
impact that the medium has on the message, where he argued that the way, or medium, by 
which something is communicated can shape more than the message itself; he says: 
“Societies have always been shaped more by the nature of the media by which men 
114 
 
communicate than by the content of communication” (McLuhan, 1967, p. 8).14 When looking 
into more current analyses of communication and capitalism, Jodi Dean’s results are helpful. 
Dean has studied the communicative aspect of capitalism, coining the term “communicative 
capitalism”, understood as “the materialization of ideals of inclusion and participation in 
information, entertainment, and communication technologies in ways that capture resistance 
and intensify global capitalism” (Dean, 2009, p. 2). In this way, Dean poses communication 
to be one of capitalism greatest mechanisms of support, but communication understood in a 
particular way. It is not about a true conversation, or a true critical outlet, but more so a 
fetishization of speech, opinion and participation (Dean, 2009, p. 17), and thus it becomes a 
vacuum in which criticism is offered to the abyss, and requires no answer because it does not 
stick as critique, but just as one more opinion thrown into the mix (Dean, 2009, p. 21). Within 
neoliberalism, everything is made into the market, made part of the market; we come to 
understand our lives through the market’s ideals: profit, competition, individualization, and 
so on, and this is an aspect which requires "technologies of information creation and 
capacities to accumulate, store, transfer, analyze, and use massive databases to guide 
decisions in the global marketplace" (Harvey quoted in Dean, 2009, p. 23).  
Dean theorizes communicative capitalism through the role played by three fantasies: 
abundance, participation, and wholeness (Dean, 2009, p. 25) each of them having relevance 
and resonating with the argument I am trying to construct. Firstly, by abundance there is a 
reference to an idea of having too much ‘out there’ and that, while we will have an impact 
with our contributions, the reality is that the content is irrelevant, all that matters in 
communicative capitalism is adding to the pool (Dean, 2009, pp. 25–30). Second, 
 
14 Baudrillard’s essay “In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities”, albeit out of scope for this thesis, 
presents an interesting analysis that is worth pursuing of the relation of the coming about of the 
masses, meaning, representation and spectacle and how these instances are—and here the influence of 
McLuhan is textual—influenced by the medium (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 35). 
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participation refers to thinking that our participation in the digital will actually make a 
contribution, when actually we are remaining politically passive and captured by technology 
fetishism (Dean, 2009, pp. 31–42). Lastly, wholeness speaks to the illusion of the digital 
allowing for far-reaching participation as the fullness of the global is simulated to being just a 
click away (Dean, 2009, pp. 42–48). In other words, Dean’s arguments further underscore the 
illusory empowerment, the symbiotic relation to gadgets and our equating the clicks of the 
digital with the world. Dean also denies a normative argument, and rather talks about the 
digital as something we cannot run away from: “globally networked communications remain 
the very tools and terrains of struggle, making political change more difficult-and more 
necessary-than ever before” (Dean, 2009, p. 48). 
There seems to be, then, an argument to be constructed about the digital being a 
possibility. We cannot get rid of it and must learn to make use of it. In this matter it seems as 
if it is up to the marginalized groups to fulfil this productive aspect of the internet, for it is up 
to them to use: “[…] the Internet as a means for the formation of counter-publics, the 
articulation of identities and oppositional discourses, and the contestation of the discursive 
boundaries of the mainstream public sphere” (Dahlberg, 2007, p. 60). A promising and 
exciting way of seeing the internet, but it does not really answer to how such use is achieved 
in a space that can also be read as a restricted one that serves to perpetuate the dominant 
discourse. Cass R. Sunstein, in his book #Republic, points towards this very aspect, as he 
argues against this notion of the digital as a seemingly very open space, and poses a 
contrasting view of it being a mediated space, which can be observed at an everyday level, by 
showing that our interactions online become carefully curated and manipulated by data 
companies and by social media (Sunstein, 2017). In other words, what we see and encounter 
in the digital has been pre-selected for us.  
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This is something which has been studied by Nolen Gertz specifically regarding 
Facebook, a platform that determines a great deal of how and what we communicate (Gertz, 
2019, p. 67). Where, then, in such a space do we find the freedom to construct a counter-
public as envisioned by Dahlberg? And even if a productive one does arise, how are we to 
ensure it is spread wide across? Going back to Bucher’s argument, and my own, on not 
wanting to make a normative claim on the digital, I am not now arguing that no dissonant 
discourse has risen from the digital. Indeed, marginalized groups have in certain instances 
found ways to creatively and effectively use the internet as a tool for organization and 
achieving coverage. However, counter discourses must be wary and cautious of the fact that 
the use of this tool, to enter such space, is one that was not built for the dissonance purpose, 
and hence, the use of the tool, the entering of the space, might not be as welcoming to counter 
discourse as we want to think.  
Until now I have addressed certain complexities of the digital: empowerment, 
symbiosis, seclusion in the digital space, censorship. Tufekci’s work on social movements in 
a digital age is a good exemplary summation of all of these aspects. In “Social Movement and 
Governments in the Digital Age: Evaluating a Complex Landscape”, she explains how the 
relation between activism and digital infrastructure is more nuanced than it might seem at 
first sight: as empowering as the digital infrastructure may be for protests and movements, it 
can lead to disempowering events (Tufekci, 2014b, p. 1). A vital reason for this, she points 
out, is because of how the digital infrastructure makes the organization process of protests 
easier, and in turn it demerits the collective capacity that would arise from having to organize 
a protest face to face:  
[…] the digital infrastructure allows movements to carry out protests with the same size 
and energy as past protests but without similar organization capacity. While this 
appears a shortcut for protests, it also engenders weaknesses, as these protests do not 
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signal the same level of capacity as previous protests, and do not necessarily pose the 
same threat to governments and power. (Tufekci, 2014b, p. 15)  
This idea is one which Tufekci develops further as she insists that the extra time required in 
the “traditional” ways of protest organization actually allows for the emergence of a 
collective thinking capacity that can see the movement through the challenges it will 
inevitably face (Tufekci, 2014a). This is an aspect which today’s movements lack insofar as, 
precisely because of the characteristics of the digital, they are able to scale up very quickly 
but without the time and opportunity to form the collective thinking capacity. The ‘easiness’ 
of organizing movements through digital platform alters our very understanding of the 
mechanics behind them; we expect results just as fast as the organization was achieved. 
We tend to think that participation has been made easier, more accessible, but, as 
Nico Carpentier points out, we do not even question what the meaning of such supposed 
participation actually is. Carpentier is insistent in saying that participation and access should 
not be confused as the same thing; participation, he points out, is a political concept: 
“Participation is not a fixed notion, but is deeply embedded within our political realities and 
thus is the object of long-lasting and intense ideological struggles” (Carpentier, 2011, p. 31), 
hence, when talking about participation we must also talk about power (Carpentier, 2011, p. 
24) because participation is contingent for it functions through the power struggles of society. 
It is precisely by signalling its inherently political nature that Carpentier is able to signal that 
participation must, then, not be confused with access or interaction, as to do so means to 
devoid it of its political characteristics (Carpentier, 2011, p. 27). 
To signal to this important differentiation of concepts brings us back to the 
conversation between democracy and the digital. Ideas regarding political participation in 
different democratic conceptions were brought to the fore, but after introducing Carpentier’s 
work, we must beg the question of how true such participation actually is. Is it not rather the 
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disguising of access as participation? Dahlgren, picking up on Carpentier’s work, points 
towards power as inherently within participation dynamics, and takes it a step further, as he 
analyses where we, as citizens, stand within such constellations of power and participation:  
The web and its ancillary technologies offer possibilities of engagement, but to what 
extent their use can enhance democratisation is still an open question. Not least it is 
clear that they can also be used by power centres to maintain control over the citizenry. 
(Dahlgren, 2011, pp. 98–99)  
This is precisely what the ambiguity of the digital rests upon, it can be viewed as a space that 
offers possibilities of engagement, as well as a control mechanism to uphold neoliberalism. 
Control over the citizenry is an aspect of the digital immersed in the political that has, over 
recent years, become more and more evident. In recent years we have witnessed several 
scandals, for example, in dealing with how certain media companies have altered and re-
shaped political moments and instances in accordance to their needs.  
Gertz, I have mentioned, has studied this through Facebook. Facebook, he claims, can 
be seen in four ways: as profile, as platform, as corporation, and as Zuckerberg. As a profile, 
it shapes what and how we communicate, and in doing so it—supposedly—gives us a place 
to occupy in social relations; a matter that is underscored in Facebook as a platform. As a 
corporation, Facebook is that which lives in the background of the scandals it is involved in. 
Gertz here argues that such scandals, as important and grave as they are, should not be our 
concern, for they conceal Facebook’s true nature which is working in the background, even 
with people that think they are not in it, but in reality any information that has been uploaded 
of them by family and friends, Facebook has stored a shadow profile (Gertz, 2019, p. 69). 
This is also exemplified in understanding Facebook as Mark Zuckerberg, and hence falling 
into the mistake of seeing the distraction that Facebook throws our way—in this case through 
the concentration on one person—from its very present capitalist ambitions as like any other 
corporation (Gertz, 2019, p. 70). This is the crucial aspect of Facebook, and the digital; that 
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which happens, which we do not even realize. Just as important, then, as it is to pay attention 
to the ways in which the digital offers possibilities of engagement, it is to look into the ways 
in which it may not be. If we fail to look at both sides, we fail to have a conversation as to 
why intents of activism and political critique coming from the digital might be failing: 
[We know from scholars such as] Weber, Michels and Foucault that forms of activism 
that become institutionalised over time and/or focus their attentions on trying to achieve 
change through existing institutional structures of power, become implicated in their 
tendencies to preserve the status quo and maintain ‘order’. (De Jong, Shaw and 
Stammers, 2005, p. 5)  
So, taken from the framing of Bucher, of the productivity of the ambivalence, I have aimed at 
fleshing out the different ways in which we think and talk about the digital today. The digital 
can be seen as the opening of new spaces for participation in politics, while at the same time 
questioning what the meaning of such participation actually looks likes. The digital allows for 
the voicing of opinions, with no certainty of where such opinions will end. The digital can be 
a powerful tool for the organizing of social movement, while weakening them by the rapidity 
in which they form. The digital allows us to have the latest news at the reach our phones with 
one rapid click, as it also permits us to reconnect with friends living far away, and in doing 
so, secludes us in the virtuality. The digital makes it possible to buy anything by just clicking, 
but also permits for the tracking of our every thought and every move. I have not intended to 
offer a normative argument regarding the digital, it is not that I wish to defend it as inherently 
negative but, rather, as complex, as ambivalent. And, in such ambivalence, we are made 
subjects; a particular type of subject that comes about from the governing practices. The 
digital as a governing practice makes us into a particular understanding of the world, one in 
which the digital in itself is taken for granted.  
The way that this chapter started was by offering an account of critical theory framed 
by the practices of governance and those governed by them. An account of critical theory 
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must offer an analysis of those regimes of practices, those discourses, which govern, which 
make, which subject. And, it must also offer an account of those it is governing, making and 
subjecting. To make an argument for an analysis of the subject as the governed side of the 
critical theory analysis is not without its complications. First and foremost, it poses a concern 
over individualizing arguments. I outlined in the previous chapter the preoccupations that 
Foucault’s analysis of the subject poses. These critiques also resonate with the underscoring 
of the subject generally speaking in critical theory, regardless of Foucault. Ultimately, in a 
world where the political is social, the signalling to singularity may seem problematic. This is 
not to say that there is an utter dismissal of the subject, but rather it is seen with little hope of 
critical possibilities. Let us take Dean’s argument on this respect as an example. We have 
seen that Dean’s term of communicative capitalism captures well the complexities of the 
digital, aspects which she takes a step further by underscoring that communicative capitalism 
operates through a system of desubjectivation (Dean, 2019, p. 174). Such a system is meant 
to show that our relation towards politics is one which is characterized by individualism:  
The spontaneous response is individual: outrage, a demand that something be done, a 
call for change. Communicative capitalism supplies the infrastructure for this 
spontaneous politics of the individual: mobile phones and social media. These media 
reward immediate reactions such as the tweet, the status update, signing of a petition, 
emailing a representative – individual activities all ancillary to the singular act said 
really to matter: voting. What passes for politics enslaves individuals ideologically to 
bourgeois individualism and its individualised political practices. Jobs are less reliable, 
and people feel like everything is more competitive, more precarious. More and more 
choices in a more and more complex and uncertain informational field are downloaded 
onto the individual, even as these individuated choices have little to no impact on the 
real determinations of our lives in a setting where satellites, fibre-optic cables, server 
farms, Big Data, and complex algorithms power high-speed trading, enable just-in-time 
production, intensify labour markets and concentrate wealth in ever fewer hands. 




Given this desubjectivation evidenced by individuality, Dean argues that we should find the 
subject through the divided people, taking up that space as its constitutive lack (Dean, 2019, 
p. 175). The challenge of politics in communicative capitalism becomes to “make effective 
the power of the many – how the crowd can be in and for itself, that is, how crowds can 
produce effects that can be attributed to the divided people as their subject” (Dean, 2019, p. 
179). For Dean, then, critique is that which is beyond collectivity, critique is collective 
(Dean, 2019, p. 182). Gertz, who also offered a more complex analysis of the digital, points 
to the fact that one of our great failures in understanding Facebook is our lack of analysis into 
how it shapes the public sphere and its role in it (Gertz, 2019, p. 66), or, in other words, we 
have failed at understanding the relation between Facebook and the collective.  
Now, to make an argument for the subject should not be understood as a dismissal of 
collectivities and, indeed, there should be caution regarding enclosed individualism. But, I 
will argue that we must look at the subject as the governed side; it is that subject after all that 
makes the collectivity. How would we go about understanding the public sphere that the 
digital has created, as Gertz invites us to, if we do not understand the subject made by the 
digital, which in turn makes the public sphere? Through the practices of governance there is a 
particular type of subject being created which feeds into the collective, the public sphere. Not 
that an analysis of the subject should be seen as a dismissal of the power of the collective, but 
it simply offers an analysis of that which makes up the collective. The spaces within the 
crowds come alive by the subjects that constitute said mass. The hegemonic discourse is 
upheld by important mechanisms, one of them being the digital, but what matters from those 
mechanisms is how they aid in the making of the needed subject for the status quo.  
Neoliberalism needs a particular subjectivity, one which the digital facilitates, thus 
why I deem it to be the precise possibility upon which critique towards this hegemonic order 
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must rise. The reader might notice, rightly so, that this mirrors the defence I offered of 
Foucault’s own focus on the subject in the last stage of his work. And, indeed, I argued for 
Foucault’s turn to the subject to not be seen as a renunciation for previous work, or an 
individualistic enclosing, an argument which speaks to the case I am now trying to make 
about the subject’s relevance.  
Throughout this chapter I have offered a reading of the digital which signals to its 
ambivalence, its complexity of positives and negatives. I defended characterizations such as 
quantified, symbiotic and secluded in order to underscore an analysis that goes beyond a 
simplistic understanding of the digital as a tool which serves who uses it with no 
repercussion. I have also signalled to an argument that this complex tool-like concept is one 
that enacts governing practices, which in turn make a particular type of subject. This 
particular type of subject I have contended we should underscore and better understand, 
mirroring Foucault’s interest in the subject, if we are to achieve a critical exercise. This I 
have defended as not being a dismissal of the collective, or the public, but rather as an 
accentuation of this aspect by paying particular attention to the singularity which makes 
them. In the next chapter I turn to the fleshing out of who is the digital subject. I build upon 






IV. Chapter Four: The Depoliticized Digital Subject. 
The previous chapter started by taking Tully’s approach to critical theory as one that must 
look at both governance and the governed. I claimed that we can take the digital to signify an 
exemplary case of the governing practices and, thus, has an important role to play in the way 
we become subjects. In doing so, I outlined a reading of the digital by paying particular 
emphasis to its ambivalence, and in doing so brought to the fore important characteristics: 
quantification, symbiosis and seclusion. I tried to show that the digital is a complex tool-like 
space which works to make a particular type of subject, one that serves the status quo. So, it 
is not so much about the characteristics drawn out of the digital in themselves but what they 
signify for the subject being made. In this chapter I turn to construct the governed subject, 
one that I will characterize as a depoliticized one.  
I offered a very loose definition of the digital as the “exacerbated use of the internet 
through gadgets”, and I did so purposely. I wanted to suggest a definition of the digital that 
could encompass many facets: the use of internet, social media, symbiosis with smartphones 
(gadgets), the quantification of data through the tracing of habits, the individualizing aspect 
of social media. I wanted a definition which would serve for both people who are ‘active’ 
partakers in the digital, but also for those that think of themselves as outside of it. Moreover, I 
wanted a definition that would lead to an instinctual understanding of the term, precisely 
because of how hard such a term is to pin down. Gane and Beer discuss in their book New 
Media (2008) that to define concepts that relate to the digital, or new media in their terms, is 
tough: “[these] are concepts that make thought possible but at the same time are hard to pin 
down and analyse” (Gane and Beer, 2008, p. 3). This is very much the case for the digital. To 
hear such term no doubt immediately makes ideas and thoughts jump out, but an actual 
pinning down of the concept is difficult. Sleeping with our phones next to us, no separation 
between home and work, using different application to track our everyday habits, from the 
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quality of our sleep to the amount of water drank, our need to post on our social media our 
every opinion and even the most mundane activities, the panic of not feeling our mobile 
phones in our pockets, all of these are the digital. And, all of these are instances I take will 
not surprise the reader, she will find herself—in some way—reflected in these examples.  
Such an open definition thus helps the reader to engage in thought experiments and 
exercises, arriving at an ‘instinctual’ understanding of the term, a gut-like feeling, regardless 
of it being difficult to pin down its specificity. The above examples also allowed the reader to 
set herself in the pervasiveness of the digital. We know of these everyday examples, we know 
how intrusive they are, and still, we participate in them. We know how invasive and 
damaging the digital is, yet we continue to take part in it. In his analysis of online 
participation, Dahlgren says: “Foucault suggests that discipline is participatory: we often 
more or less willingly participate in disciplining mechanisms. This seems to be very much the 
case in our daily patterns of use online” (Dahlgren, 2011, p. 101). We know that the 
information of ourselves we feed into any online platform no longer belongs to us. We know 
that having our emails in our phones is detrimental for our wellbeing and allows for further 
work exploitation. We know that social media has augmented depression in younger 
generations. We know we are losing our sense of privacy. We know, and still, we participate. 
We participate because we are made to participate. We are made to participate in our own 
quantification, our own symbiotic relation with the gadgets. This chapter will, precisely, flesh 
this out and argue for the mechanisms that bring this about.  
Taking from Foucault’s genealogical stage, I will look into the disciplinary 
mechanisms—understood as the logics that reinforce certain enactments of and within the 
political at play in our current subjection process from which we emerge as a certain subject. 
I must emphasize once more that the drawing out of these characteristics is not to construct a 
view of the digital as bad, but rather to further highlight its complexity, or its danger in more 
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Foucauldian terms. Moreover, I do not wish to argue that it is only through the digital’s 
mechanisms that we become subjects. Rather, as I have insisted before, I take this tool-like 
space to be an exemplary and paradigmatic case that serves for illustration purposes.  
The Digital through Foucault  
Discipline through the Panoptic  
Perhaps the most obvious link between Foucault’s thought and the digital is the idea of the 
panoptic and the discipline it instilled. The panoptic was an idea that arose from the 
genealogical stage, and referenced a particular architectural figure, envisioned as a prison. 
Such figure, a tower surrounded by a circle of cells, was built in such a way that the guard on 
the top of the tower was capable of seeing inside each and every one of the cells, but the 
inmates had no possibility of seeing the guard. In other words, the prisoners knew they could 
always be watched but had no way to confirm if they were actually guarded. Perpetual 
surveillance is the way in which the Foucauldian panopticon is carried into analyses of the 
digital. Mark Poster, for example, takes the notion of the panopticon to only be exacerbated 
since Foucault’s writing because of the development of the internet and databases (Poster, 
1990, p. 121). For Poster, the panopticon of the nineteenth century had limitations which the 
technological growth witnessed by the end of the twentieth century eliminated, creating what 
he coins the Superpanopticon (Poster, 1990, pp. 121–122). Jeffrey Nealon is another author 
who underscores the work of Foucault on this aspect, as he particularly uses such ideas to 
signal the resurgence of discipline and the panopticon, which can be seen in the constant 
government surveillance on its citizens and how it becomes official unquestioned policy 
(Nealon, 2008, p. 3). 
What is relevant when using the idea of the panopticon as a tool of thought is to 
understand that the actual architectural figure is used in Foucault’s writing as a means of 
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expressing an idea. It is not that the actual interest in Discipline and Punish was this prison 
design in itself, but what it meant. And, what it signified was the idea of visible but 
unverifiable power (Foucault, 1995). It is enough to instil in the mind the possibility of 
surveillance for good behaviour, such is the prime characteristic of the disciplinary power, 
one that disciplines the body as much as it does the mind or, in other words, the subject is 
disciplined into suitable behaviour. Now, needless to say, the use of Foucauldian thought for 
the analysis of the digital is not without critiques and problems, one of the most important 
being the time passed since his writings. When Foucault wrote Discipline and Punish the 
technological advancement that would come out of the internet in the nineties was still to be 
lived. Indeed, the last 30 years have signified an unparalleled technological growth—one so 
rapid that we cannot even comprehend its impact. Nonetheless this does not mean that 
Foucault’s ideas are not fitting for the analysis being offered. Rather, I take his ideas to be 
further amplified. The expansion of the internet into the digital world which we inhabit today 
has only underscored the perpetual unverifiable surveillance, an aspect which we know and 
yet still participate in, further proving the disciplining into willing participation.  
As soon as you do a google search of any product, the rest of your digital encounters 
will be filled by advertisements of such products or related ones. It has been said that one 
does not even need to do the search, but just talk about it, and our phones listen and in turn 
show us the pertinent promotions. Or, depending on our patterns of use of digital media, it 
can be guessed our age, interests, relationship status, ideological stance and a virtual profile 
of us is created to cater and target publicity and digital information. If we take part in online 
shopping, which is more and more the trend, our finances and expenditure habits become part 
of the digital machinery. Any photography we upload to social media, we immediately lose 
rights over. In fact, this applies to all of our information uploaded to social media. We give 
up the property of our information, so much so that in recent years a debate on the ‘right to be 
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forgotten’15 has underscored the discussion regarding the fact that online platforms refuse to 
erase or take down profiles of people, even of those that have passed away. We know all of 
this. The surveillance of our everyday life through the digital is patent; we know that 
anything and everything that we feed into the digital becomes a weapon of control:  
Every click that one makes is stored. Every step that one takes can be traced. We leave 
digital tracks everywhere. Our digital life is reflected, point for point, in the Net. The 
possibility of logging each and every aspect of life is replacing trust with complete 
control. Big Brother has ceded the throne to Big Data. The total recording of life is 
bringing the society of transparency to completion. (Han, 2017, p. 71) 
We know this. We know that the digital trace is undeniable, from the moment we make an 
email address, from the first online shop that we do, from the second we activate a social 
media account, and there is no going back. Moreover, we know that we do not have 
ownership over that digital trace, whatever we do, anything we “upload”, anything we 
“share” we lose possession over. Every click that one makes is stored. As the digital evolves, 
this reality reaches even more absurd levels. Today it is seen as ‘healthy’ and fashionable to 
allow an app to track your sleep pattern, or your water intake, or the number of steps you 
have taken. Our daily habits, as personal and intimate as they may be, are now also part of the 
digital and we give them willingly. We are always being watched, even when we cannot truly 
spell out who is watching us or from where. But, still, we feed the machine. We do so 
because this is the way in which we understand how to be a subject; we are created into this 
participatory surveillance scheme.  
We are made to participate and to take for granted. We take for granted what our own 
participation in such surveillance does. And we take for granted that this meaning we grant to 
being subjected through the digital is not ‘natural’. We are made to think that this is 
 
15 Debates and legalities around this topic centre themselves on the attempt to regulate the indefinite 
storage of personal information on web pages by different organisations (GDRP, 2021). 
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unescapable. How many times we might have thought “well yes, I know I am actively 
participating in my own surveillance, but I cannot escape it”, and so this seems to be reason 
enough to continue in actively participating in our own discipline. And so, like it was in the 
prison analysis offered by Foucault in 1976, in the digital we are normalized to take for 
granted the contingent, effectively depoliticizing us. The digital presents itself as 
incontestable, and by doing so it marginalizes and diminishes its political reality, and as 
subjects made by the digital, we buy this. 
The subjection process undergone through the digital is one that normalizes us into, 
precisely, not questioning such a process, or accepting such surveillance: “Subjectification 
takes a particular from in neoliberalism, in which subject self-defines in terms of their status 
for the external quantified gaze” (Moore and Robinson, 2015, p. 2). This is something which 
further underscored the value of Foucault’s tools of thought, for it allows it to be shown that 
we are made into subjects that have had not only our conducts normalized to a certain pattern 
but also our attitudes (Foucault in Moore and Robinson, 2015, p. 2). We might think that we 
are trying to contest, through certain key points of vigilance—the internet, laptops, 
smartphones, tablets—but we cannot really point towards the one who invigilates us, we can 
signal to structures, and agents, but, ultimately, we do not know who is the ultimate tower 
keeper of the panopticon. This takes us back to Gertz’s arguments about Facebook and how 
unproductive it is to equate Facebook with Zuckerberg, who of course is a key figure, but the 
vigilance of the digital goes beyond him. If it were not him, it would be someone else. Visible 
but unverifiable power. We have come to believe that our engagement in the digital space is 
freeing when, in fact, we live the most powerful and subtle of repressions. Visible but 
unverifiable power. We feed our information into the digital because we have been 
disciplined to be validated by the digital.  
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The digital self sees as normal the perpetual recording of its being. It is normal for the 
digital subject to record its every biological move: sleep patterns, number of steps taken, 
number of glasses of water drank in the day. It is not only normal, but desirable; doing so 
tells the quantified self something about their health. Quantification moves beyond biology: 
number of emails answered, number of ‘likes’ on social media, number of ‘friends’ on 
Facebook, number of ‘views’ on social media platforms. This quantification we equate with 
value, with worth, with a supposed purpose of life achieved. We have been made into 
subjects that understand through quantification, we have been stripped down to the number in 
order to become politically lacking subjects. This surveillance, discipline and our active 
participation in it, serve a purpose; power mechanisms are not gratuitous. Furthermore, this 
disciplined surveillance is one that does not uphold on its own, it is in need of other 
mechanisms. And, very much like Foucault himself pointed out, one of them is discourse 
itself.  
Mediation of Discourse  
It is not an odd idea to pose the digital as a space that controls or mediates the ideas being 
shared. One of the ways in which the digital has been signalled to in a critical manner is 
precisely because of the echo chambers it creates: through the digital people tend to only 
interact with people that think alike, which in turns makes it seem as if everyone thinks the 
same. This is one of the aspects which shows how little ‘free’ flow discourse has in the 
digital, which brings to the fore the second Foucauldian characteristic I will make use of to 
construct the digital subject. It was indeed Foucault’s genealogical stage that began by 
precisely offering an analysis of how discourse is mediated. In his inaugural lecture at the 
College de France, later published under the name The Order of Discourse, Foucault poses 
the query of “What is so perilous, then, in the fact people speak, and that their speech 
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proliferates? Where is the danger in that?” a question which he answers by offering the 
hypothesis that: 
In every society the production of discourse is controlled, selected, organised and 
redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its 
powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome 
materiality. (Foucault, 1971c, p. 8) 
What unravels from this lecture is the triad of terms that would characterize the next ten years 
of his work: knowledge-power-truth. Ultimately the argument becomes one of underscoring 
how Western society is one where the will to speak truth rules above anything else: we are 
forced to speak truth above anything else. But, if this truth is one that stems from a controlled 
discourse, what truth are we actually being forced to speak? By signalling to how intertwined 
power, knowledge and truth are, Foucault then poses the idea that there is in fact no scientific 
or objective knowledge or truth. If discourse is controlled, then so are truth and knowledge. 
Taking from Foucault, Wendy Brown states that “the representation that flows from speech is 
not without power; rather it is a vital field of its practice” (Brown, 2008, p. 71). Furthermore, 
by arguing that truth arising from a mediated power shows the falsehood of objectiveness and 
scientificity, he also hints towards power’s productive quality. Power is not only repressive, 
Foucault famously stated; if it were who would obey it? Power’s complexity and 
inescapability is not explained solely because of its repressive aspects, rather it is the 
productive dimension of power which proves extremely alluring. Power’s productive quality 
starts to tie in with the disciplinary aspect of the previous section. We are created, produced, 
to comply in certain respects, and one of the instances we are made to submit to is 
surveillance. 
I take that Foucault’s analysis of the mediation of discourse offers productive tools of 
analysis within the digital on two levels. Firstly, the simple, obvious and literal mediation of 
discourse that we find within the digital, that is: censorship. I have hinted at this in the 
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previous chapter by the use of Sunstein’s work. Our online interactions are carefully curated 
and manipulated by data companies and what we are shown has been preselected for us 
(Sunstein, 2017). The era f the digital is one of supposed easy access to information, but we 
do not really know what is actually the scope of the information nor the part of it that we are 
really seeing. This control of what we are exposed to serves a purpose, not only of 
‘censorship’, but of an objective simulation which produces truth and knowledge. There is a 
specific goal being chased in the construction of this curated discourse, a precise truth-power-
knowledge triad, which is built to purposely simulate being neutral and objective. The 
mediation of discourse on the superficial level is one that functions to create the production 
of a supposedly neutral discourse which veils its power mechanisms and inhibits critique—in 
other words, it depoliticizes. This should not be surprising, as Brown argued when analysing 
capitalism and media, the media is one of the key aspects for the thriving of capitalism and, 
thus, we cannot expect for media to be critical of that which it is helping uphold. Critique of 
the system cannot arise from the mechanisms that enforce the system (Brown, 2002, p. 563). 
Such an argument is relevant here, insofar as the digital is today one of the great upholding 
mechanisms of neoliberalism; why, then, would we expect to find within one of the core 
spaces of neoliberalism the tools to critique such system? And so, rather, what we are 
witnessing is the digital actively depoliticizing us.  
This simulation of the digital’s discourse being neutral and objective, almost natural, 
is what I take the second level of mediation of discourse to be, the mediation of not only what 
is said and what remains unsaid, but more so the mediation of meaning in itself. What I mean 
by this is that we have failed to take into account the meaning that the digital creates, and 
which undoubtedly creates us. The digital mediates a discourse, a meaning, that makes us. 
And this meaning is one that makes us take for granted the non-objective aspect of the digital. 
We are made by a discourse that presents itself as neutral, where the advancement of 
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technology is to be appreciated, and the downsides of it (surveillance and control) are 
presented, simply, as an inescapable part of this, and in such a way we are encouraged to 
continue feeding the machine. 
We are made into subjects in a tool-like space that, first and foremost, wants to be 
understood as natural, objective, given. There is a seclusion of its contingency, there is a 
seclusion of the political and, thus, we are depoliticized. The reader here might want to point 
out that through the digital we have seen and encountered valuable moments of social and 
political unrest, which is true and I do not mean to take away any value from them. However, 
I see these as periodic outbursts of ‘political’ outcry, those moments of supposed political 
indignation towards certain crises or injustices, which the digital, for a few brief moments, 
makes a priority. We are a society of outrage and scandal, says Han, but those aspects are 
ephemeral and dissipate soon in the digital (Han, 2017, p. 7) for they rise upon isolated 
individuals with no common spirit (Han, 2017, p. 10). People go online and post their 
political opinions. A piece of news will ignite anger and, thus, the expression of outcry on 
their online profiles, which might be followed by other people chiming in. But then, the day 
will carry on. Or, if the news is something of more magnitude, probably we will also join in a 
viral hashtag campaign. But, then again, not much will happen from it. As Zygmunt Bauman 
says, these periodic outcries do not hold within them the possibility of true political change 
due to their inadequacy in the face of human misery gestated in the new global ethical void 
(Bauman in Dahlberg and Siapera, 2007, p. 2). Or, in other words, the mere expressions of 
indignation, even if well intentioned, have nothing to grip onto if they are posed in a space 
empty of critical and political insight.  
Biopower  
Panoptic discipline and mediation of discourse are not separate aspects of the digital, rather, 
they are closely intertwined. The meaning which the digital creates, feeds into the 
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participatory nature we have within the disciplinary aspect of the digital, as I have argued. 
These are instances which in Foucault’s work itself are not separate either. The argument of 
discourse being mediated and as a result, truth and knowledge, implicates the argument 
offered for the disciplinary mechanisms of power. These two aspects meet at the end of the 
genealogical stage, they reach a climax, where Foucault argues that the idea of disciplining 
the mind and body is maximized through the idea of normalizing, subjection happens then 
through normalization. Or, in other words, biopower is born. Biopower was Foucault’s notion 
of a power that reached its maximum potential, power over life:  
[T]he set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human 
species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in 
other words, how, starting from the eighteenth century modern Western societies took 
on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species. This is 
roughly what I have called biopower. (Foucault, 2009, p. 1) 
Biopower becomes the medium of control between the “normal” and the “abnormal”, in and 
through life, as it normalizes—quantifies—the mind. In this last mutation of power, “the idea 
of sovereign of power makes room for the careful administration and control of population” 
(Han, 2017, p. 77). The careful administration and control of population is not something 
achieved in an explicit manner, but rather by the way in which subjects are already made into, 
to act in the way that is desired from them.  
As I try to move this argument towards the digital, I want to be clear in saying that I 
do not mean to say that the digital is the sole mechanism of normalization or that the digital 
and biopower are synonyms. Rather, the argument here is that the digital is one of the 
mechanisms that uphold the workings of biopower, or the hegemonic discourse, today, and it 
does so because it has proved itself extremely useful in this regard. The digital is one of the 
most effective mechanisms in dictating what is normal and what is not. We ‘understand’ the 
world through our screens. We deem as normal the perpetual feeding of our information to a 
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machine we do not own or really understand. We deem as normal that we must have an email 
account in order to be able to work. It is normal to count on the mobile phone as the baseline 
for any social interaction. It is normal to have an app, which we do not know who created or 
who commands, tell us how good a workout we did or how many glasses of water we must 
still drink to be labelled as ‘healthy’. We deem as normal the creation of an erasable virtual 
trace. We see as normal the elimination of the dividing line between work and home. We 
deem as normal, as understandable and acceptable, that more and more we merge into one 
with the digital, more and more we connect less with the world.16  
The digital seems to be in every part of our lives, it controls populations and we take it 
to be normal, natural, a given. It is this perceived sense of normality that precisely signals to 
the depoliticization that characterizes the digital, as it covers over contestation and 
contingency, as it sells itself a discourse sedimented for good with no possibility of change. 
We are made into subjects that will not see the digital’s normality as contingently 
constructed. Through the digital, the seclusion of the political that serves the grip of the 
neoliberal hegemonic discourse becomes actualized through the subjects that we become. 
Power over life: 
New media makes users more vulnerable to surveillance and other forms of control. 
Perhaps never before has the distinction between empowerment and vulnerability, 
between recognition and control, been thinner. (Brighenti quoted in Dahlgren, 2011, pp. 
98–99) 
We are vulnerable to the control and surveillance of the digital. We are vulnerable to 
understanding the world solely through the normalization the digital dictates. It is not, as I 
have been insistent upon, that the digital is in itself bad, I have made no normative argument. 
 
16  Juxtaposing these ideas to those of Baudrillard’s text Simulacra and Simulation (Baudrillard, 1981) 
would result in interesting further research. His text would be an invitation to further flesh out the 
interplay of reality and representation that underly my argument.  
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Rather, I have tried to signal its dangers, to the nuances that we resist exposing. And so, yes, 
while the digital can be seen as empowering as it allows for participation in politics, it also 
makes us vulnerable due to its surveillance. While the digital can grant us recognition as we 
see ourselves with more spaces to do politics, it no doubt also controls us.  
The underscoring of the aspect of control here is one that echoes Deleuze’s “Postscript of the 
Societies of Control”, where he makes the argument that what follows Foucault’s analysis of 
the disciplinary society is that of societies of control: the discipline that certain enclosed 
spaces enforced (family, school, factories, hospitals) starts to escape the specificity of 
location. Deleuze argues that while, in the disciplinary society “one was always starting 
again” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 5), in the societies of control “one is never finished with anything” 
(Deleuze, 1992, p. 5) because such societies instil their control through the openness, through 
the mutation of its medium, through the inescapability of consumption;17 aspects which 
resonate with the argument I am building regarding the digital. Deleuze says:  
There is no need to ask which is the toughest or most tolerable regime, for it is within 
each of them that liberating and enslaving forces confront one another. For example, 
in the crisis of the hospital as environment of enclosure, neighbourhood clinics, 
hospices, and day care could at first express new freedom, but they could participate 
as well in mechanisms of control that are equal to the harshest of confinements. There 
is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons. (Deleuze, 1992, p. 4) 
I find such an idea fitting with the portrayal of the digital I am offering. I am not interested in 
concluding the digital to be the most tool-like controlling space, nor am I trying to enclose it 
in a normative reading (either positive or negative). Rather, what I want to offer is a reading 
of the digital the underscores the complexities that make it, for only in such a way can we 
 
17 An interesting angle that could be added to further this discussion is the work of Jean Baudrillard in 
The Consumer Society (Baudrillard, 1970). The idea defended there being how consumption has 
become the major feature of society, so much so that humans now find themselves surrounded not by 
other human beings, but by objects (Baudrillard, 1970, p. 25). 
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bring new weapons to better critique and thus fight the hegemonic discourse. Nonetheless, 
before being able to convincingly make an argument for what such a ‘weapon’ would look 
like, I must first conclude the argument of that which the digital, in its control and 
inescapability, is creating.  
Useful and Docile Bodies 
Ultimately, these three aspects of Foucault’s thought come together into his argument of how 
bodies are created, offered in his text Discipline and Punish. While the idea of biopower is 
not explicitly drawn out in this text, and would rather be exposed in the next book of his to be 
published (the introduction to History of Sexuality), it is still evidently traceable. Discipline 
and Punish is an analysis of the historicity of the penitentiary system and its particular and 
contextual political economies, ultimately the rise and sedimentation of the prison as the only 
punishment system for law offenders is explained by it serving the objective of 
manufacturing useful and docile bodies (Lemke, 2019). I offered in chapter one an overview 
of Foucault’s work, in which I said that his analysis of the penitentiary system starts by 
signalling to prisons deemed as natural and objective, which begs the question, why: why do 
we take the prison as a natural and given part of the way we structure society? Foucault offers 
the juxtaposition of corporal and public punishment versus the timely regulated manner of 
inmates scheduled inside prisons, to highlight the incoherency of seeing the prison as the 
‘natural’ and perpetual form of punishment. The genealogical analysis offers a historically 
dependent account of political economies and their mutations to meet the needs of power 
within particular times and characteristics: from a sovereign power that thrives and reinstates 
its power through publicly punishing bodies, a penal reform in between to meet the economic 
needs of the time, to the finalized prison system being instated. If one looks at these events 
without questioning the context and the power mechanisms at play, one might, wrongly, 
conclude that the penal reform in between these two conceptions of sanctions had the purpose 
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of treating legal offenders in a more humane manner, placing their dignity as a matter of 
concern which then made the corporal and public punishment disappear. However, when one 
looks closer, at the role of the body, one can gather nuances that tell a different story. With 
the prison, the body remains as the target of punishment, even if not in the gruesome way that 
it was with the corporal punishment (Foucault, 1995, pp. 104–131). 
A genealogical analysis of the prison system, one that looks meticulously into the 
historical moments, context and into the micro power mechanisms (Foucault, 1971b, p. 145), 
brings to the fore that which power’s discourse had tried to disguise in a supposed concern 
for dignity, and shows that the mutation between forms of punishment has very little to do 
with a yearning for more humane treatment of criminals and, rather, more to do with finding 
the most efficient ways to punish. Succinctly put, the public corporal punishment represented 
an economic loss for the sovereign power for it was an event that presented a disruption in 
society given that the days prior to the punishment, parties and celebrations would be held. 
The penal reform intended to solve this issue more than the hideousness of the sentence. It 
was at this moment in history that the beginning of capitalism and the reign of the 
bourgeoisie was rapidly coming into being and the protection of the economy became 
paramount. Amongst the many ways in which the penal reform tried to safeguard the 
economy’s interest was with the prison and soon enough the prison showed itself to serve the 
economy in a profound way. In such a way, incarceration became the main form of 
castigation insofar that it maximized the benefits of punishment at the minimum cost. The 
prison system met the need of a penal economy that wanted to minimize costs and the prison 
showed just that: surveillance was more efficient than punishment. Such efficiency 
however—and this was the key—had not only to do with brute economic costs, but with how 
deep the prison system was implanted into the society. 
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The power of the prison is, thus, not restricted to the actual building of confinement 
but to the discourse of surveillance within society. Foucault uses the idea of the panopticon to 
exemplify this, a figure already described in the previous section. The brilliance of this 
architectural edifice is that the possibility of being watched is enough to instil control and 
good behaviour in the inmates. It is subtle, but knowing of the perpetual possibility of being 
watched is an extremely powerful mechanism of control. Moreover, and this is the key, this 
allegory is not only restricted and functional in the prison system per se, but to society as a 
whole. The prison is more so a symbolization of control.   
The prison, says Foucault, serves beyond the depriving of freedom to the criminal, it 
makes the rest of society think that they are free. There is the edifice of the prison and the 
citizens outside of it, what better proof of being free? This makes all the other spaces which 
serve as controlling mechanisms go unquestioned: how we are indoctrinated at school, the 
way the medical discourse impacts our lives, the supposedly objective discourse between 
state and citizens, and so on. And so, Discipline and Punish ends by making a case for how 
disciplinary power finds its maximization through normalizing power, which shows the 
beginning of what Foucault’s work on biopower will become: perpetual surveillance works 
because it is enacted by the normalized discourse of control. We see, as I have mentioned, the 
prison as ‘objective’, as the ‘natural’ way in which to punish the offenders. We understand 
schools and universities to be spaces of ‘scientific’ and ‘objective’ knowledge. We take 
madness to be ‘obviously’ placed as the counterpart of rationality and, thus, excluded by it. 
The normalized discourse of control is one embedded in the inner most parts of our societies 
and ourselves, our bodies. Discipline and Punish, then, is not making the argument of docile 
and useful bodies exclusively by pointing towards the individual body, but the social body in 
its entirety.  
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This move however from docility into being useful is performed in a particular way, 
in the upholding of the hegemonic discourse. Let’s bring this back to the digital’s 
mechanisms. The panoptic discipline of the digital, its visible but unverifiable power. We are 
aware of the perpetual possibility of being watched, and this is enough to continue to feed the 
machine that which it asks of us. Anything we feed we cannot take back, it is there out of our 
control. The mediation of discourse, the making of a digital meaning that makes us 
understand our lives through virtual screens, that makes us see the digital as understandable, 
desirable, incontestable. Docility of being controlled even in the most intimate aspects of our 
lives. The digital has, we can affirm, power over life. To be sure, I am not trying to make the 
argument that the digital is a prison but, rather, as Foucault himself made use of this 
architectural figure, I am drawing a parallel with the way that the digital today also serves the 
creation of useful and docile bodies. Bodies that, given the mechanisms that bring them 
about, live through quantification, individualization, seclusion to the virtual, all with the sole 
purpose of taking for granted the political.  
A docile and useful body, individual and social, to maintain the hegemonic discourse 
of the time. A docile and useful body as the one that takes for granted, that accepts without 
shadow of a doubt. Discourse not only as the speech dictated by the ruling figures but, most 
importantly, as the meaning that regulates life and body. Just as the meaning that makes the 
prison system into a ‘natural’ part of society, as the ‘obvious and objective’ manner of 
punishment, as that which allows for the ‘free society’ narrative to all those citizens that are 
out of the prison system, comes the meaning that makes the digital appear as incontestable, a 
neutral tool, a technological advancement not to be criticized. The docile and useful body of 
the unquestioned discourse. The useful and docile bodies that naturalizes the depoliticization 
of everyday life by secluding contingency.  
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Through the promise of empowerment, through disguising the complexities of 
political transformation by the number of ‘likes’ on a social media post, through making us 
believe that being able to tweet to the head of government actually poses significance, the 
digital has secluded the political. The digital has depoliticized the political. The political 
praxis has been relegated and secluded, and we see the public space more so devoted to the 
exercise of politics than the political. As discussed, the depoliticization we see in the “the 
significance of an issue or norm is systematically diminished or marginalized” (Roussos, 
2019, p. 267), which we see in the digital’s imposing of the taken for granted truth.  This is 
indeed the matter of the digital, for of course as I pose the digital to be part of a hegemonic 
discourse, I could only do so by admitting it as political: the digital is hegemonic precisely 
because it is political. But the gripping of the digital depends precisely on the discourse and 
mechanisms which it creates and upholds, and which makes us take them for granted. We 
have come to take for granted the discourse that makes us subjects, a discourse that is not in 
itself apolitical, but that secludes the exercise of critique of that which has made us be. The 
depoliticization that I see in the digital subject is, precisely, the absence of contestation, the 
seclusion of contingency and uncertainty. Or, to begin to bring this back to the care of the 
self, the depoliticization in the digital is the imposing of a certain truth. 
The Depoliticized Digital Subject   
The ideas underscored up until now (mediation of discourse, panoptic discipline, and 
biopower) characterize Foucault’s genealogical stage and reach a climax in his analysis of 
bodies, as I have also drawn out a parallel. These notions bring to the fore an understanding 
of power that can embrace everything including, of course, the subject. This is why, as I 
argued in chapter 2, contrary to many critiques, I do not see Foucault’s work as disconnected 
in between stages. From a stage of thought that culminates in an analysis of power that runs 
through the subjection process, what else but an analysis of the subject as resistance could 
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have followed? The subject made into particular characteristics and needs for the hegemonic 
discourse. In Discipline and Punish the following quote appears: 
Our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance; under the surface of images one 
invests bodies in depth; behind the great abstraction of exchange, there continues the 
meticulous, concrete training of useful forces; the circuits of communication are the 
supports of an accumulation and a centralization of knowledge; the play of signs 
defines the anchorages of power; it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is 
amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is 
carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies. 
(Foucault, 1995, p. 217) 
The individual is carefully fabricated. We are made into subjects. We are made into subjects 
by the articulation of contingent meaning. As I have drawn these Foucauldian tools of 
thought out of the digital, I have shown that we are made into subjects that participate in our 
surveillance through the mediated discourse that makes us take the digital as a given, as 
natural, as normal. The digital, as a mechanism to uphold the hegemonic discourse, serves to 
control populations through the farce of normality, much like biopower. We are, as the quote 
says, fabricated into and by a society of surveillance, by a society with disguised mechanisms 
that simulate themselves as empowering technological advancements.  
The normalized surveillance makes us then into depoliticized subjects. Depoliticized 
because it masks the contingency of the discourse, we are made to comprehend the world as 
one in which the digital is unequivocally given, and its functioning is incontestable masking 
in this way the contingency of its discourse. It is not only the digital that masks itself as 
incontestable, but also the way in which we are made into subjects. I have signalled to certain 
characteristics: quantification, (false) empowerment, symbiosis and seclusion, that make up 
the subject we are today, all of which work in securing the depoliticization that makes us. 
These aspects are, of course, not exhaustive, but they offer a well-rounded picture of the ways 
in by which the depoliticization is exemplified.  
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We count ourselves and allow ourselves to be counted. We understand the world 
through quantities and quantifications. Moore’s work signalled to this, the quantified subject 
exploited in the workplace, but as I underscored quantification goes beyond that. Today, we 
are counted and we count, as Han says. It is not only that within the workplace the employer 
quantifies us, as with the example of warehouse workers, but that we as employees also 
quantify ourselves in each of our workplaces. How many emails have I answered? How many 
clients have I tended to? How many words did I write today? And, beyond work: how many 
likes did my Facebook status received? How many people commented on my picture? How 
many people saw my latest restaurant picture? How many glasses of water have I drunk 
according to my health app? We have become so accustomed to counting and being counted 
that we see the world through numbers, and we lose sight of what is in between those 
numbers or what those numbers signify.  
We feel a sense of empowerment as we believe that, because of the tool-like aspects 
of the digital, this allows us to ‘feel’ as if we can have an impact on politics. Using the trendy 
hashtag, being able to tweet ‘directly’ at our politicians, being ‘free’ to post any opinion 
about anything, thinking that the world and politics work in the same mechanical way as the 
phone we are using to connect. We do not even care to realize the dangerous commodity 
fetishism symbiosis which rules us today. We are one with our gadgets; we are one with our 
phones, our tablets, and our laptops as we deem that it is through them that we achieve the 
validation of the quantified empowerment. This, of course, secludes us, it hides us from the 
world, it makes us captives of the tool-like space of the digital, it makes our gaze only 
concerned for the virtual screen and for what it asks from us.  
Our perpetual participation in the surveillance instilled upon us through a created 
meaning that controls us and entire populations in the most intimate way, exemplified by our 
understanding of the world as quantified, disciplined participation as empowerment and our 
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symbiosis and seclusion as biopower reaching every possible corner. We are made into 
depoliticized subjects insofar as we are made to offer no contestation to that which rules us. 
However, I must insist again that this is not a normative argument neither on the digital or its 
subject.  
I am not trying to conclude that the digital is the culprit of the depoliticized subject I 
have described. Rather, going back to Gane and Beer and their argument in their analysis of 
networks and individualism, they pose that: “It is not the internet that created a pattern of 
networked individualism, but it does provide an appropriate material support for 
individualism” (Gane and Beer, 2008, p. 23). So, mirroring this argument for my particular 
interest, it is not that that digital inherently possesses the characteristics of panoptic 
discipline, mediation of discourse and biopower, but rather that given its properties it 
provides an extremely productive support for these aspects. Simply put, I am not trying to 
claim that regardless of its context, the digital would always unequivocally create 
depoliticized subjects. Rather, given the hegemonic neoliberal discourse, its pervasive 
governmentality functioning takes hold of the digital and shapes it to meets its needs. Thus, 
precisely because my argument is not to say that the digital is the culprit, a critical study of 
the digital must then leave space for a re-envisioning of how this tool-like space can be 
understood differently. And this rests in the subject itself, and also in the space it inhabits. 
Having understood the space as that in which boundaries are constructed politically, this 
means that boundaries can be changed (Howarth, 2006, p. 119) which allows for us to rethink 
the relation between the inside and the outside of the space that constitutes the self and vice 
versa. The question then becomes: how to do this?  
How can we envision the digital differently, especially if the argument made up until 
now is how much it resembles Foucauldian characteristics? Where is the space left-over from 
the panoptic discipline and mediation of discourse that reach a climax through biopower? We 
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must not forget, as much as Foucault’s critics like to do, that all theorization of power and its 
mechanisms leave room for freedom and, thus, for resistance. If there was nothing to be done, 
then no theorization would even matter. Even in the analysis from where these Foucauldian 
power mechanisms stems, like that of the prison, there is still room for possibility. And such 
possibility I find it to be in the coming about of a new type of subjectivity through the care of 
the self. To this I turn in the next and final chapter, where I attempt to bring together the two 
arguments in this dissertation into a third and final one.  
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V. Chapter Five: The Critical (Digital) Subject.  
There have been, up until now, two core arguments offered in this dissertation. On the one 
hand, I have offered a close reading of Foucault’s care of the self and have defended it to be 
politically productive insofar it allows for a new type of subjectivity, a political one that 
reignites the possibility of critique. On the other, I have offered a critique of the digital space 
by highlighting the problematic subjectivity that arises from this space as one which is 
depoliticized. I have argued that such digital subjectivity is generated by highlighting three 
power mechanisms at work in the digital: mediation of discourse, panoptic discipline and 
biopower. Both contributions, however, have loose ends. I signalled at the end of the second 
chapter, the political reading of the care of the self, the practicality of such activity remained 
to be developed: how can we envision the care of the self in ‘practical terms’? The previous 
chapter finished by claiming that other possibilities within the digital can be found, but I have 
not fleshed this out. It is the task of this chapter to build upon these two foundational pillars a 
new type of subjectivity. 
I have highlighted that a reworking of his study on the care of the self allows us to 
start imagining a new subject. If we take the care of the self as a praxis in which the subject 
transforms itself through the bodily critique of limits, we can come to understand this as 
politically productive. In such a scenario, my analysis of the digital serves to exemplify in a 
less abstract way how to conceptualize this. The choosing of the digital is not coincidental; I 
have proposed it to serve as an exemplar of the hegemonic discourse today which makes us 
into subjects. It is not that our whole subjection process is entirely defined by the digital, but 
that focusing on such space serves to make the scope of analysis manageable within this 
thesis. So, the digital, being a mechanism of the hegemonic neoliberal discourse, is one of the 
important spaces that serves the subjection process of such discourse.   
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My loose definition of the digital served the purpose of allowing the reader to 
approach it through a more instinctual understanding, one that would provoke thought even if 
it was not a fully pinned down definition. Also, the phrasing of the definition served to 
emphasize this as not being a normative argument on the digital. Again, mirroring the 
argument of individualism not being inherent to networks (Gane and Beer, 2008, p. 23), it is 
not that that digital inherently possesses the characteristics of panoptic discipline, mediation 
of discourse and biopower, but rather that given its properties it provides an extremely 
productive support for these aspects. Simply put, I am not trying to claim that regardless of its 
context, the digital would always unequivocally create depoliticized subjects. Rather, given 
the hegemonic neoliberal discourse, its pervasive governmentality functioning, takes hold of 
the digital and shapes it to meets its needs. And, thus, precisely because my argument is not 
to say that the digital is the culprit, a critical study of the digital must then leave space for a 
re-envisioning of how this tool-like space can be understood differently.   
Taking Foucault’s own invitation to understand his work as a toolbox, I have taken 
key tools to argue how the digital resembles the creation of a particular type of body, of 
subject. I have constructed an argument where I pose that discourse—i.e., meaning—does not 
flow freely in the digital, and that this mediation is met by a panoptic like discipline, and 
these matters point towards understanding the digital mimicking biopower, power over life, 
and power and control over the population. I have argued this not only as a characteristic of 
the digital in of itself but because of the gadgets that come hand in hand with the digital: 
smartphones, tablets, smartwatches, laptops, all machines with which we form a symbiotic 
relation. This is an aspect which is becoming underscored in new media analysis: “as new 
media interfaces have become woven into the bodily and/or spatial materialities of everyday 
life, they have also been described as being ubiquitous or pervasive” (Gane and Beer, 2008, 
p. 60). The interface, the gadget that make the digital accessible, are becoming more and 
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more a part of us, making them and the digital pervasive and ubiquitous. Just like biopower, 
this is a ubiquitous power which merges into the body.  
The point of bringing to the fore these characteristics of the digital is not out of 
interest in the characteristics themselves but in what they represent for the subjection process. 
Our inhabiting of the digital, making use of it, makes us affected by it; we understand the 
world differently, we relate to each other in different ways, we cannot think that this tool-like 
space has no impact in the way in which we construct ourselves as subjects and the way we 
related and become subjects. And, the subjects we become, I have argued to be depoliticized, 
as we are made to take meaning as given, as objective, to take for granted all the mechanisms 
that make it and uphold it. Hence, the importance of a political reading of Foucault’s care of 
the self for a possible new subjectivity.  
The second chapter, the political reading of the care of the self, finished by hinting 
that it would be through the idea of askēsis where we would find the way through which to 
understand the bodily critique of limits in a more practical manner. Obviously, it is not meant 
that I want to argue for such practice and technique to be brought into our day-to-day life as 
they were practiced in Antiquity—this would be non-sensical. Rather, like a toolbox, it is 
about seeing what works for the task we are encountering and make use out of that. My call 
for reading the care of the self as a political productive activity today means to understand 
what was at its core as an activity in Antiquity and re-articulate this core to make use of it 
today. What was it about askēsis that made it significant in better understanding the practical 
manner of the care of the self, and how then do we bring it about today? As already advanced 
in pervious chapters, this is something which Foucault leaves unfinished, presenting a 
limitation in this work, and hence why this chapter will make use of complementary thoughts 
and analyses.  
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The framing by which Foucault began his tracing of the care of the self was through 
the underscoring of the ethico-political tension, in other words the juxtaposition of spirituality 
(the transformation the self needs to undergo to access truth) and philosophy (the already 
existing limits demarcating the access to truth). Simply put, from the start, the way the care of 
the self is contextualized by Foucault is through subject and truth, and the tension in which 
these two terms find themselves. We have seen how for Foucault there is a particular danger 
in the taking for granted of the subjection process (as the digital subject does). This danger 
stated differently could be phrased as the seclusion of the aforementioned tension between 
subject and truth. The care of the self read through the bodily critique of limits underscores 
such tension through askēsis, a praxis encapsulated by the poles of training and meditations. 
Training here read as the preparing for any possible life event, and meditation seen as an 
exercise of thought on thought. These pillars can be read to be referring to the experience of 
self-control (Lemke, 2019, p. 293). I will now return to the three aspects which allowed me to 
read the care of the self politically (the body, critique, and limits) reading them under the 
digital light, and fleshing out the aspect of askēsis.  
The Body  
The body was introduced when discussing how the care of the self moved from being an 
activity saved for a particular part of the population into a more generalized understanding; 
the pedagogical mode was replaced by the medical one, where to care for oneself is 
understood as being a doctor throughout one’s life. The role of the body then takes the role of 
the vessel that brings together the practice of caring for oneself; I took this to signify 
politically as the body being the site of resistance.  
Ethics in Foucault’s work is then primarily “a corporeal phenomenon; habits are 
‘constituted though the repetition of bodily acts’ making the  body the ‘locus of one’s ethos’” 
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(Disprose in Lloyd, 1997b, p. 88). The body as a site of resistance means precisely this. It 
signifies the place where the practice of askēsis becomes possible, as the activity which sets 
about the bodily acts that allow for the exercise of critique. The question then becomes, as to 
what this theoretical reading looked like in a more tangible manner, particularly in my 
reading of the paradigmatic example of the digital. Within my argument of the digital, the 
body has been a notion looming in the background as that which is being lost, as we become 
secluded in the digital, but at the same that which is facing the utmost control, through the 
digital symbiosis.  
The more we live our lives through the screen, the more it seems that our body 
becomes an afterthought. In his book Exposed, Bernard Harcourt points towards this as he 
proposes that the digital age is the time of two bodies: a digital permanent and mortal 
analogue one (Harcourt, 2015). As much as we would like to think of the digital as passing or 
ephemeral, the reality is that our digital trace is permanent, once we enter into the digital 
there is no way to erase ourselves from it. The moment we created an email account or a 
social media account, the moment when we decide to online shop, are moments we cannot 
take back. Very rarely can we delete such accounts, or such online financial patterns. We 
might be able to deactivate the account but never permanently delete them, because the 
digital trace is, precisely, perpetual. Within the digital age it is the digital body that seems to 
outrank the analogue one in importance, as paradoxical as that sounds, “if you are not on 
social media you do not exist” (Harcourt, 2015). One can no longer apply for a job interview 
without an email address to give as a form of contact; before a landline we are always asked 
for our mobile numbers; more so than hard print CVs we now need to have our LinkedIn or 
academia.net accounts up to date; all aspects which are further heightened within younger 
generations, those that truly do not know a world without the digital. We do not really seem 
to have the possibility to retreat from the digital without having our existence questioned. As 
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the digital more and more occupies the terrain of our everyday life, the space to step outside it 
becomes smaller and more alienating. What is, then, at stake by the loss of the body? And, 
even more so, what does this loss actually look like? 
The loss of the body seems at first glance an appropriate enough take on what the 
intricacy of the digital in our everyday lives means. And, on the one hand, it is a fair 
assessment. Like the instances I have just narrated, we seem to live at a time where our 
virtual presence carries more weight than our material and analogue one. But, on the other 
hand, our dependence on our body is simply undeniable, even for the digital. As undeniably 
perpetual as our digital trace is, so is our mortal material body. This introduces, precisely, one 
of the main debates with regards to digital analysis and media studies: the status of the body. 
Authors, like Katherine N. Hayles, continue to give the body a central space of importance, 
seen as the embodiment of information and consciousness. On the other hand, there are 
authors, like Friedrich Kittler, who refuse to give the body any type of analytical or 
ontological priority (Gane and Beer, 2008). Hayles is of the idea that it is wrong to split mind 
from body or, in media terms, software from hardware, as consciousness and information will 
always be embodied in a physical medium (Gane and Beer, 2008, p. 111). Kittler however 
argues that the media age has rendered indistinguishable the body from the machine and, 
furthermore, the body is not seen in its “humanness” but rather as an effect of technology 
(Gane and Beer, 2008, p. 114). My argument falls in between this spectrum. While, on the 
one hand, I do pose a particular emphasis to how the digital’s discourse seems to indicate the 
riddance of our body, on the other hand I find that such materiality cannot be denied, 
especially given that it is the thing which the digital clings most tightly to. It is a blurry line, 
that of the role of the body in the digital. But, it is precisely this blurriness which I want to 
emphasize, for it is there that the role of resistance, of practical askēsis, can be found.  
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To argue an idea of the body which is indistinguishable from the machine, to defend 
materiality as ‘extinguished’ signifies the offering of an argument which takes flesh to be 
subjected to the utmost control. However, it is not a control of the flesh for the control per se, 
but what that control serves and the way it shapes and makes the body. The material 
importance cannot be erased; it is taken to be of importance given that even that which 
escapes the material must inhabit somewhere. This gives priority then to the body in itself. If 
the argument is to be made that no matter how intricate the digital and the body are, the body 
is still something separate, then this means the body is not  fully ‘co-opted’, and hence, the 
body remains as a site from where contestation can happen. The debate, then, mirrors the 
theorization Foucault made of the body in his work: as utterly controlled in Discipline and 
Punish, and as the possibility of resistance in the account of History of Sexuality.  
Conceptualizing the body as both the ground of control—by its supposed 
elimination—and the site for resistance, sheds light on why Foucault turned to ethics after his 
genealogy on power. His turn to the subject was not a renunciation or an incoherent break, 
but rather it was the trace of this same line of thought that centres the body. Let us not forget 
that Foucault’s analysis of power culminates in the historical tracing of the prison system 
which serves, in his analysis, for the creation of docile and useful bodies. His turn to the 
ancient subject and its relation to its body, then, represents the attempt to understand how the 
same terrain for subjection can be a terrain for resistance. I have attempted to further 
underscore such arguments in the previous chapters. I have posed that one of those 
paramount subjection mechanisms of the hegemonic discourse is one that captures the body 
to the point it tries to ‘disappear’ it and, parallel to this, I have offered a reading of the care of 
the self which offers an understanding of the body as a site of resistance for the possibility of 
a new subjectivity. 
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Our body is more than just flesh, it makes us, it connects us to the world. If we are to 
‘lose’ our body we also lose skill, reality, and meaning as Hubert Dreyfus states in this 
analysis of The Internet (Dreyfus, 2001, p. 6). This is why the body signifies a terrain for the 
digital’s subjection process. And, precisely, this is why it is also the place from where 
resistance can arise. Our body is the starting point of resistance, as it is the starting point of 
the subjection process. Since it is the body that the digital grips on to, paradoxically through 
simulating its elimination, it is from that same flesh which resistance arises.  
I have signalled in the conclusion of the previous chapter the parallelism of the 
manner by which the digital and the prison make useful and docile bodies. Now, to be sure, I 
am not trying to make the argument that the digital is the equivalent of a prison or that the 
digital is a prison in itself. What I am trying to offer by delineating a similitude between the 
genealogy of the prison and the digital is how both spaces make use of the body, and how 
both spaces make the ‘natural’ or ‘taken for granted’ as their most forceful gripping 
mechanism for control. In other words, the digital, we can argue, also makes useful and 
docile bodies according to its needs. And in such a conceptualization of the body, as one 
which tries to make us see our materiality as ‘not as important’ and ‘natural’ given the digital 
world in which we live, there rests the digital’s power. How, then, do we regain the body? 
How to awaken this taken for granted control of our flesh? This, I take to be precisely the 
quest that Foucault was attempting to delineate in the work of The History of Sexuality; from 
the conclusion of the docile and useful body, followed the analysis of how such body can 
resist such normalizing discourse.  
As Foucault turns to Antiquity his analysis becomes heavily oriented, as we have 
seen, on the techniques of the self and the matter of experience (Lemke, 2019). There are, 
says Foucault following Habermas, three types of techniques: “the techniques that permit one 
to produce, to transform, to manipulate things; the techniques that permit one to use sign 
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systems; and finally, the techniques that permit one to determine the conduct of individuals, 
to impose certain objectives” (Foucault, 1997d, p. 177) or, simply put “techniques of 
production, techniques of signification or communication, and techniques of domination, 
respectively” (Foucault, 1997d, p. 177). However, Foucault will claim that in his studies and 
works, he became aware of another type of technique: 
Techniques that permit individual to effect, by their own means, a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies, their own souls, their own thoughts, their own 
conduct, and this in a manner to transform themselves, modify themselves […]. Let’s 
call these techniques “technologies of the self”. (Foucault, 1997d, p. 177) 
When wanting to create a genealogy of the subject in Western civilization, it is the 
juxtaposition of the techniques of the self and those of domination, where we should place 
our attention (Foucault, 1997d, p. 177). Discipline and Punish offers us the techniques of 
domination, and the return to Antiquity would give the techniques of the self. The subjected 
subject juxtaposed to the possibility of the subject making itself. In this dissertation, the 
digital poses the analysis of the techniques of domination, and the praxis of the care of the 
self in our present day fulfils the techniques of the self. To be sure, the idea here of 
‘techniques of domination’ must be understood as it is said, that which determines the 
conduct of individuals imposing certain objectives, but such determination and imposition are 
never fully closed, allowing for the possibility of resistance or, in other words, for the 
techniques of the self. This juxtaposition of techniques, I have also mentioned, can be 
understood or read through the idea of experience: the experience of how the subject is 
constructed versus the experience of how the subject makes itself; the experience of everyday 
life as a form of resistance; and the role of experience is that of the subject giving itself the 
right to critique the limits of truth (Lemke, 2019).  
The body was brought into conversation as the care of the self moved from a 
pedagogical to a medicinal understanding, the body being the vessel of the activity, the flesh 
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for which to care. This flesh, through the digital, has tried to be made meaningless, 
paradoxically, by gripping to it ever so tightly. We see here, as just exemplified, a parallelism 
to the useful and docile bodies versus the self as possibility for self-creation. Or, in other 
words, we see the juxtaposition of techniques of domination and techniques of the self, both 
stemming from and creating at the same time the bodily vessel. It is here, in the flesh, that the 
self finds itself living the experience of being made and also of becoming. It is this second 
aspect that the digital secludes, that which it tries to deny as it tries to fulfil a meaning of 
needlessness. By doing so, the digital takes hold of the everyday experience, equally 
mundane and equally powerful.  
Our everyday life, and thus experience, is mediated through the imposed truth of the 
digital subjects use of quantification, symbiosis, and normalized discipline. As Hartcourt 
notes, the truth the digital constructs is one which poses our existence in the digital more 
important than our materiality, if we don’t exist in social media we don’t exist. The digital’s 
imposed truth is one where a teenager with no social media would come to think and 
understand themselves as not having the capacity to socialise and interact. Think also, of how 
each of us would be perceived were we to say that we do not have an email account, when 
this is what is deemed today to be the first point of contact and communication. We take 
these impositions as natural, as obvious and understandable, because such is the 
normalization of the digital. We are made into docile and useful bodies insofar as we relegate 
our materiality. We take it to be logical and understandable that our existence is given to us 
by the intangibility of the digital rather than our flesh.  
And so, the starting point of envisioning a different way to understand the digital, for 
a new subjectivity to come about, is the regaining of this ever so controlled site. Our body, 
then, becomes the site of resistance, for it is through the flesh where the self finds itself 
dominated, but also, it is the place upon which it can become. The needlessness of our body 
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is an imposed truth which sets our conduct, and so, to regain it we must disclose the 
possibility of becoming through the making of our own truth. To regain our body, then, starts 
by critiquing this imposed truth and its limits.  
Critique  
The imposed truth grips onto the body as it constructs a meaning which attempts to relegate 
it. This makes the body not only the site of control but also the site of resistance through 
critique. To regain the body is that which the practicality of the care of the self through 
askēsis must achieve. The digital makes us believe that we can and must think of our body as 
mere flesh that simply carries us around. The digital makes us understand our body as 
something that we have and that serves its function by facilitating our connection to the 
digital. The digital constructs our bodies as the docile and useful bodies of the twenty-first 
century. Docility and utility evidenced precisely because we do not question, because we 
move through the digital taking its meaning as natural, as objective, as understandable; 
ultimately, we seem to offer no contestation. But, this ‘place’, the body, as the site of 
primordial control, as the space in which the useful and docile bodies of the twenty-first 
century are made, is the place where resistance can start. To regain the body, then, means to 
break from that imposed truth, which then calls for the exercise of critique. And so, the 
seizing of the body must come from, and is built from, the experience of the everyday 
resistance, which itself stems from the exercise of critique and the posing of the question 
“how not to be governed like that, by such truth”? 
Perhaps the critique could come about from the simple signalling of our body not 
being something that we have, as the digital’s truth tries to signify insofar that it makes the 
body into something we can leave behind, but rather understand that our body is that which 
we are. Here, I find particularly helpful bringing into conversation the ideas of Merleau 
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Ponty, particularly Marina Garces’ reading of him (Garcés, 2013). She poses that, precisely, 
the way in which Merleau Ponty brings about his philosophy of the body is through an 
understanding of the body as “that which I am, not that which I own”.  Diving into another 
complex thinker’s work, like that of Merleau Ponty, is well beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, especially well beyond the possibilities of this last chapter. In a very succinct 
way, Merleau Ponty critiqued the philosophy of conscience insofar that he took it as making 
us mistakenly conclude that ourselves, as individuals, and our bodies, are merely to be seen 
as opposing each other. In contrast, he argues for the understanding of a ‘we’, through the 
insistence that we cannot get about on our own - we are not individuals, but subjects. This 
‘we’, however, is not to be taken as a simple addition of subjects, rather, it is about the 
culmination of understanding the impossibility of individuality and, thus, achieving a plural 
anonymity which does not erase our singularities but gives meaning and identification to a 
collectivity (Garcés, 2013).  
I bring into the conversation these ideas of Merleau Ponty, because I take them to help 
in furthering the argument being built here, as well as complementing it. If it is the body 
where resistance must arise by the exercise of critiquing the imposed truth, then bringing to 
the fore an idea of the body as that which offers the possibility of our own truth and not the 
imposed one is a crucial and productive starting point for the possibility of this resistance. As 
the digital forces on us a truth that tries to relegate out material body, what such truth is doing 
is relegating our capacity to understand the world. Hubert Dreyfus says this in his work On 
the Internet (Dreyfus, 2001) where he critiques the internet’s discourse that constructs the 
body as something which we can go without, when the fact is that we are our body, and it is 
through our body that we make sense of the world. This is why I have tried to argue that the 
digital’s discourse, that makes us into subjects that illusively think we can go without out 
bodies, is one which seeks to depoliticize us. Our body is a political terrain, which if we 
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‘lose’ by thinking we can go about without it, are then losing politically. Our relation to the 
world depends on the body we are. The prioritization of our digital body signifies that our 
material body is secluded to private spheres, actively depoliticizing it. And so, to regain an 
understanding of our body as that which we are, opens the way for the coming about of 
collectivity and the public, that which gives possibility to the anonymous plurality.  
This brings us back to the importance of the tension between self and truth, and the 
need and importance for underscoring the ethico-political tension of our day, or, in other 
words, bringing to the fore the tension between the self-transformation needed to access truth 
and the already imposed access to truth; simply put, uncovering the taken for granted 
subjection process. The call of critique, not wanting to be governed like that, not seeing the 
body as dispensable, might seem as not powerful or not productive enough, but this is 
precisely what as digital subjects we are made to believe: if nothing can ever change, then 
why even question something? And while the posing of critique might not offer all the 
answers, the making of the interrogations: why?; why the digital?; why do we find it so 
understandable that we are one with the digital?; opens up a vast array of possibilities, 
because it is through critique that we achieve bringing to the fore the relation between 
philosophy and spirituality, between the truth that is given to us and the one we reach by self-
transformation. 
Lemke posits that for Foucault, critique is an ethical choice that creates itself out of 
nothing and opens rooms for freedom (Lemke, 2019, p. 293), a reading which is aligned with 
the argument being built here. The ethico-political tension, the juxtaposition between 
spirituality and philosophy, has the care of the self at its core. The care of the self, politically 
read, is an activity that calls for courage and opens room for freedom, for resistance. The 
subject takes the courage to critique the limits imposed upon him, enacting then a self-
transformation by the setting of new limits to its truth. As we critique the limits set upon us, 
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as we recognize that the limits may speak to a different truth, we exercise freedom and, thus, 
set the ground for alternatives, for other ways in which to imagine our world. Without 
freedom we cannot reimagine ourselves nor our world. To exercise critique might not seem 
as such a radical enterprise, but without it we cannot expect for any change. It is critique that 
allows imagining the possibility of an alternative.  
We can now start to truly develop how the idea of askēsis plays a role here. Again, 
this praxis is one that is to be understood between the pillars of meditation and training, with 
the practicing of self-control at its core (Lemke, 2019, p. 293). Meditation here is referencing 
an exercise of thought on thought, and the idea of training is the mental exercise which 
prepares one for diverse life outcomes, particularly through the enacting of abstinence and 
tests. Training and meditation, Foucault says, stand on a twofold base for askēsis. The first, 
that of true discourse making up the soul’s necessary equipment for life, giving the self-
capacity to confront life’s events as they come. The second, that of putting these true 
discourses to work, transforming truth into ethos, is where askēsis in the strict sense is found 
(Foucault, 2005, p. 416); to train to be prepared for life and turning truth into ethos or, 
differently phrased, turning truth into one’s own. Foucault notes that these aspects are not 
actually theorized in the thought he is making use of to construct his own work; there is the 
posing of the question for what is this life a preparation?, but no theorized answer is offered 
(Foucault, 2005, p. 446). Nonetheless, Foucault takes this missed theorization not as an 
accidental oversight from Stoicism but, rather, as an understanding of a gaining of autonomy 
of the care of the self with regards to its theoretical problems (Foucault, 2005, p. 445), 
creating, thus, a space in between theory and praxis.  
Let us remember that one of the reasons for Foucault’s interest in the care of the self 
envisioned by Stoicism, during the Hellenistic-Roman period, was precisely the argument for 
autonomy. In contrast to the Platonic-Socratic care of the self, envisioned to prepare young 
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rulers to be, the golden age sought a care of the self that, as Foucault reads it, understood the 
care of the self as an activity in and for the self, a perpetual preparation for life regardless of 
the profession-to-be. This generalization of the care of the self meant for Foucault for the 
activity to be gaining a sense of autonomy, insofar as its end rested in the self itself and not in 
its age or intended profession. Given this autonomy, this end in itself could also be read upon 
the same argument of autonomy from its theoretical moments, opening up space between 
theory and praxis. I take it that Foucault’s reading of the care of the self follows the tool-box 
like envisioning he had of his work, not setting any particular end. The lack of an answer to 
the question what is life a preparation for?, should be understood as providing a sense of 
autonomy, and this understanding takes its reasoning from the idea of the care of the self 
being a tool to be used, without granting it a set end beforehand. 
In this way, then, to read the care of the self as an activity which opens up possibility 
becomes all the more evident. Not having set a specific theorization of its end goal opens the 
way for freedom and new possibilities. We are preparing for something, whatever that might 
be, coming from the posing of critique, from finding ourselves in the tension of the imposed 
truth and our making of truth to regain our bodies. The transformation of truth into an ethos 
meant for the stoics the turning of the gaze onto itself, passing from a non-subject to the 
status of a subject. Or, in other words, it meant turning the gaze from the imposed truth to the 
truth of one’s own; from the truth of that which has made us into non subjects to the truth that 
we make ourselves, as we come to be subjects. We turn the gaze away from the digital’s 
imposed truth onto the work redefining our own truth, one to be found by preparing ourselves 
to live in a world without the digital. Not that I am arguing for an elimination of the digital, 
this is impossible, but rather that the thought exercise, the meditation, of envisioning such a 
world, is the path to allowing us to see the possibility of a truth which is not imposed.  
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A truth that may be found, in the asking, or the pausing to imagine our world without 
the digital. In a similar way as it was for the stoics to train for life’s most dark scenarios, even 
death, we can transgress the limits on the truth imposed on us by, simply, imagining what 
would be if those limits were not there. What if, we would dare to leave the house without 
our phones? What if next time we have lunch with a friend we make a conscious decision to 
not look at our phones all that time? What if next time we are angered by something online 
we try to engage in face-to-face conversation instead of posting on our Facebook and patting 
ourselves on the back?  
Much like the posing of the question, how not to be governed like that?, the queries in 
the above paragraph might not seem like enough, might not come across as radical enough 
when it comes to making the shift from theory to practice in the critique of the digital. It is 
not yet clear, I take it, for the reader how these queries offer new openings and possibilities 
for freedom. Rather, when thinking about critiques or breakings of the digital, most likely the 
examples that might come to mind are those of the whistle-blowers: Julian Assange, Chelsea 
Manning and Edward Snowden. Hartcourt analyses these examples, particularly Assange’s 
creation of WikiLeaks in an attempt to “turn the panopticon inside out”, in other words, to 
make the citizens the surveillants of the state, to be able to see into the most intimate parts of 
it, just like the state has been doing with our lives up until now (Harcourt, 2015, p. 267). The 
hacker collaborative Anonymous and their work into making more accessible important 
information for those that want to better protect their privacy on the web is also brought up 
(Harcourt, 2015, p. 271). However, as valuable and brave as these examples are, I do not 
think they get to the core of the digital issue. I do not mean to belittle them, or deny their 
importance and the courage that it has taken for these men and women to show the rest of the 
world how dangerous the digital is. But I still see these instances to remain constructed within 
the limits demarcated by the digital.  
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Snowden and Assange’s life are still in danger and under threat, Manning suffered 
enormously while imprisoned, and only recently lives ‘freely’. Anonymous remains, 
precisely, anonymous. The examples of trying to break the digital did not break it and were 
actually engulfed by the digital itself making them the ones at fault, the ones that have done 
something wrong. Their brave ‘wrong-doing’ has them living in exile, while the war crimes 
and frauds they exposed remain unpunished, and we, the citizens for whom they risked their 
lives, continue to feed the digital machine, upload our photos in search of ‘likes’, do online 
shopping, check our emails as if our life depended on it, buy the newest version of the smart 
gadget. The truth that the digital imposes on us remains unchallenged. These examples did 
not allow for the transgressing of an imposed truth into the making of our own truth, and this 
is why these brave women and men are the ones at fault.  
The irremediable permanency of the digital makes it harder to argue for possible 
alternatives or possibilities. Of course, no convincing argument could be made for a digital 
disobedience based on the eradicating of the digital. As Jodi Dean says in her analysis of 
collectivity as critique, the digital is here to stay whether we like it or not (Dean, 2019). 
However, the undeniable fact of the digital’s permanency should not limit our imagination for 
the resistance we can pose to it. On the contrary, it should be that which pushes us into 
reimagining; reimagining it, meditating it, training towards it. Otherwise, the extremely brave 
actions of those like Manning, Assange and Snowden will fall upon deaf ears. I think that 
Harcourt would agree with this, even if those were his examples, as the final conclusion of 
his analysis is the stating that, indeed, digital disobedience is still not clear, and the need for it 
is also the need for an ethics of the self (Harcourt, 2015, p. 283). In other words, the brave 
and heroic examples of digital disobedience like those mentioned will find no echo if they are 
received by the still depoliticized digital subject. A subject who continues to take for granted 
the digital imposed truth, who still understands life through quantification and symbiosis, a 
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digital made through normalized discipline, is not a subject that will be awoken by whistle-
blowers. Making an ethics of the self within the digital, exercising critique to regain the body, 
must signify a transgressing of the digital’s limits, opening ways for alternatives within our 
own truth. If exercises of thought on thought and the training that comes with them do not 
precede the attempt to tackle the digital, the actions will still fall in the exception as they have 
not yet managed to pose themselves as a possibility for alternatives beyond the ‘wrongdoing’, 
not managing to inscribe themselves in the experience of the everyday life, of the everyday 
resistance, that can only stem from a new subjectivity. Reimagining the digital must mean 
making our own truth, our own limits.  
Limits  
The body as the site of resistance, critique as its exercise and limits as its objective. To regain 
the body through critique, to pose new possibilities and alternatives to those imposed by the 
digital depends, then, on the limits, the awareness towards them and the transgressing of 
them. This is a Foucauldian idea which follows his thoughts on critique stemming from his 
reading of enlightenment. He takes from the meaning of this historical epoch that there is a 
call: to be able to know the limits of our epoch, those which make us, and a call for courage 
to be able to challenge them. The call for courage to be able to critique, to question, the 
imposed representations—as the exercise of meditation would do—and prove oneself as 
subject of truth (Sauquillo, 2017, p. 437).  
I have tried to set out until now the body as the site of resistance, critique as the 
exercise of resistance and, now, we turn to the limits as the objective. I have argued that the 
discourse of the digital is one which makes us lose sight of our body, even makes us think we 
can go without it, when in reality the digital is clinging ever so tightly to the body, subjecting 
it in its needs for perpetuating of the status quo. Even in this tight grip, there is still room for 
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resistance, and transformation of the imposed bodily truth. The care of the self, then, 
understood as an exercise of critique brings about the possibility of the making of one’s own 
truth. Such an exercise of critique is not any critique, but one which is framed by the poles of 
meditation and training; the posing of the question how not to be governed like that must be 
met by the preparation of the outcomes that such a query might have through the exercise of 
thought on thought. We must train ourselves into better navigating the digital on our terms 
and not the hegemonic ones. Practicing exercises of thought on thought to disclose the truth 
imposed and which we take for granted. And, in doing so transforming the imposed truth into 
our truth or, in other words, making the truth into ethos. An ethos to be enacted by the 
transgressing of the limits.  
What does resistance as the transgressing of limits mean? What does it mean to 
transgress the limits of the digital? How is it that training and meditation come into play in 
my envisioning of resistance? In 1983 Foucault, in a seminar in Berkeley University, talked 
about The Culture of the Self and offered a succinct but dense summary of his analysis of the 
care of the self. He discusses how the idea of caring for oneself, seen as occupying yourself 
with yourself for yourself, comes to show an idea of the self as that which comes about 
through the correlation of different technologies, or techniques. So the key aspect becomes 
how we can come to create new types of relationships to ourselves or, as in my reading, how 
we come about into new types of subjectivities. If the self is the result of the coming together 
of techniques and this makes the question about how to understand ourselves differently, this 
has then to be about understanding those techniques differently, and that can be as ‘simple’ as 
bringing them to the fore, as not taking them for granted. The limit is transgressed insofar it is 
signalled, as it is made visible.  
I have posed the digital to be representing the techniques of domination, those that 
determine the conduct of individual, whereas the care of the self speaks to the techniques of 
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the self, those that allow for the transformation of the self by the self. The juxtaposition of 
these allows the exposure of the ethico-political tension in between the imposed limits of 
truth and the self-transformation of accessing one’s own truth. The imposed truth, that which 
determines the conduct of the individual, tells the individual that there is only such truth, that 
there is no escaping it. The imposed truth of the digital, of its perpetual discipline, 
surveillance, of its mediated meaning, of its power over life, as it depoliticizes the subject by 
bringing to the fore the limits of truth as given, as objective. The digital’s truth thrives by 
secluding the hegemonic discourse’s socially constructed and contingent manner and, in such 
a manner, it determines the conduct of individuals. And so, juxtaposed are the techniques of 
the self, those that give the self the ability to self-transform, those that rest between training 
and meditation.  
Meditation as an exercise of thought and training as a preparation for life’s events. An 
exercise of thought which ignites again the political, as we come to understand that the truth 
we are now living is a constructed and imposed one, we come to see the contingency, the 
impossibility of fixation. We come to underscore that this is in fact a truth that demarcated 
and is itself demarcated by limits, and limits exist insofar they can be transgressed. We do not 
have to accept ourselves as subjects which are disciplined, invigilated, quantified, and made 
into peons of the upholding of a discourse that presents itself as objective and immobile. And 
so, we train for what this thought exercise will open in terms of possibilities.  
Indeed, to phrase the care of the self in this way offers no clear paths, no clear 
‘solutions’. In this reading, my reading, the care of the self allows for the envisioning of 
possibility but does not clarify what such possibilities may be. Foucault, then, did not intend 
for a universal principle of transgression but, rather, wanted to point towards the points where 
change is possible and desirable and grasp them (Foucault in Lloyd and Thacker, 1997, p. 4). 
And so, much like the criticism that Foucault faced, here the reader might then wonder why 
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would we embark on such a call? What is the purpose of a critical activity that leads into 
uncertainty? Furthermore, the reader might also think, why would this path be ‘better’ than 
the whistle-blowing examples which I argued as non-sufficient. The key aspect here is that 
the care of the self allows for the reimagining of the digital’s limits, as uncertain as it may be 
that it will end up looking. The care of the self allows for this because as I have been arguing 
in this thesis it is an activity that allows for a new subjectivity, and in doing so reimagines, 
transgresses the limits. The example of whistle-blowers attempts to work within the existing 
limits, the existing depoliticized digital subject. This is not to say that such examples are not 
useful in themselves, but that they have to be supported by something else, that something 
being what I am trying to flesh out through the self in the everyday. The digital, as it takes 
our body, it takes and grips our everyday, the mundane. If what the digital takes from us is 
our daily being, our everyday life, an exceptional activity such as hacking cannot be the 
answer, at least not the whole of it. Rather, to fulfil the call for the reimagining of limits, we 
must turn to the nuances of the everyday. 
Nonetheless, it is clear by now that we have reached a limitation in Foucault’s work. 
While the call for the care of the self is a call towards the uncertain, Foucault does not guide 
us into how to reach the path of such uncertainty. There is no tangible spelling out of the 
hows and whys of the envisioning of possibilities. We know that this is something set in 
between the experience of being made and the experience of becoming, and that in antique 
thought itself this signified an opening of a space between theory and praxis. And, all of this, 
happening in the everyday or, in other words, in the micro. So, any tangible envisioning of 
the care of the self through askēsis must fulfil such aspects.  
William Connolly’s ideas on micropolitics and the politics of becoming are useful 
here. When discussing Foucault’s work on ethics and the self, Connolly expresses concern 
precisely about the manner in which the theorization of the self was accounted for. 
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Particularly, Connolly claims that the arts of the self which Foucault theorized implied the 
imposing of disciplines onto the self to temper the demand of imposing disciplines on others, 
this as a result of the arts of the self not being met in a positive ethos of politics appropriate to 
a pluralist culture (Connolly, 1999, p. 153). This, as we have seen, is not an uncommon 
critique Foucault faced. For example, Lloyd recalls that Foucault is “condemned for not 
offering criteria to separate out those principles which are ‘suggested’ to individuals and 
those ‘imposed’ upon them” (Lloyd, 1997a, p. 294). Connolly’s critique would also be 
welcomed, I think, by Myers who we have seen deemed the Foucauldian subject not capable 
of caring for the world. Nonetheless, I do not take these reservations to be too problematic in 
bringing Connolly into conversation with my reworking of Foucault’s care of the self. After 
all, even with such critiques, Connolly did embrace certain parts of Foucault’s work.  
From Foucault, Connolly takes that “the self contains pools of “energy” and 
“impulses” that decentre these attempts at social unity and normalisation” (Connolly in Khan, 
2010, p. 167). In other words, and as Khan reads Connolly, he sees within the self a “capacity 
to work on the multitude of material forces that constitute his/her being” (Khan, 2010, p. 
167). In other words, Connolly, while sceptical on the role of imposition, finds value in 
Foucault’s techniques of the self. Connolly will understand the Foucauldian techniques of the 
self within his own framework of the relationship between the virtual and material forces, 
arguing that an effective politics of intervention must engage with unconscious forces that 
make our passions and culture (Khan, 2010, p. 168). We need then, if we are to follow 
Connolly, ways in which to dislodge and dislocate the unconscious. Khan takes this to be 
accomplished through the corporeal appealing to the unconscious (Khan, 2010, p. 169), what 
can be seen and understood as “tactics of resistance that induce an emotional or bodily effect 
such as disgust, repulsion, shock, horror, surprise or laughter [to have the] greatest impact in 
dislodging and unsettling attachments to sedimented ideas and practices” (Khan, 2010, p. 
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171); simply put, here we find the defence of the visceral response through and to the 
everyday taken for granted behaviours. 
This call for the dislocating of the unconscious, read through the visceral responses, is 
then a call for the coming about of new subjectivities, an aspect which Connolly further 
underscores in what he will call the politics of becoming:  
By the politics of becoming I mean that paradoxical politics by which new cultural 
identities are formed out of unexpected energies and institutionally congealed injuries. 
The politics of becoming emerges out of the energies, suffering, and lines of flight 
available to culturally defined differences in a particular institutional constellation. To 
the extent it succeeds in placing a new identity on the cultural field, the politics of 
becoming changes the shape and contour of already entrenched identities as well. 
(Connolly, 1999, p. 57) 
The overlapping between the politics of becoming and the care of the self read in a political 
light are striking. Connolly invites us to think of a politics that invites for the flourishing of 
new identities born out of the suffering—or governing. He further underscores and develops 
this thought through the discussion of relational arts and micropolitics. Connolly explains that 
the politics of becoming represents a modest but powerful political exercise when juxtaposed 
with relational arts. Here Connolly offers an example of how this would look: he poses the 
case of someone who firmly believes that death is something only to occur when God or 
nature mandates it, in other words a person who is against doctor-assisted death for 
terminally ill people. But, this person’s belief, when exposed to a larger variety and pool of 
understandings, might shift. If this person were to open themself to the stories of other 
people, maybe the terminally ill as their loved one, or were they to come into close contact 
with a terminally ill patient, they would ultimately understand their original position 
differently. The original positions shift as the subject lives through experiences of visceral 
and emotional reaction. It might not mean a radical change but rather that “what was 
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previously thought as non-negotiable gradually becomes rethinkable” (Connolly, 1999, p. 
147). This individual has now “worked artfully on [itself] in a modest but politically salient 
way. And the ethical effects of that work now inform the micropolitics in which [it] 
participates” (Connolly, 1999, p. 147).  
Such example of self-artistry calls for a back-and-forth movement between registers 
of subjectivity, or an exercise of thought on thought – or meletē. It is one where the process is 
not one you can control entirely and there is no guarantee of a result—much like I am 
admitting in the possibilities to come from the care of the self—so, you must train for the 
possibilities. There is no assured result, there is no clear path to ‘success’. As Connolly 
narrates: “these are the enchantments and risks of micropolitics. […] Arts of the self and 
micropolitics are two sides of the same coin” (Connolly, 1999, pp. 148–149). That which 
makes us and the possibility to make ourselves go hand in hand. In Foucauldian terms, 
governmentality and the technologies of the self are irretrievably linked, as one functions to 
sediment subjectivities, the other fights for the open space for creating anew. Because of this, 
as Connolly also comments, for the self-artistry to be successful it must be met by a 
“micropolitics receptivity that has been nurtured across several registers” (Connolly, 1999, p. 
149), precisely making the point as to why I find troubling the exemplification of whistle-
blowers as digital disobedience.  
I contended that the fact that these are examples, still enlisted within a ‘wrong-doing’ 
discourse, show that their significance did not grip us; we must open the possibility for the 
grip. In other words, the work done by the care of the self must meet the power mechanisms 
it is trying to fight on the same level. The resistance or disobedience offered by the work of 
whistle-blowers aims to dismantle and critique the ‘top’ level power mechanisms, hence why 
my argument is that they do not resonate on the lower levels, and are quickly digested by the 
digital and repurposed for further sedimentation of the hegemonic discourse. The techniques 
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of the self and micropolitics being two sides of the same coin means that their efficient 
working and, in turn, their dismantling, must be met on the same level. This is exemplified, 
precisely, by the body: it being the site of utmost control through the paradoxical discourse 
which claims it as unimportant and, precisely why I defend it to be the place from which 
resistance must arise. Ultimately, I take that the control of the body into its docility and 
usefulness corresponds to the control of the everyday.  
The control of the everyday: we live through the digital, our day to day is structured 
by it. We count our productivity in the number of answered emails, in the number of articles 
read. We measure our worth through said quantifiable productivity. Our day to day is 
structured by the digital, our desires, our pleasures, and our social interaction. We must 
answer work emails as soon as they come, and we do in our home space, meeting friends 
means posting it on social media, unwinding means online shopping, catching up with loved 
ones means video calls. The worth we give to ourselves is the one the digital indicates. The 
fact that it is almost unimaginable in going without the digital in our lives is a testament of 
how much is has been woven into our daily life. And so, the fight must also come from our 
daily life, reimagining the limits that have been made to demarcate it by an imposed truth.  
The Examples of the Everyday  
What if we dare to leave the house without our phones? What if next time we have lunch with 
a friend we make a conscious decision to not look at our phones at all during that time? What 
if we delete the email app from our phone? These examples towards which I signalled 
previously, while vague and seemingly superficial, I think could allow us to formulate, or 
rather, live an experience in which we could come to understand as rethinkable, or 
contestable, that which we previously took as objective and certain. To try, in our everyday 
life, to make some space between us and the gadgets towards which we hold symbiotic 
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relations, could be the first step into the regaining of the body and our everyday. Of course, 
this is something that has to be done with an awareness of what such an exercise might 
become. In other words, the posing of this space is one that has to be accompanied by a true 
critical take on what such space means.  
Much like Connolly who doesn’t pose the analysis on medical assisted death as a 
simple and superficial ‘change of mind’ but more so to an exercise done by the self where 
exposure to other ideas and minds is vital, here these examples intend to follow a similar train 
of thought. It would not be enough, nor is it my argument, to conclude from this dissertation 
that all that is needed is for us to try to look at our phones less, and the work is done. Rather, 
the space I am arguing for in between this symbiotic relation must be a space that allows for 
the exercise of thought on thought which calls for a critique of the imposed truth in the means 
of making one’s own truth, the true exercise of askēsis. In other words, it is not about the 
posing of less use of our phones and think the work is done, but to make that decision 
accompanied by training and meditation into where it might lead us. Allow ourselves 
stepping into the space of uncertainty having questioned what we once thought objective.  
The space created by the making of one’s own truth can then be filled by a different 
relation with the digital. Opening up a space through meditation and training, through the 
posing of scenarios that make contestable what was thought otherwise, should not be read as 
the denial or the erasing of the digital. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, the 
argument is not about the erasing of the digital; not only is this a non-achievable argument 
but it would also not be coherent with my negation of a normative take on the digital. I have 
contended that it is not that the digital is intrinsically a neoliberal upholding mechanism but, 
rather, because of its characteristics, it easily merges and serves the hegemonic discourse. I 
underscore this again, because this is why I pose the space to be drawn in the making of one’s 
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truth as a space that can be re-appropriated by another relation with the digital. It is within 
this space that examples like those of activism and whistle blowing can begin to grip.  
In her text “A Cyborg Manifesto” Donna Haraway analyses the boundaries of machine and 
flesh, and accounts for how our lives are undoubtedly intertwined with such technologies, 
and she poses that to better navigate this reality:  
 […] means embracing the skilful task or reconstructing the boundaries of daily life, 
in partial connection with others, in communication with all of our parts. It is not just 
that science and technology are possible means of great human satisfaction, as well as 
a matrix of complex dominations. Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze 
of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves. 
(Haraway, 2006, p. 147)   
Aligned with the argument being offered here, Haraway shows that the boundaries are to be 
reconstructed in our daily life. In A Hacker Manifesto McKenzie Wark argues that politics 
through hacking seek “to permeate existing states with a new state of existence, spreading the 
seed of an alternative practice of everyday life” (Wark, 2020, p. 423). The exercise of thought 
and training to create space between the self and the digital then allow for the collective 
critical work of the digital to grip. Let us recall the ideas of Merleau Ponty brought into this 
chapter to underscore that the body is not something that we have but rather, it is that which 
we are, and through that realization the collective can arise. The space that the making of 
one’s own truth opens up, the turning of what was thought as incontestable into contestable, 
happening through the body allows the coming about of a collective rising in a different 
discourse than the hegemonic one.  
So, to bring askēsis to the fore today, means to take the examples posed, as thought 
exercises that will open the way for the critiquing of the imposed truth. By posing questions 
and examples like “what if we delete the email app from our phone?” I mean to signal to the 
potential these thought exercises can open. It is through askēsis that a full and independent 
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relation of the self to the self by constituting truth telling to be the subject’s way of being can 
be achieved (Foucault, 2005, p. 327). In between the pillars of meletē and gymnasia, we find 
a central concern over the idea of self-mastery. Meletē we know refers to the imagining of 
possible events to test how one would react, whereas through the latter the self places itself in 
a real situation and tests the self’s independence to the external world (Foucault, 1997e, pp. 
239–240). Askēsis happens by the self through the self, the self makes itself as the object of 
tekhnē, and life becomes to be understood as a work of art (Foucault, 2005, p. 424). And so 
the thought exercises that I am proposing to explore are the askēsis of our time, for it is 
through training and meditation that they can achieve the underscoring of the imposed truth. 
For the self to ask these questions, it means for the self to undergo the critical exercise that is 
the care of the self and thus come to see that the digital’s truth is imposed, and that it has 
taken it for granted as natural and objective. And, in doing so, it must prepare for the 
alternatives this could bring about.  
Much like in Connolly’s example, the posing of these thought exercises should be 
read as modest but powerful exercises which allow for the unthinkable to be thought 
differently. Bringing to the fore these examples (leaving the house without our phones, 
deleting certain applications that blur home and work space, not looking at our phones, going 
for a run without tracking our progress, not fixating on the number of likes our social media 
receives) are not, of course, novel. However, what is particular in my offering is how these 
examples are read through the bodily critique of limits, or the exercising of askēsis. Such 
exercises on thought carried out through the political reading of the care of the self defended 
in this thesis, means that they must aim at the recovering of the body through the critique of 
limits. So, it is not just about deleting our email from our phone, but about what doing so 
opens up in the everyday with regards to our body and the making of our own truth. These 
examples then, are not finite in the sense that a finite and specific amount of time is required 
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of them, rather it is about them opening the possibility for further thought and experience. 
From the what if I delete my email from my phone, more questions will unravel. There is not a 
definite answer of what will be found, and so the self must be ready for the uncertain and 
unknown. After all, any exercise of critique leads to such a path.   
In conversation with Chomsky regarding human nature and justice, Foucault poses 
what he deems to be the paramount political task as that of “critiquing the workings of 
institutions apparently neutral and do so in a way that the political violence they enact is 
unmasked – if we fail to thoroughly criticizing power we run the risk of the “possibilities” 
posed in the aftermath to continue the reproduction of the same political violence even in the 
ways they seem noble” (Foucault, 1971a). I think this quote exemplifies well what I have 
argued in this thesis. To take the care of the self as the bodily critique of limits, results in a 
possibility through the critical task of refusing the taken for granted. I have argued that what 
is at stake here is the juxtaposition of the imposed truth and the subject’s own truth, or the 
conversion of power evidenced from the passing of a subject that was made to one that makes 
itself and, in doing so, underscores the supposed neutrality as one that is constructed and 
imposed.     
I have further underscored this through my analysis of the digital. I have offered a 
reading of the digital as one that makes a subject that, precisely, is depoliticized as it takes for 
granted the imposed truth, as it appreciates the tool-like space and the resulting subject as 
neutral, objective, understandable. If we fail to understand that the digital discourse is one far 
from neutral, and if we miss understanding that such a discourse is a powerful subjection 
mechanism, then we fail at being able to trace out alternatives and possibilities. If we miss 
this first step, then the reimagining of the digital becomes frustrated. It is through the bodily 
critique that transgresses limits that the envisioning of new possibilities can come about. The 
bodily critique of limits practiced through thought exercises questions the imposed, refuses it, 
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makes the self’s own truth through the negation of supposed neutrality. This, of course, does 
not lead to specific answers or instances. Rather, it ‘simply’ offers possibilities, possibilities 
which arise anew and are not set beforehand, making way for the creation of space. A space 
built upon the self’s own truth, not understood through quantification, symbiosis or seclusion, 
but, instead, through the flesh that makes it, allowing, through the recaptured everyday, the 





My motivation writing this thesis - a yearning to better understand the world in the hopes that 
achieving such an objective can bring change - is shared by most scholars that find 
themselves within the field of political theory. As I read, developed and wrote this 
dissertation I came to see that such hope might be better phrased not so much in advancing an 
understanding that will permit change, but more an understanding that excludes the static.  
I have throughout the previous five chapters offered three distinct contributions. The 
first: my political reading of Foucault through what I termed the bodily critique of limits. I 
have argued that Foucault’s thought, particularly his interest in the care of the self, can be 
reworked into offering political possibilities through the notions of the body, critique and 
limits. This first contribution is one that finds conversation with the body of work that reads 
Foucault’s interest in ethics as one that offers political potential. I speak against readings of 
Foucault that take his ideas on power to seclude any possibility of a politically productive 
subject. My political reading of the care of the self is one that remains critical towards works 
that take the Foucauldian subject as one that holds no space with the mechanisms that made it 
and, thus, has neither the ability or, more drastically, the desire, to critique (Žižek, 2002; 
Nealon, 2008; Castro, 2012; Allen, 2013; Myers, 2013; Castro-Gomez, 2015). By arguing 
against such an understanding of Foucault, I hold a conversation with the body of work that 
sees and highlights the role of freedom, possibility and resistance in the Foucauldian 
framework (Lloyd, 1997a; Butler, 2001; Luxon, 2008; Kelly, 2013b; Laidlaw, 2014; 
Sauquillo, 2017; Lemke, 2019). My reading of the care of the self as the bodily critique of 
limits is one which advances this body of work for it not only argues that there is possibility 
in the Foucauldian subject, but also by offering a theorization of such possibility through the 
underscoring of the body, critique and limits.   
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My second contribution speaks to my arguing for an account of the subject today as a 
depoliticized one, an argument which I built from the conceptualization of the digital as a 
complex and ambivalent tool-like space. I offered the digital to be an exemplary case of the 
subjection process which we undergo today, one characterized by quantification, symbiosis, 
and seclusion as a result of the mechanisms at play through the digital: mediation of 
discourse, discipline and biopower. I took particular inspiration in offering an account of the 
digital that would highlight its complexity (Bucher, 2019) and defending ambivalence against 
any normative take. Rather I aimed at constructing my argument regarding the digital through 
the various voices that feed into digital and media literature. From the pioneering works 
(Turkle, 1984; Poster, 1990), to the body of literature that has signalled to the undoubtedly 
close relation that the digital and democracy have formed, and its implications (Dahlgren, 
2007; Hands, 2007; Dahlberg, 2011; Tufekci, 2014a), and also underscoring the authors that 
have remained more critical on the role of this new technology (Gane and Beer, 2008; 
Harcourt, 2015; Moore and Robinson, 2016; Han, 2017; Dean, 2019).  
The bringing together of these voices, allows me to offer an account of the digital as a 
tool-like space, complex and ambivalent, which is characterised by quantification, symbiosis, 
seclusion and empowerment. Not only this, but I find my argument here to contribute in the 
taking further of each of these pieces of work insofar as I make the case for not fixating on 
each of the characteristics per se, but rather, I invite the unearthing of the mechanisms that 
allow them: mediation of discourse, discipline and biopower. In doing so, I find my argument 
to contribute to exemplifying how a Foucauldian framework still holds today in offering an 
analysis of the useful and docile bodies of the twenty-first century. In other words, I take here 
my contribution to not only be about the underscoring of a particular type of subject, but that 
I do so by reigniting Foucault’s genealogical thought through an analysis of digital media.  
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Lastly, by the bridging of both these arguments, I offer my third contribution as the 
defending of the role of thought exercises in the posing of possibility. Here, I admit to the 
limitation in Foucault’s work when wanting to unravel in a more practical manner how the 
care of the self offers a new subjectivity. While I take his invitation to look into askēsis 
through the pillars of meditation and training, such calling does not materialize into a 
practical conclusion. And so, I overcome this restraint by the inviting in of complementary 
voices in order to offer a defence of the body (Garcés, 2013) and of theorizing the uncertain 
through thought exercises (Connolly, 1999), which, by contesting the taken for granted, open 
up the possibility for new subjectivities.  
These thought exercises I have exemplified through the posing of seemly simple 
questions “what if I were to leave my house without my phone?”, for example. The posing of 
such questions is, I have argued, the first step to exercising the bodily critique of limits. It 
signifies a thought exercise which poses a modest but powerful political exercise, unfolding 
into the disclosing of contingency; it makes rethinkable that which was thought as 
incontestable. To introduce questions like the one just offered, or to invite actions like: not 
taking our phones during social times with friends, or deleting the email app from our 
phones, or not tracking our daily habits through smartwatches, we are opening up the 
possibility to understand our everyday differently and we are preparing towards what may 
come after. In this sense, I take my third and final contribution to be one that invites us to 
further the conversation of the body and thought through a Foucauldian framework. But, 
more importantly, I take that my offering of the role that thought can have in the coming 
about of a new subjectivity also invites the exploring of the role and potentiality that the 
uncertain can have in our trying to bring about change. Allow me to offer a brief overview of 
each of the chapters, before discussing the implications that stem from the arguments offered.  
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Overview of the Chapters  
The first chapter, Foucault’s Care of the Self, was one that presented an overview of 
Foucault’s thought, culminating in an analysis of his work on the care of the self. I traced 
how Foucault’s work is typically understood in a three-stage manner: archaeology, genealogy 
and ethics. At first the interest is the noting of the breaks in discourse formation, followed by 
a wondering of the mechanisms that allow for such ruptures, culminating in how the subject 
relates to such breaks. I then moved on to the true interest for the chapter: epimeleia heautou, 
or the care of the self. Such is a concept found within the wider project The History of 
Sexuality, a work that was left unfinished given Foucault’s death. The introduction of the care 
of the self in said project follows, says Foucault, the need to better understand the desiring 
subject, and how such a subject comes about. In other words, the care of the self is introduced 
in Foucault’s work in light of wanting to better understand how a certain type of subjectivity 
came about, particularly a subjectivity built by the subject itself. In this chapter, I narrate the 
historicity of the concept, and note particular attention to the Hellenistic-Roman period, 
which was for Foucault the key period when constructing the care of the self as an activity of 
cultivation of the self.  
In the second chapter, The Bodily Critique of Limits, I deepen the theoretical ground 
set out, and I argue in favour of rethinking Foucault’s care of the self by posing particular 
emphasis towards the body, critique and limits, thus allowing for the care of the self to be 
read as an activity which allows for a new (political) subjectivity. I argue that I do not 
understand Foucault’s interest in the idea of subjectivity as a breaking point from his previous 
work; rather, I see it as consequence following of the realization of a notion of power that has 
reached even the most intimate parts of what makes us. In the face of a notion of power that 
works to control entire populations through the making of useful and docile bodies, resistance 
should come precisely from those same bodies. I thus make a case for understanding the care 
179 
 
of the self as an embodied exercise of critique which seeks to transgress limits. This, 
however, does not tangibly or practically explain how a new subjectivity comes about, and so 
I underscore the idea of askēsis as the way through which we can more practically envision 
the rising of a subject. 
In the third chapter, The Digital, I turn to address that my call for a new type of 
subjectivity implies a critique of the current one. I frame the chapter through the analysis of 
the governed and governance, which I defend to be the subject and the digital. I take the 
digital as an exemplar case of the hegemonic discourse today. Moreover, I argue that the 
digital is to be understood as a tool-like space which is complex, nuanced and ambivalent. By 
underscoring such complexity certain characterisations came to the fore: quantification, 
seclusion and symbiosis. These aspects, however, are not my interest per se, but rather I 
signalled that my concern was for the role they played in the subjection process and, 
furthermore, what are the mechanisms that allowed them.   
Building upon the previous argument in the fourth chapter, The Depoliticized Digital 
Subject, I argue that the characteristics named in the previous chapter are not gratuitous, but 
rather respond to specific mechanisms which function through the digital: mediation of 
discourse, panoptic discipline and biopower. These mechanisms underscore that the tool-like 
space of the digital enforces a subjection process which brings about the useful and docile 
bodies of our time. The subject made through the digital is done so for the needs of the 
hegemonic discourse, it is depoliticized, as it sees the digital’s truth as unquestionable. The 
depoliticized digital subject understands the digital as objective, normal and incontestable.  
We arrive to the fifth and final chapter, The Digital (Critical) Subject, where I offered 
how my political reading of the care of the self serves to reignite politically the subject that 
results from the digital and, thus, brings about a new subjectivity. In order to do so, and by 
highlighting the role of askēsis (and its pillars of meditation and training), I underscore that a 
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‘fight’ versus the digital is one that calls for the body to be seen as the site of resistance, 
critique as its exercise and the transgressing of limits as its objective. The role of askēsis is 
here to show that there will be no clear result from this resistance; rather we must train and 
prepare for the uncertain through thought exercises. In this chapter, I also discussed the 
limitation faced within Foucault’s thought and, thus, complemented the discussion by 
bringing into conversation the idea of politics of becoming to further flesh out the idea of 
thought exercises. I concluded that such exercises underscore the political power that coming 
to contest something previously thought as unquestionable holds, finally making way for a 
new subject.  
Implications: The Public and The Collective 
This thesis has offered three distinct contributions. First, I have offered a reworking of 
Foucault’s ideas on the care of the self as an embodied political exercise of critique which 
can be read as a practice to bring about a new subjectivity. Secondly, I offered an account of 
the subject today by arguing for a conceptualization of the digital as a complex tool-like 
space. In doing so, I underscored the subjection process which we undergo in the digital, 
signalled to its worrying characteristics and mechanisms and argued that from it, a 
depoliticized digital subject emerges; one that takes for granted the possibility of 
contestation. The third, and final, contribution aims to bring together the first two in a 
productive way. I signalled to Foucault’s limitations and made use of complementing voices 
to better construct and exemplify what the bodily critique of limits would look like in a 
practical sense, ‘fighting’ against the depoliticized subject. I offered that a new subjectivity 
emerges from the digital through thought exercises of possibility.  
I have dedicated the entirety of my dissertation towards the political potential of the 
subject, defending it to be of value in the work of theorization and the starting point of praxis. 
I have made the subject the core idea of my work and I have done so by the use of Foucault, 
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commonly accused of theorizing an individualized subject secluded from the public, an 
aspect which even if I have by now discussed against extensively, might still leave a certain 
preoccupation with the place of the public in my overall work. Moreover, my analysis of the 
digital is one which flagged worrying ideas with regards to the public. In my discussion of 
the digital as a tool-like space I noted the idea of quantification, symbiosis, seclusion and a 
particular type of communication.  
 The digital I defined as “the exacerbated use of the internet through gadgets”, an 
admittedly very open and loose definition. I exemplified this definition by the use of 
everyday examples: the incessant checking of our phones, the allowing our phones to track 
our daily habits—from the hours slept to the number of steps taken and our hydration levels, 
the negative impact on our mental health from the number of ‘likes’ our social media post 
receive, the blurred lines between spaces as we carry with us our work everywhere we go. I 
used these examples to show the complex characteristics of this tool-like space. One of them 
being the quantification through which we now live, in the workforce and in our everyday 
lives (Lupton, 2013; Moore and Robinson, 2016; Han, 2017), the digital makes us into and 
through numbers. Also, and consequently, through the digital we establish symbiotic relations 
with gadgets that enable such quantification. We are ‘glued’ to the gadgets that give us 
quantified meaning; we panic if we don’t have our phones, we rather read the news through 
our screens than on print, we are fed the happenings of our world through livestreams, we are 
out for lunch with friends and we have our phones at the ready. How many times have we not 
all encountered a group of friends in silence and each only facing towards their phones? We 
have become secluded in the virtual. We are gripped through our screens, making us run the 
risk of forgetting that our lives are lived through the analogue, not the virtual (Turkle, 1984, 
2011; Dahlgren, 2011; Tufekci, 2014b). The digital, in its upholding of the hegemonic 
discourse, sells itself as attractive, as allowing and facilitating communication, and as 
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empowerment through an easier access to politics. But we have seen that aspects of 
censorship and commodification of communication show that it is not a free flowing of ideas 
that nurture the digital, but rather a calculated meaning (Sunstein, 2017; Dean, 2019). And so, 
the question then here becomes: what public sphere or collectivity can come from such a 
space? How to build a public space of critical deliberation from a stage that is set so skewed?  
 I have tried to underscore as the core of my thesis the value that rests within the idea 
of the subject. I have argued against a Foucauldian individualistic account of the subject and, 
rather, exemplified it as being one which is very much linked and theorized in unison with 
the care of the self being read as a social activity. I advanced this argument, as I contended 
that while the (individual) body is particularly important for my political reading of the care 
of the self, my understanding of the body is as the flesh which we are, not that which we own, 
contesting in this way an individualized subject. To understand the flesh as that which we are, 
is to understand the body in the possibility of the subject making itself, allowing for the self 
to enact the self-transformation in the making of its own truth. Such a reading of the body is 
one which fits with the way in which Foucault understood the care of the self, as an activity 
of cultivation of the self through the self but looking towards others (Foucault, 1986, p. 45). 
Let us remember that between its first and second historical moment, the care of the self 
passed from being an activity for rulers, towards being a more general activity, regardless of 
profession and age. This should not be taken to mean that the objective of looking towards 
the other was lost, quite the contrary. The importance of the other was heightened, as the 
other mattered not only in its role as citizen, but as a subject in itself. In this way, Foucault 
underscores that through the caring for itself the subject opens itself to the relation with 
others (Foucault, 1997f, p. 289). When bringing these ideas back to my own political reading 
of the care of the self and its implication for the public and the collective, I understand the 
purpose of caring for the self as an attempt to break the depoliticization barrier which makes 
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us understand ourselves as individual and secluded numbers. It is through the opening up of 
the possibility to contest that which is imposed, from which the collective may arise.  
 I have been insistent in not wanting to argue for a normative argument on the digital, 
as I have also insisted for my argument to not be one that advocates for the elimination of the 
digital. Rather, I defend the reimagination of the digital and I take this to be possible through 
the bringing of a new subject, one that by the conversion of power can also then convert the 
power mechanisms that allow for quantification, seclusion and symbiosis. The political 
reading of the care of the self thus challenges the imposed truth on us subjects and, 
consequently, the imposed truth on the possibility of the collective, of the public sphere. 
Today, the public is a space in which the depoliticized digital subject participates and makes. 
This is why I have contended my argument to be relevant even for those that have supposedly 
set themselves aside from the digital - they too reside within the public and the meaning that 
stems from such space. The reimagination of the public must come about from a self that, 
since its conception, turns to the other - a self that makes itself through a social activity and 
not an individualized one - and that is what I take the care of the self to offer. I thus take my 
argument to be an invitation to further explore the political possibility of the collective 
through the subject.  
Indeed, this takes me to another point I would like to discuss the implications of: the 
relation between the political and politics, and what stems from this. In my constructing of an 
understanding of the political in Foucault’s thought I made use of the differentiation between 
the political and politics. Foucault participated actively in politics, we could almost say that 
each of his texts and works were informed or inspired by the politics he was participating in 
at the time. Discipline and Punish was the culmination of his interest in prisons due to his 
involvement in Le Groupe d'information sur les prisons (The Prisons Information Group) 
with several other intellectuals of the time, for example. When it comes to the political, we 
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have seen he did not offer a succinct definition and, so, I have offered an account of what I 
take we can read as the political in Foucault, where the underscoring of contingency, and thus 
of freedom and the possibility of resistance, is of vital importance.  
What I find of interest here is the interplay of politics and the political in Foucault. 
Every theoretical undertaking in his work to tackle the secluding of contingency was 
informed by the politics of his everyday life. His interest in medical institutions, prisons, 
madness and sexuality all informed his yearning for the political. And, so I take that the 
arguments offered in this thesis help to offer a juxtaposition of politics and the political 
centred on the idea of struggle:  
In other words, Foucault’s political project is founded on the valorization of struggle. 
It is the human condition to exist within a system of power; it is the human potential to 
incessantly resist its reach, relocate its boundaries, and challenge its authority. The 
ethico-political choice to be made everyday consists in a judgement as to what form of 
power most threatens (the possibility of) its continued resistance. (Thiele, 1990, p. 918) 
I find the previous quote particularly helpful to ground the point I aim to make. I take 
it that reading the political through Foucault allows for the underscoring of the role and 
attention given to the everyday, to the mundane, in terms of the juxtaposition between the 
political and politics. Within this Foucauldian framework we see that the noting of 
contingency in theoretical claims is grounded by the analysis of politics. And, as exemplified 
through Foucault’s own example, this is not arbitrary but, rather, the underscoring of 
contingency must be done in the capillaries, in the everyday, for it is there where it became 
secluded. Every day we must make the decision to critique, to contest, because it is our 
everyday that which has been moulded most efficiently by the imposed truth. We have seen 
this through my reading of the care of the self; an activity lived through in the daily, not a 
one-off action that would be enough to set about change. And such an argument I culminated 
through the role of thought exercises, as ones that rest upon the everyday decision to exercise 
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them. Indeed, it is not enough for one singular thought exercise to critique the digital’s truth, 
the task is about the regaining of the everyday, and so they must be done constantly, daring to 
see what unfolds. 
Emphasizing the everyday results is particularly helpful for post-structuralism more 
generally speaking. A common critique, or problematic, scholars direct at poststructuralism is 
the heavy attention on the “matter of ontology at the expense of refinement of political 
concepts or a concrete analysis on of forms of power” (Khan, 2017, p. 552), a problematic 
which can be ameliorated by “an explicit shift to more concrete analysis forms of power and 
conditions of freedom” (Khan, 2017, p. 560). While this dissertation has focused on the idea 
of the subject through the political, I take that such an argument may be continued into the 
politics of the collective, as I am trying to argue now. In such a way, this work furthers 
poststructuralism theory in not stopping at the grand theorization of ontology, but to take 
such ideas into the concrete, for which I take Foucault to be a prime example for the 
aforementioned reasons. My reworking of Foucault’s thought shows that post-structuralist 
thought can offer both accounts of ontology and concrete analysis of forms of power that, in 
conjunction, serve to point towards political possibility.  
Simply put, I think that my discussion of the subject and the political, serves to show 
that there is a fruitful discussion to be advanced with regard to these terms and their relation 
to the collective and politics. The pairing of self-collective and political-politics are lived and 
accentuated through the everyday. It is there where the normalization of imposed truths grips 
strongly and there it is where we can begin to disclose contingency. Thought exercises that 
allow us to regain our everyday, that permit for the digital depoliticized subject to understand 
itself not as an individual body but as a body that it is, and that is within the possibility of the 
public. A subject that has refused the imposed truth of understanding itself as a quantified and 
secluded individual, such is a subject from which the public collective can arise.  
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Limitations, and the reimagination of the everyday  
No piece of research is ever truly complete, and this thesis, as any, has limitations. Or rather, 
more than limitations I would like to frame them as unanswered questions. I have theorized a 
care of the self to be a political activity read as the bodily critique of limits, and within the 
delineation of such concept, I have noted that there is a need for courage to embark upon the 
exercise of critique and that this is thus a personal choice. The coming about of such courage 
is an aspect which has remained unanswered. How to call for courage, how to make the 
subject leap into the uncertain exercise of critique? I think that the answer to this question is 
one that could be nurtured by taking a step further the role of emotions, of the visceral in our 
moving through the political. Taking from Connolly, as has been discussed, emotion and 
visceral responses pose important tools of analysis and possibility (Khan, 2010). Indeed, this 
also brings to the fore the question of the presupposition of a critical ethos already embedded 
in the subject that dares to embark upon thought exercises.  
However, and not wanting to dismiss the validity of such limitation, I think that the 
further thinking and debating of this quandary can only be productive. The urgency of better 
understanding the relation between emotion and the political has only been accentuated in 
recent years. To state that the practice of the care of the self is something that depends upon 
courage is to state that such is an activity which depends on emotion setting it about. We can 
say the same for the critique; it is built upon and embedded with emotion. And because of 
this, I take that the work posed here in this thesis is one that notes the necessity to further 
discuss emotion in our mundaneness, in our everyday and how to stem critical exercises from 
there. Now this, of course, would still not resolve what happens after critique is set about, 
which I take to be the second limitation of my work.  
Ultimately, I have made an argument for understanding the bodily critique of limits to 
be practiced through thought exercises and, thus, allowing for the possibility of a new 
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subjectivity. How this becomes actualized in what happens after, I have not shed light on. I 
have, then, defended, in a very much Foucauldian manner, the role of uncertainty. Even if we 
were to conclude in a way in which the courage to embark upon the critical exercise could be 
called upon, the activity set about by such courage still offers no clear path. The bodily 
critique of limits, as it points towards the opening of possibility, does not reach conclusions 
about what such a possibility would look like. This takes us back towards the same critiques 
that Foucault encountered, in his lack of clear paths and answers: his theoretical work always 
being driven by trying to better understand our present and what we are, by noting the taken 
for granted; and, indeed, posing theory in this way can be frustrating.  
This was advanced and admitted since the introduction: this thesis would not pursue 
any final answers, any recipe like solutions to the constructed problem. Not to conclude that 
the role of the uncertain is not without its problems but, rather, I take this limitation to offer 
the possibility of further exploring the political potential of the uncertain coming about from 
the analysis of that which we are today. I take it that more than focusing on what will come 
next in our theoretical undertaking, there is value to be better grappled with in the task of 
understanding that which we are today. And, today, I have argued we are subjects of the 
digital, living our lives through normalized quantification, symbiosis and seclusion, resulting 
in the taking for granted of such imposed truth. Today we are the incessant checking of our 
phones, we are the tracking of our health habits, we are the blurring of home and work 
spaces, we are the number value driven social interaction. And the theoretical analysis I have 
offered as a way to start contesting this which we are does not offer clear paths, but it does 
offer the idea of possibility and within that, it offers a refusal of the imposition. Foucault was 
insistent on this, in the power of offering a critical ontology of ourselves and our present 
(Foucault, 2007b), and then from such knowing we can then take the step toward refusal, 
refusing that which has been imposed upon us (Foucault, 1982).  
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Ultimately, I think this thesis serves to further a discussion in that an understanding of 
what we are, the refusing of such imposition and the struggle that results from it, need not be 
seen as pessimistic or frustrating given the lack of clarity in the steps to follow. Rather, I 
think that this should serve as an invitation to further explore the possibility of the uncertain 
and, in such a way, rest assured that while we might not know what is to come, we know that 
we have opened the way for that possibility. We may not be sure of the character and 
direction of the change that could follow from the struggle, but we know we have not 
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